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Abstract 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent rapid shifts in economic, political, and 
social institutional arrangements – labeled here as a “regime change” – offer a unique 
opportunity to explore how patterns of social inequality vary across broader institutional 
contexts and over time. How the stratification order between different social groups has 
changed in the aftermath of the regime change in Russia is a central question I raise in this 
thesis. In contrast to prior research, I draw on a life-course perspective and address several 
rather untouched aspects of social inequalities in Soviet and post-Soviet societies and 
investigate them in terms of school-to-work and work-to-school transitions in the earlier and 
later life courses. Empirically, I employ powerful longitudinal data from the Education and 
Employment Survey for Russia (EES) linked to the Russian Gender and Generation Survey 
(GGS), which cover life trajectories in a time-frame between 1965 and 2005. Compared with 
previous studies, that data enable me to utilize a much larger observation window to 
scrutinize long-term consequence of the regime change in Russia. 
First, I tackle social inequality in terms of horizontal gender differences and vertical gender 
inequalities upon labor market entry. My findings reveal that despite proclaimed equality 
principles, the school-to-work transition was by no means gender-neutral in Soviet Russia, 
with women facing a net vertical disadvantage in job authority. This inequality has increased 
even more since the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly due to worsening chances for 
female entrants. Second, I explore inequality of adult-educational opportunity due to initial 
educational level and occupational position. My results suggest that selective participation in 
adult education might lessen or exacerbate inequality of adult-educational opportunity 
depending on type of adult education and analyzed group of participants. Nonetheless, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union has contributed to inequality of adult-educational opportunity, 
thereby strengthening the exacerbation effects of adult education on social inequalities. Third, 
I investigate whether participation in adult education may improve career opportunities, 
thereby mitigating social inequalities that emerged in the earlier life course. My findings 
show that adult education either benefits all participants or those who are already advantaged. 
Overall, the results point to a mechanism of persistence or reinforcement of social 
inequalities. Furthermore, returns to adult education have decreased or been not offset since 
 
ii 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, throughout my thesis I put a particular focus on 
gender. Altogether, my findings unravel noteworthy gender inequalities arising in the initial 
career stages. These initial (dis-)advantages cumulate over men’s and women’s life courses, 
thereby contributing to overall social inequality in Russia, and specifically during the post-
Soviet period. I conclude that the regime change was accompanied by a widening of pre-
existing social distances and an effective amplification of the Russian society’s stratification 
order. 
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1 
Chapter 1  
Introduction and research questions 
1.1 The “natural experiment” of the regime change in Russia 
Studying post-socialist countries such as Russia provides an outstanding opportunity for the 
inquiry of social stratification, particularly due to the scale and the immediacy of major post-
Communist changes. On the one hand, these changes happened instantly, they embraced all 
spheres of social and economic life, and they are very apparent and relatively easy to trace. 
On the other hand, cultural structures, people’s habits, stereotypes, and strategies for living 
life and making life-course decisions change at a much slower rate: Culture is more inert. 
Hence, studying the Russian case offers a unique chance to examine institutional and cultural 
impacts and their mechanisms. 
From a sociological point of view, Russia’s society is an interesting example because “state 
socialism had a longer life there and was homegrown rather than imposed by a foreign 
occupying power” (Gerber & Hout, 1995, p. 612). In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), there was no competitive labor market, and the workers’ allocation, wage system, 
and consumption opportunities were circumscribed and controlled by the state. Workers’ 
mobility outside of governmental scenario (central planning system) was considered negative 
and undesirable. The whole Communist ideology was aimed at stabilization of the pre-
defined life and working tracks. 
For the socialist state, education was of the utmost importance as an instrument for building 
Communism and promoting economic and political growth (Noelke & Müller, 2011). 
Correspondingly, the state took over full control of the educational system and “determined” 
individual access to education and its social and economic outcomes (Titma & Saar, 1995). 
The ideological apparatus gave primacy to the prosperity of Soviet society rather than to 
aspirations and preferences of individuals (Gerber, 2003; Titma & Saar, 1995). At the same 
time, education was strongly vocationally oriented, and credentials played an important role 
in the labor market, assuring a smooth and secure transition from school to work and shaping 
life chances. As result, individual life courses were highly standardized, resulting in a high 
degree of stability and security (Mach, Mayer, & Pohoski, 1994).  
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The Communist regime aimed at minimizing social inequality on ideological grounds. This 
dogmatic view purported no antagonistic classes in the USSR and equal life chances for 
various social groups (Von Beyme, 1981). This notwithstanding, studies have found ample 
evidence that various forms of social inequality did exist in Soviet Russia (Yanowitch, 1977), 
e.g., in terms of income (Bergson, 1984; Dobson, 1977), gender pay gap (Katz, 1997), and 
education (Gerber & Hout, 1995). With the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991, the economy and 
the labor market changed immensely: Russia was hit by an “integration shock” that has led to 
massive restructuring of the labor market and to growing uncertainty (Gimpelson & Lippoldt, 
2001). These developments together with the initial orientation on the liberal welfare regime 
model (Davidova & Manning, 2009; Hanson & Teague, 2007; Kapeliushnikov, Kuznetsov, & 
Kuznetsova, 2011; Knell & Srholec, 2007) and redounded to dramatic decline in the living 
standards of Russian people (Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter, & Stolyarov, 2010). These 
turbulent processes of overall economic and market developments have undoubtedly had 
dramatic economic and social consequences with a great deal of unplanned job mobility and 
major life-course changes. 
1.2 Social inequality and regime change: the main research 
questions of this thesis 
Given such enormous upheavals in political, economic, and social institutions, this thesis 
addresses an important inquiry regarding how the regime change in Russia shaped patterns of 
“who gets what and why?” (Lenski, 1966, p. 3), i.e., of social inequality. Three questions are 
tackled: (1) To what extent did various forms of social inequality prevail under the 
Communist regime? (2) How has post-socialist transition to a market economy structured the 
patterns and the degree of social inequality? and (3) What processes have been driving these 
changes? Studying these questions for the example of Russia is particularly intriguing since 
Russia is a cradle for Communism and a country with a turbulent and uncertain 
transformation process in the aftermath of the Soviet Union collapse.  
Theoretical predictions stipulate that the introduction of market forces should have had a 
lessening effect on social inequalities as a result of moving from hierarchical social order to a 
liberalized market economy (Nee, 1991). Empirical findings, however, seem to refute this 
view (Verhoeven, Jansen, & Dessens, 2005) and regularly challenge Nee’s influential Market 
Transition Theory. For instance, transition to the market was found to be associated with 
growing income inequalities (Bian & Gerber, 2008; Verhoeven, 2007), an increase of 
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inequality in educational opportunity (Gerber, 2000a, 2007; Kogan, Gebel, & Noelke, 2012), 
and declining class mobility (Gerber & Hout, 2004; Rona-Tas, 1994; Saar, 2009).  
The inquiry on the regime change impact becomes particularly relevant when considering the 
immense bulk of cross-national literature examining (and anticipating) the role of 
institutional settings for social inequality (e.g., Allmendinger, 1989; H.-P. Blossfeld, Kilpi-
Jakonen, Vilhena, & Buchholz, 2014; H.-P. Blossfeld, Skopek, Triventi, & Buchholz, 2015; 
H.-P. Blossfeld & Stockmann, 1999; M. Buchmann & Charles, 1995; Dieckhoff, 2007; 
Estévez-Abe, 2006; Hout & DiPrete, 2006; Müller & Gangl, 2003; Müller & Shavit, 1998; 
Soskice, 1999; Steinmetz, 2012). While very helpful, the cross-comparative approach has 
some limitations that reduce the explanatory power and interpretation of the obtained results 
(Jowell, 1998) because countries differ strongly in respect to hardly comparable institutional 
structures, cultural aspects, and data and sample definitions. Nevertheless, comparative 
studies imply that regime change should have had an impact on life course patterns, but this 
is difficult to prove (Mayer, 2006). 
My thesis proposes another strategy to “measure the impact of institutions,” i.e., the impact 
of regime change. Drawing on a cross-temporal lens, I study change by comparing two 
periods of time, namely the Soviet period (1965-1990) and the Post-Soviet period (1991-
2005). This comparison allows for tracing the consequences of the “natural experiment” of 
fundamental economic and societal change, which took place after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Accordingly, if institutions determine specific patterns of social inequality, then we 
should find these effects when institutional structures change. 
Despite such a plentiful research field, sociologists have primarily focused on the 
liberalization reforms’ impact on intergenerational transmission of social advantage (C. 
Buchmann & Hannum, 2001; Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2010; Gerber & Hout, 2004; Robert & 
Bukodi, 2004; Rona-Tas, 1994; Saar, 2009; Zhou, Moen, & Tuma, 1998) and on the role of 
family background for educational opportunities in earlier life courses (P. N. Blossfeld, 
Blossfeld, & Blossfeld, 2015; Gerber & Hout, 1995; Gerber, 2000a, 2007; Heyns & Bialecki, 
1993; Kogan et al., 2012; Mateju, 1993; S. Szelényi & Aschaffenburg, 1993). Furthermore, 
the literature has tackled the issues of change in income inequalities (see Verhoeven et al., 
2005 for comprehensive review) as well as in returns to education (Bukodi, 2009; Gerber & 
Hout, 1998; Gerber, 2003; Konietzka & Bühler, 2010; Saar, Unt, & Kogan, 2008; Saar, 2005; 
Solga & Konietzka, 1999; Täht, Saar, & Unt, 2009) and to party membership (Geishecker & 
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Haisken-DeNew, 2004; Gerber & Hout, 1998; Gerber & Mayorova, 2010; Gerber, 2000b, 
2001b; Hanley, Yershova, & Anderson, 1995; Rona-Tas & Guseva, 2001; Shu & Davis, 
2003). Considerably less is known about how the regime change has influenced other aspects 
of social inequality, such as gender relations (however, see Brainerd, 2000; Gerber & 
Mayorova, 2006; van der Lippe & Fodor, 1998), intra-generational inequality patterns 
(however, see Ivančič, 2000; Mach, 2004), and inequality in educational opportunities in the 
later life course (however, for some indirect evidence, see Konietzka & Bühler, 2010). 
Accordingly, one of my core contributions to the sociological literature is tackling the 
specific aspects of social inequality that have been largely ignored by previous research on 
transition economies. 
Beyond being quite limited in scope in terms of the aspects of social inequality, the 
“transitional” literature is challenged regarding its timing aspects. Most of the research on 
transitional societies was instigated in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
In this context, three main problems should be considered: First, most of the surveyed data 
were cross-sectional, which did not allow studying and disentangling the impact of the 
regime change from other life-course-related modifications (e.g., changes in human capital 
and in job experience, family-related changes). Second, windows of observation were rather 
short and consequently too limited to enable conclusions about the regime change’s long-
term impact on social inequality, particularly because the establishment of the new economic 
and social institutions took time. Third, a lack of comprehensive longitudinal and life-history 
data constrained analyses in identifying causal mechanisms. All these aspects, in turn, have 
led to various inconclusive and often contradictory conclusions. 
My thesis contributes to the transitional literature by studying the regime change impact on 
various aspects of social inequalities based on the following case studies: (1) horizontal and 
vertical gender differences and inequalities at labor market entry, (2) the impact of initial 
educational and occupational resources on access to formal adult education, and (3) the role 
of adult education in lowering Matthew effects, i.e., inequalities due to initial educational and 
occupational attainment. In this sense, the first case study addresses social inequalities in 
terms of gender inequalities; the second case study approaches social inequalities in terms of 
inequality of (adult-)educational opportunity; and the third case study focuses on social 
inequality aspects from an intra-generational perspective. Contrary to previous research, I 
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adopt a life-course perspective and focus on the status attainment processes by studying the 
regime change impact on the career start and its developments.1 In this regard, I place an 
analytical focus on educational careers, which are decisive for the status attainment processes 
(Blau & Duncan, 1969). 
Empirically, I rely on well-suited longitudinal data for Russia – the linked data from the 
Gender and Generation Survey (GGS) and Education and Employment Survey (EES). These 
data cover a time span of twenty-five years of state socialism and fifteen years of post-
socialism. This forty-year period bore witness to stable and secure socialist life-course 
patterns and dramatic related changes to these patterns in the aftermath of the Soviet regime 
collapse. The data provide rich life-course information on educational, occupational, family, 
and residential career trajectories, thereby allowing the exploration of different aspects of 
social inequality in individual life course and their variation over the regime change in 
Russia. 
1.3 Life-course perspective on social inequality: educational 
trajectories by and during adulthood 
Education has been one of the most pivotal topics for scholars and policy-makers for several 
decades. Sociological research conceives of education and the organization of educational 
institutions as key factors for the analysis of stratification processes in modern societies 
because education is considered a channel for social mobility and status attainment. 
Economic studies discuss the role of education in terms of development and economic 
growth, educational choices and their subsequent returns, and how reforming the educational 
system may affect individual educational choices.  
At the micro-level, education is one of the most powerful assets throughout the individual life 
course, and not only determines one’s position at the time of labor market entry (Blau & 
Duncan, 1969) but also often limits the extent to which one can progress (Hillmert, 2011; 
Müller & Shavit, 1998). Until quite recently, educational attainment was considered “wholly 
prior to the first job” (Kerckhoff, 1995, p. 332). However, in knowledge-based societies, 
                                                
1 I additionally review and elaborate on other aspects of social inequalities that have been addressed in the 
literature on transitional societies. 
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education has become a lifelong process through which individuals acquire and develop skills 
and competences throughout the entire life span from all potential and available sources. 
Stratification research usually focuses on the analysis of different stages of the educational 
career separately, and their importance in terms of inequality is often discussed within a 
shorter time horizon. Due to the aforementioned reasons, it is crucial to map and to analyze 
the patterns and processes of education and training by and during adult phases of the life 
course to obtain a comprehensive picture. 
Life-course research has provided evidence for a so-called “Matthew effect” (Merton, 1968), 
or a cumulative disadvantage/advantage hypothesis (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006; Elman & 
O’Rand, 2004) predicting that (socio-economic) advantages in the earlier stages of 
educational careers are reproduced and amplified in later (educational) opportunities and 
outcomes. In other words, this effect predicts that initial educational inequalities grow over 
the life span, meaning that both education and labor market related inequalities are steadily 
amplified. This effect might have important consequences for the adult phase: Adult 
education is often considered to provide opportunities to reduce inequalities that have 
emerged over the life course because it might provide the chance to attain a higher 
educational level or to change the occupational field (H.-P. Blossfeld et al., 2014). However, 
if more-educated individuals have more opportunities for training and education in the later 
life course, adult education is likely to increase initial inequalities according to the Matthew 
effects. To draw the appropriate theoretical conclusions about educational inequalities over 
the life course, an understanding of the long-term effects of initial education is crucial, 
especially in terms of whether and to what extent this effect is reproduced and cumulated 
over the whole individual life course. 
In this regard, when discussing educational life-course trajectories in Russia, we should bear 
in mind that under the Soviet regime, individual choices were restricted and that “the state 
had a total control over the distribution of educational and social opportunities and over the 
criteria of educational selection” (Titma & Saar, 1995, p. 37). Hence, if educational 
trajectories were stratified, we can anticipate that they were not the result of the individual 
choices, but rather of Soviet policies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state 
monopoly on education was eliminated, and the educational system was decentralized and 
liberalized, which, in turn has led to “freedom of choice” in education and the subsequent 
educational expansion. However, this freedom has not been advantageous for every social 
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group, and educational choices and decisions (as well as educational outcomes) have become 
a matter of social selectivity.  
Although educational choices are individual decisions that are often circumscribed by family 
and socio-economic resources, previous research demonstrates that educational trajectories 
and payoffs are country-specific and are shaped by institutional settings, such as the 
organization of the educational system and the welfare regime (e.g., Allmendinger, 1989; H.-
P. Blossfeld & Stockmann, 1999; Dieckhoff, 2007; Müller & Shavit, 1998; Soskice, 1999). 
Accordingly, institutions are major sources of information for the extent to which educational 
systems sort students into different tracks and for the role of the certificates produced by 
them. Additionally, labor market structures and employment regulations are important for the 
level of market supply of educational opportunities and educational outcomes for the labor 
force (Dieckhoff, 2007; Soskice, 1999). Finally, welfare policies determine the role of the 
state in covering labor market risks and needs and influence chances for disadvantaged 
groups to participate in adult education (Kilpi-Jakonen, Vono de Vilhena, Kosyakova, 
Stenberg, & Blossfeld, 2012; Lassnigg, 2005; Rubenson & Desjardins, 2009). Therefore, by 
examining Soviet and post-Soviet Russia – characterized by distinct institutional structures 
before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union – I contribute to the further development of 
a systematic theoretical concept on how the entire institutional country framework shapes 
educational trajectories and (the resulting) social inequality. 
Against this background, I structure my analyses of the regime change on social inequalities 
in Russia along three specific stages in educational and occupational careers: (1) the school-
to-work transition at the beginning of the labor market career, (2) the work-to-school 
transitions (assuming that labor market entry has occurred), and (3) the consequences of the 
initial and adult school-to-work transitions for the labor market career in Soviet and post-
Soviet Russia. How I approach the defined objectives of my thesis is described in the 
following sub-section. 
1.4 Concept and outline of the study 
Social inequality is a multifaceted pervasive concept tackling the problematic of “unequal 
rewards or opportunities for different individuals within a group or groups within a society” 
(Scott & Marshall, 2009). The inequality of rewards and opportunities may arise during 
various life course stages and phases and cumulate over individual’s life course in a path-
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dependent way, often following the logic of the Matthew effect. The extent to which these 
commutations of initial advantages and disadvantages progress over the life course is argued 
to be contingent on a society’s institutional and cultural set-up. Cross-comparative research 
provides ample empirical evidence supporting those claims. In this type of research, scholars 
tend to (over-)emphasize the relevance of institutions and often assign to them a 
“deterministic” influence on individual life courses. If these postulations are valid than we 
should find changing patterns of social inequalities in countries experiencing gradual changes 
in their institutional arrangements. 
The central goal of my thesis is to address the impact of changing institutional and cultural 
frameworks – the regime change – on the several specific aspects of social inequality which 
has been overlooked by previous literature. In contrast to prior research, I draw on a life-
course perspective looking at various stages of the status attainment processes after the initial 
educational level has been achieved. Consequently, my empirical analyses are structured 
along the processes of school-to-work and work-to-school transitions in the earlier and later 
life courses. Figure 1–1 outlines the main concept of my thesis and dimensions of social 
inequality which I will elaborate on in my analyses.  
My investigation is clearly informed about the fact that social inequality arises very early in 
the life course and the process of attainment with regard to initial education. For that reason, I 
provide a comprehensive overview to the pertinent literature that makes the reader aware of 
important findings with respect to the emergence and prevalence of social inequality up to 
stage of labor market entry. In addition, my review is treating those issues specifically for 
transition societies during and after the communist regimes.  
In the first step of my empirical study, I focus on the initial school-to-work transition stage 
and approach social inequality from a gender perspective. In the second step, I explore the 
“work-back-to-school” transition process by focusing on inequality in participation in adult 
education due to (initial) educational and occupational attainment. In other words, I study 
inequality of adult-educational opportunity. In the third step, I devote to the “school-back-to-
work” transition in the later life course stages. I particularly address inequality in returns to 
adult education due to initial educational endowments. In other words, I assess the 
consequences of adult education for intra-generational mobility.  
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Figure 1–1: Theoretical concept of this thesis and empirical approach 
 
Note: Own illustration. 
This thesis consists of one introductory, one theoretical, one descriptive, and three empirical 
chapters consolidated by a common goal of scrutinizing the impact of the regime change on 
social inequalities in Russia. In the following, I outline the content of each chapter in more 
detail. 
In Chapter 2, I elaborate on the main research question of this thesis, namely whether and in 
what way the regime change has altered inequality structures among different social groups 
in Russia. First, I discuss the importance of institutional contexts from the life-course 
perspective. Life courses are viewed as cumulative, path-dependent flow charts embedded in 
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and structured by institutional arrangements. Therefore, when studying social inequalities, it 
is of the utmost importance to consider the contextual conditions and opportunities, 
particularly when these conditions and opportunities are changing, as in the immense regime 
shift that happened in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, the question of 
how the introduction of market-based institutions affected social inequalities in post-
Communist countries has caused a great deal of debate in the sociological literature. Hence, I 
contribute to this debate by incorporating the Russian case in more detail. Finally, I review 
and summarize the current literature on the impact the regime change has had on social 
inequality in countries with a socialist past. I close the chapter with a brief summary of the 
main arguments and formulate the overarching hypothesis of this thesis. 
As cross-national research has shown, country set-ups might “open some doors and close 
others”. Therefore, Chapter 3 is devoted to the description, analyses, and discussion of a 
historical context with a particular focus on the institutional and cultural framework in Russia 
during and after the Communist period. This macro-level environment is said to be crucial for 
the micro-level life courses and is relevant in this regard for the analyses in the following 
empirical chapters. Reviewing official legislation, as well as empirical and theoretical 
research, I outline the main features of the educational and vocational systems in Soviet 
Russia and the major changes and reforms that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Afterwards, I deliberate on Russia’s welfare regime, which encompasses (a) the 
characteristics of the labor market structure and the role of employment regulation, and (b) 
the welfare system and the role of state in covering risks for vulnerable groups. Finally, I 
address the issue of gender-specific policies and norms, as they are of particular relevance for 
this thesis.  
Chapter 4 describes the data used in the empirical investigations, overall data preparation 
process, and the sampling and construction of variables for empirical analyses. 
Chapter 5 investigates labor market and social inequality in respect to gender. The main focus 
is on changes in horizontal and vertical gender segregation in Russia upon labor market entry 
before and after the collapse of the Soviet regime. My results provide evidence for horizontal 
gender segregation across branches of the economy among labor market entrants in Russia, 
which have been growing since 1991. Moreover, horizontal differences seem to be driving 
vertical gender inequalities in terms of entry into authoritative positions. Accounting for 
heterogeneity in education and the entered branch, I find that despite gender equality 
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principles and full-time employment for women, vertical gender inequalities existed under 
the Soviet regime. However, these inequalities increased during the liberalization reforms. 
The growing vertical gender inequalities can mainly be traced back to a worsening of female 
chances in an economic transition, whereas there was no significant change for male entrants. 
Furthermore, women seem to be particularly disadvantaged among highly qualified entrants. 
I conclude that Russian female entrants have not fully converted their educational advantage 
into occupational opportunities since the transition from socialism to a liberalized market 
economy. 
Life-course research argues that initial advantages in educational careers are likely to be 
reproduced and amplified in later educational and labor market opportunities. Accordingly, 
Chapter 6 examines whether and how enrollment in distinct types of adult education – 
upgrading (defined as achieving a higher formal level of education) and sidestepping (defined 
as achieving the same or lower level of formal education) – can compensate for these initial 
inequalities in socialist and post-socialist Russia. Hence, I tackle the issue of unequal adult-
educational opportunities due to initial (educational and labor market) attainment. 
Furthermore, distinguishing between upgrading and sidestepping is an original contribution 
going beyond previous research and enables my analysis to shed more light on contradicting 
earlier findings. I have found that initially educationally disadvantaged individuals and 
occupationally advantaged individuals are more likely to upgrade. In turn, sidesteppers tend 
to be initially educationally advantaged, while occupational advantage is less relevant. 
Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union has reduced opportunities for all groups, 
particularly for the previously disadvantaged. I conclude that selective participation in adult 
education might lessen or exacerbate inequality in adult-educational opportunity depending 
on the type of adult education and analysed group of participants. Nevertheless, the regime 
change has clearly contributed to inequality of adult-educational opportunity, thereby 
strengthening the exacerbation effect of adult education on social inequality. 
Adult education may mitigate lifetime social inequalities by allowing educationally 
disadvantaged groups to catch up to their advantaged peers and thereby improve their career 
prospects. Challenging this idea, Chapter 7 examines returns to adult education and 
implications for social inequality in Russia from a intra-generational mobility perspective. 
Again, I differentiate between upgrading and sidestepping adult education strategies, because 
they are likely to provide distinct signals to the potential employers and, hence, may have 
different consequences for career outcomes. Results show that adult education either pays off 
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equally for all groups or benefits predominantly those who are initially already more 
educationally advantaged. Hence, initial social inequalities are not offset but rather amplified 
through adult education in Russia. Furthermore, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, adult 
education has become less effective in terms of career opportunities compared with the pre-
collapse period. My study highlights the importance of taking institutional set-ups into 
account when studying returns to adult education. 
In Chapter 8, I summarize the results of the empirical chapters and discuss their implication 
from several perspectives: (1) regime change and social inequality, (2) Market Transition 
Theory, (4) relevance of the contextual embeddedness, (5) gender, (6) Matthew effects, and 
(7) life-long education process. I wrap up the thesis by elaborating on limitations and 
recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Theoretical background: social inequalities in the life 
course and regime change 
2.1 Introduction 
Life-course approaches perceive individual life trajectories as a “sequence of activities or 
states and events in various life domains that span from birth to death” (Mayer, 2003, p. 464). 
Although individuals decide on their own life sequences, these life sequences can often be 
shaped by broader institutional contexts and by historical events. In this regard, individual 
opportunities and life patterns are often structured and challenged by the social forces in 
which they are embedded (Elder, Kirkpatrick Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003). 
Given the centrality of the “contextual” issue, the collapse of the Communist regime in 
Russia and the associated fundamental transformations in political, economic, and 
institutional structures provide a unique opportunity to study key ideas of the life-course 
approach. At the micro level, the collapse of the Soviet Union has altered life courses 
substantially, effectively bringing an end to the guaranteed employment and the secured life 
journey associated with it (in economic terms). At the macro level, the consequences of this 
abrupt social change include drops in employment, output, and real income, as well as the 
outbreak of poverty, unemployment and social inequality (Mayer, 2006; Noelke & Müller, 
2011). 
The overriding objective of the current chapter is to elaborate the general hypothesis of this 
thesis in respect to the impact of the regime change on social inequalities in Russia. For the 
purpose of deriving well-grounded expectations, I first discuss the relevance of assessing the 
institutional embeddedness of stratification in the life course. I constrain myself to education- 
and employment-related (adult) life-course trajectories and focus on two specific transitions, 
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namely (1) school-to-work and (2) work-to-school. 2 Following this, I turn to the market 
transition theory and its applications to social inequality. In the next step, I review available 
studies on the impact of regime change on various aspects of social inequality in countries 
with a socialist past. The chapter concludes by deriving the main hypothesis of the thesis. 
2.2 The life course and social inequality 
Generally speaking, conceptions of the life course assume that prior individual decisions and 
experiences shape later decisions and experiences, with various outcomes for various life 
journeys. In this context, the so-called “social pathways” encompass individual and group 
trajectories over the life course and are concerned with educational and occupational 
attainment, family formation, and residential area (Elder et al., 2003). Hence, individuals’ 
subsequent economic and non-economic outcomes throughout their life course are highly 
contingent on the previous decisions and experiences made along these social pathways.  
When talking about decisions and experiences, we intuitively assume that individuals have 
active roles of “casual agents in the construction of [their] environments and [them]selves” 
(Gecas, 2003, p. 369). However, the attainment of initial education highly depends on social 
origin and decisions made earlier by parents, whereas educational and working careers after 
the initial education stage are instead a construct of the individuals’ “active decision making” 
process. Therefore, studying whether and to what extent various social institutions might 
shape these decisions is worthwhile. However, before turning to a discussion on institutional 
arrangements, I provide a brief overview of the major developments in the literature 
concerned with social inequality that emerge in the phase prior active decision making, 
namely inequality due to family background. In the literature, this type of inequality is 
usually termed as early-life-course “inequality in educational opportunity.” 
2.2.1 Inequality in educational opportunity in the earlier life course 
During the twentieth century, the industrialized world experienced educational expansion and 
increasing educational opportunities for the masses. However, stratification in educational 
                                                
2 The school-to-work transition refers to employment trajectories after initial or adult education (assuming that 
initial education has been attained). The work-to-school transition refers to educational trajectories (assuming 
that labor market entry has occurred). For methodological details, see Chapter 4. 
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opportunities seems to be rather persistent; in almost all countries, children from families 
with lower socio-economic status are still facing lower chances of attaining higher 
educational levels (e.g., Ballarino, Bernardi, Requena, & Schadee, 2009; Breen, Luijkx, 
Müller, & Pollak, 2009; Rotman, Shavit, & Shalev, 2015; Shavit, Yaish, & Bar-Haim, 2007). 
Despite the prolongation of compulsory schooling, educational opportunities are still rather 
unequally distributed and are tightly connected with family background (H.-P. Blossfeld & 
Shavit, 1993; Boudon, 1974; Ganzeboom, Rijken, & Treiman, 2009; Mare, 1980; Rijken & 
Ganzeboom, 2000). For example, children from upper social strata have better access to pre-
school education and returns to it in form of higher school attainment (R. Becker & 
Lauterbach, 2008), they are more likely to be placed in higher secondary school tracks 
(Grand, Szulkin, & Tåhlin, 2005; Stocké, 2007; Tieben, 2009), they have higher subsequent 
educational achievements (Dustmann, 2001; Reimer & Pollak, 2009), and they are more 
likely to return to education (Hällsten, 2011) and to receive training at mature ages 
(Schömann & Becker, 1995). These findings stress that education is a highly cumulative 
process, which follows a principle of path-dependency labeled the “Mathew effect” (Merton, 
1968) and/or a logic of cumulative advantage and disadvantage (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006). The 
latter predicts that initial educational inequalities (due to the class differences) grow over the 
life span, meaning that both education and labor market related inequalities are steadily 
amplified. 
For decades, scholars from various fields of research have been trying to detect mechanisms 
behind educational decisions and inequality in educational opportunities (IEO) over the life 
course. Social origin is thereby crucial and is considered as a major driving force for the 
stratification process influencing (1) the class-dependent differences in educational decision-
making process (e.g., Boudon, 1974; Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; 
Esser, 1999; Gambetta, 1987), (2) the class-dependent differences in the beliefs and values 
about educational success and differences in educational preference (e.g., Hyman, 1966), and 
(3) the class-dependent differences in the educational opportunities (e.g., Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1971; Coleman, 1988; Sewell, Haller, & Ohlendorf, 1970).  
The literature in the IEO field differentiates between the so-called “primary” and “secondary” 
effects of social origin (Boudon, 1974). Primary effects incorporate the impact of social 
origin on educationally relevant competencies (academic performance). This means that 
upper social stratum has more resources relevant for learning and provides more stimulating 
environments for learning. Thus, primary effects might lead to class-dependent inequalities 
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before entering school. Secondary effects describe educational choices that children from 
different social strata make within the educational system. In this regard, social origin is 
crucial for the following educational decisions, even under the assumption of identical 
previous academic performance. The secondary effects are therefore decisive for educational 
inequalities. 
The main mechanism concerned with decisions of investment in education might be 
characterized as a “status maintenance motive”. In trying to maintain their status level, 
privileged classes share higher educational aspirations regarding their offspring’s educational 
careers because downward moves might be very “painful”. At the same time, for lower 
classes, less education does not necessarily associate with intergenerational status demotion 
(Boudon, 1974; see also Stocké, Blossfeld, Hoenig, & Sixt, 2011). In line with the concept of 
(relative) risk aversion, all classes aspire to avoid downward mobility (Breen & Goldthorpe, 
1997). However, the subjective perception of educational decisions works differently for 
different classes: A specific educational transition might be considered a downward move by 
higher classes, whereas middle classes might consider it status maintenance. For instance, 
upper classes might invest in (more expensive) education in order to maximize the 
probability of entering into the service class, whereas the working class might focus on the 
minimization of risks of entering the underclass.  
Class-related educational inequalities may further arise due to distinct value systems of 
classes, as well as their beliefs and attitudes (Hyman, 1966). A significant role is given to 
motivational aspects and self-confidence (Hyman, 1966), ambitions (Elder, 1968), reference 
groups, and peer-group effects (Singer, 1981), all of which vary among different classes. 
Lower classes might be generally less motivated to achieve great success. However, research 
indicates that those with a high level of abilities and high ambitions might show deviant 
behavior, implying an interaction between abilities and motivation (Elder, 1968). Lower 
classes face self-imposed barriers to upward mobility due to a strong conviction of less 
opportunities and inaccessibility of success. Additionally, they are also less motivated to 
reach traditional goals of high success, perhaps because they do not consider these goals to be 
traditional. As result, they might suffer less from the impact of their low status (Hyman, 
1966). Moreover, lower classes appear to be less motivated because of awareness of fewer 
(socially imposed) options, and they constrain themselves in order to avoid negative 
experiences of frustration and failure. 
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The role of reference groups and the influence of significant others on the self-evaluation 
processes and consequent behavior are no less important. The expectations of the significant 
reference groups can shape the learner’s educational and occupational aspirations, as 
reference groups might serve (1) as standards of comparison of an individual’s performance 
and (2) as a source of an individual’s norms, attitudes, and values (Singer, 1981; see also 
Sewell et al., 1970; Sewell, Haller, & Portes, 1969). Parental valuation of education might 
work as a mediating instrument in the educational aspiration of their children and their 
development in the following years, even if parents lack of opportunities to provide necessary 
resources to prepare academic skills and knowledge (see e.g., Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, 
& Pastorelli, 1996). However, the influential power of significant others might vary with the 
frequency of interpersonal contact and communication (Friedkin, 1993), parent-offspring 
closeness (Hoffman, Hofacker, & Goldsmith, 1992), and the strength of ties (Granovetter, 
1973). 
Furthermore, the social capital theory refers to possibilities of the upper social strata to 
mobilize social resources and their superior connections to others in order to attain better 
social status (Coleman, 1988). Cultural reproduction theory, in turn, states that students from 
upper social strata have a more advantaged position in the educational system due to their 
higher initial level of culture, which, in turn, is a “legitimate” culture in the school system 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1971; Bourdieu, 1986).  
To sum up, the underlying mechanisms discussed here highlight the existence of class-
specific social inequalities that emerge in the earlier life courses. However, research has also 
demonstrated that the impact of the socio-economic background is stronger in earlier stages 
of the educational career than in later ones (H.-P. Blossfeld & Shavit, 1993; Breen & 
Jonsson, 2005; Dustmann, 2001; Hällsten, 2011; Mayer & Tuma, 1990). Accordingly, in my 
thesis, I focus on the social inequalities that develop after initial education, yet I recognize 
their contingence on the inequalities that emerged during the initial phase of the educational 
attainment process. 
2.2.2 Education as a life-long and life-wide process 
Since the 1980s, the world has experienced a globalization process with important influence 
on the economic, social, and cultural spheres of life, and this process was accelerated through 
the rapid spread of information and communication technologies. Over the last decades, 
modern industrialized societies have shifted their focus from “manufacture-based” to 
 
18 
“service-driven” economies, leading to the wide recognition of “the importance of knowledge 
and intangible capital in fostering economic growth and social change” (Powell & Snellman, 
2004, p. 202). These developments have led to growing worldwide interconnectedness 
(Alasuutari, 2000; Robertson, 1992) and internalization, an intensification of economic 
competition, accelerated diffusion of knowledge, and a rising importance of markets (Mills & 
Blossfeld, 2005). Altogether, globalization forces modern societies to continuously adapt 
their economies and workforces and to adjust the workforces’ skills and knowledge to 
constantly changing demands (Kristensson Uggla, 2008).  
Moreover, in the aftermath of demographic aging, adult life expectancy, and reduced fertility 
(which have led to the increasing imbalance between those who contribute to the pension 
system and those who receive pensions), it has become necessary for companies and 
governments in modern societies to ensure that all potential workers remain in the labor 
market (Buchholz et al., 2011), e.g., by integrating and/or (re-)training those parts of the 
population that have so far been systematically excluded from employment (e.g., older 
employees, mothers, low-qualified workers, and migrants) (Kilpi-Jakonen, Buchholz, 
Dämmrich, McMullin, & Blossfeld, 2014).  
Under these conditions, education has been becoming a life-long process through which 
individuals acquire and improve their skills, knowledge, and competencies throughout the life 
course from pre-school to post-retirement age. Furthermore, education has become a life-
wide process that requires an increase in various types of learning (e.g., formal, non-formal 
and informal learning) across the full range of life activities in the personal, social, and 
professional context and that takes place at any stage in the life course (CEDEFOP 2008). As 
my dissertation deals with educational careers and labor market inequalities, the following 
discussion is limited to learning that is relevant for the labor market. 
Formal learning occurs in such hierarchical and stratified organizations as education or 
training institutions or in-company training and leads to recognized certificates or diplomas 
that strongly affect labor market chances. Formal learning is always intentional but is 
characterized by an other-directed learning environment since a person is “educated” in the 
formal learning environment, particularly in schools. Correspondingly, the roles of teachers 
and students are defined in a clear-cut way (Eurydice, 2011; Kleinert & Matthes, 2009). Non-
formal learning includes shorter institutionalized training courses that can lead to certificates 
(or to certificates that are not fully recognized), but not to a degree. Like formal learning, 
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non-formal learning is intentional and involves a teacher and a curriculum. It usually involves 
very (firm-)specific content and is often organized as a part of employment (including on-the-
job training). Informal learning is self-directed and involves intentional (learning organized 
by individuals themselves, e.g., reading books, learning groups) and unintentional (learning-
by-doing) learning activities. 
To conclude, educational careers are shaped by specific learning environments and cumulate 
across the life course. In the Russian context, however, it is likely that the labor market value 
of skills obtained via formal learning has been changing throughout the course of 
liberalization. In turn, skills obtained via non-formal (especially firm-specific) and informal 
learning might have been being strongly devaluated (Kapeliushnikov & Lukiyanova, 2010; 
Lehmann & Wadsworth, 2000; Mayer, 2006; Sabirianova, 2002). This seems to be a 
consequence of the removal of state-defined wage regulations as well as growing 
opportunities and incentives after the transition to the labor market and, hence, an increasing 
signaling role of educational degrees as signals for skills and productivity (Noelke & Müller, 
2011). Therefore, in the empirical part of my thesis, I focus on formal educational activities.  
2.2.3 Structural embeddedness of the stratification process 
According to the life-course approach, historically important societal events, such as wars, 
economic fluctuations, revolutions, and technological change, have enormous impact on life 
trajectories of individuals and cohorts. On the other hand, individual life courses are 
constructs of the choices and actions individuals make and take within the opportunities and 
constraints of the social structures and institutional environment (Elder et al., 2003; Müller & 
Shavit, 1998). In this respect, institutions can be considered as “mechanisms by which lives 
are channeled in specific ways” (Mayer, 2003, p. 163). This means that life courses are 
embedded in and framed by a historical context (e.g., Elder, 1994; Hareven, 1978, 1982) and 
structured by social institutions (e.g., Allmendinger & Hinz, 1997; Spilerman, 1977). 
Therefore, such enormous historical events as the regime change in Russia and the 
accompanying reforms to economic, political, and social institutions are likely to have been 
shaping individual life courses. 
But how do institutions shape life courses? In the sociological research, the “collective 
environment” of institutions often plays an important role in individual choices and decisions 
to participate in education as well as in constraining or facilitating educational returns to the 
labor market (Allmendinger, 1989). The institutional organization of the educational and 
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vocational training system, in particular, has a strong impact on an individual’s labor market 
entry and occupational mobility (which corresponds to the school-to-work phase mentioned 
above). For instance, the level of standardization, stratification, and vocational orientation of 
the educational system have been found to be crucial for the school-to-work transition and 
the labor market success of graduates because these institutional characteristics define the 
importance of the certificates and the level of occupational boundaries in the labor market 
(Allmendinger, 1989; H.-P. Blossfeld & Stockmann, 1999; Müller & Shavit, 1998; Saar et 
al., 2008).3 As result, educational certificates obtained in educational systems with different 
characteristics may produce different signals for employers (Rosenbaum, Takehiko, 
Settersten, & Maier, 1990).  
Educational systems further differ in the “openness” of educational pathways, e.g., in the 
permeability of educational tracks (Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2014). In knowledge-based societies, 
constantly changing demands call for a continuous adjustment of skills and knowledge within 
working life. This may be particularly true in countries in which the initial education 
transmits general as opposite to specific skills and in which labor market entrants thus first 
need on-the-job training in order to be useful to the employer (Müller & Shavit, 1998). 
Educational systems oriented towards the production of more general skills are also 
characterized by more common core curriculum, thereby facilitating the gaining an additional 
or new qualification (Kilpi-Jakonen, Vono de Vilhena, & Blossfeld, 2015). Educational 
systems producing more specific competences may also provide a favorable environment for 
returning to education in the later life course because of the fast erosion of the specific skills 
(Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, & Leuven, 2005; Groenez, Desmedt, & Nicaise, 
2007). 
While an organization of the educational system is more determining in respect to the 
attainment and accumulation of individual resources in signaling the worker’s suitability for a 
particular job, labor market regulations and the employment system are crucial in the 
employer’s decision-making process when hiring a worker. These institutions determine the 
                                                
3 Standardization describes the extent to which training conforms to the same standards and qualifications are 
widely recognized. Stratification describes the extent to which training is organized in a hierarchical structure. 
Occupational specificity describes the extent to which specific qualifications lead to and are required for 
specific occupations. 
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employment condition, risks and chances, and possible labor market outcomes of education 
(e.g., Breen, 2005; Müller & Gangl, 2003; Soskice, 1999). Moreover, labor law may regulate 
the labor market supply of adult learning, thereby shaping work-to-school transitions 
(Dieckhoff, Jungblut, & O’Connell, 2007). 
Finally, the level of de-commodification4 offered by the national welfare system has a strong 
impact on the role of the state in contributing to the individual’s options for learning and 
employment for vulnerable groups (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Lassnigg, 2005; Rubenson & 
Desjardins, 2009). Welfare state settings like labor market policy may be related to individual 
labor market chances and risks (Saar et al., 2008). Furthermore, gender-related policies and 
institutions, and societal gender norms are additional crucial aspects of welfare regimes that 
affect the interrelation between the labor market, (adult) educational opportunities, and 
family relations (Chang, 2000). By supporting a combination of education and/or work with 
family life, the family norms and policies can shape educational and occupational 
trajectories. 
Overall, life-course trajectories are (1) stratified and complex individual outcomes resulting 
from (2) cumulative processes of previous decisions and experiences that are (3) embedded in 
institutional structures. Therefore, changes in institutional structures are very likely to affect 
the stratification order in a country (Gerber, 2003). The potential direction of these effects is 
discussed in the following sections. 
2.3 Market transition and social inequality 
This thesis’s focus is on transitional societies, experiencing an immense political, economic, 
and social change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Transition to a market economy and 
the impact of such changes on the existing stratification order has caused a great deal of 
debate in the empirical literature (see Verhoeven et al., 2005 for the review). Some authors 
have claimed that liberalization reforms should have a lessening effect on social inequalities, 
which – despite the proclaimed equality ideology – did exist under the Communist regime 
(Nee & Matthews, 1996; Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996; I. Szelényi & Kostello, 1996; I. Szelényi, 
1978). Others, however, have argued the contrary, stating that capitalism advantaged the 
                                                
4 De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a 
livelihood without reliance on the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 22). 
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privileged classes (Rona-Tas, 1994). In the following, I briefly summarize the ongoing debate 
on the impact of regime change on social inequalities. I explicitly concentrate on Nee’s 
Market Transition Theory (MTT) and outline its main criticisms afterwards.  
2.3.1 Social inequality under State Socialism  
Despite the prevailing ideologies, there was no social equality under the Communist regime. 
Instead, the redistributive system was a major factor in reproducing and maintaining social 
inequalities (I. Szelényi, 1978). The state socialist system of redistribution was based on a 
hierarchy of redistributors (cadres) and producers in which resource allocation and income 
distribution followed central planning (Nee, 1989). In this system, the (political) bureaucracy 
was considered a new class under state socialism since control over means of production can 
be viewed as property rights (Djilas, 1957). Accordingly, as this class governed and 
controlled redistribution, inequality was present. In other words, on the one hand, more 
privileged groups had access and power over resources and their distribution, and on the 
other hand, they favored similar individuals. In this vein, the socialist system created 
advantages for those already advantaged via a redistributive allocation of scarce goods and 
services (I. Szelényi, 1978). 
For instance, in socialist Hungary, private housing was allowed but heavily subsidized by the 
state. In contrast to capitalist economies, access to subsidized housing was secured for those 
already privileged: Highly qualified workers received state-built and -owned flats, while 
working class had to build houses at their own expenses (I. Szelényi, 1978).  
Subsidized consumer prices were another effective mechanism for the reproduction of social 
inequality. The idea behind price subsidies was a value reallocation from higher to lower 
income groups via subsidization of the most important consumer goods, such as fruits and 
vegetables. Nevertheless, higher-status groups were said to be the primary beneficiaries of 
this policy because they consumed much more of the mostly subsidized goods compared with 
lower-status groups (Ladányi, 1975 as cited in I. Szelényi, 1978).  
Higher social strata (with managers and professionals far ahead) received more material (e.g., 
family allowance) and non-material subsidies (e.g., medical and educational allowances, 
pension plans) compared with the lower social strata, with the exception of the inactive 
population (who received the most of subsidies overall). Moreover, the privileged groups also 
enjoyed non-material benefits of higher quality, such as private hospital rooms, highly 
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qualified medical specialists, and better schools (D. S. Lane, 1982; I. Szelényi, 1978; 
Yanowitch, 1977).5 
Finally, parental affiliation with the Communist party significantly increased chances of their 
offspring’s being affiliated with the Communist party, demonstrating the intergenerational 
transmission process of privileged status (Hanley, 2003; Walder, Li, & Treiman, 2000). 
Altogether, the privileged enjoyed even more privileges, suggesting a cumulative life-course 
effect of the social advantage that was evidently further reproduced and maintained across 
generations. 
2.3.2 Transition to market: Decreasing social inequality? 
In contrast to the redistributive system, I. Szelényi (1978, p. 64) argued that liberalization 
reforms should reduce social inequalities as they predominantly serve “the interests of the 
working class.” In line with this belief, the example of China’s liberalization reforms in the 
agricultural sector has shown that peasants’ household income increased dramatically and the 
social gap between urban and rural inhabitants has shrunk sharply. This is primarily due to 
the increased prices of agricultural goods, which, on the one hand, has resulted in higher 
income of peasants and, on the other hand, inflated prices for urban strata, thereby 
condensing urban-rural income gap (Nee, 1989). 
Elaborating on Szelényi’s arguments, Nee (1989) has proposed the market transition theory 
(in the following, termed MTT). The MTT maintains that introduction and expansion of 
market institutions replaces the redistributive mechanisms in the allocation of goods and 
services. In the market economy, redistribution is based on horizontal relationships between 
(legally equal) buyers and sellers with prices based on mutual agreements. Thus, the former 
absolute control of redistributors over resources and power diminishes and shifts to the 
market participants, and market forces change the incentives of the producers and create new 
opportunity structures (Nee, 1989; Verhoeven et al., 2005). The restructuring of the property 
rights reduces “political power in competition over resources with power becoming market-
based” (Verhoeven et al., 2005, p. 202). These affect fundamental changes in the socio-
                                                
5 Inequality in access to privileges (such as housing) and other scarce goods and services might be justified 
because there was lower differentiation in wages among different occupational classes under the Communist 
regime. 
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economic attainment processes, with human capital being a major factor returning benefits in 
the labor market, whereas the returns to political power atrophy. 
In the original manuscript, Nee (1989) derived three coherent theses on which the MTT is 
grounded. These were (1) the market power thesis, (2) the market incentive thesis, and (3) the 
market opportunities thesis. 
Market power thesis: If surplus is no longer monopolized by the redistributive sector and 
exchange is market-based, redistributors lose power and control over resources in favor of a 
market. As a result, price setting becomes market-based (i.e., based on mutual agreements 
between buyers and sellers), which, in turn, favors producers (Nee, 1989). In this context, the 
redistributors “experience a relative loss” since their power is transferred to the market. 
Moreover, they also lose in terms of vanishing returns to political capital (such as party 
membership, Verhoeven et al., 2005), which was associated with various material and non-
material benefits under the Communist regime (Gerber, 2000b). 
Market incentives thesis: Redistributive systems reduce incentives as prices are usually below 
market-based and salaries do not allow for performance-adjustment (Nee, 1989). Market-
based prices are considered to be more efficient since they are based on mutual agreement 
between buyers and sellers, and the direct producers are able to retain a higher share of the 
surplus (Nee, 1989, p. 666). Accordingly, the introduction of market institutions benefits all 
market participants, stimulates efforts and raises incentives. Human capital becomes a major 
criterion for labor market attainment and human capital returns grow.  
Market opportunities thesis: The transition to the market economy opens up new 
opportunities that are above “bureaucratic advancement,” i.e., access to and mobility within 
the redistributive sector (Nee, 1989; Rona-Tas, 1994). Entrepreneurship provides such 
opportunities. Additionally, changes in property rights advance returns to private-sector 
employment, which is likely to be more market-based as compared with the public sector 
(Nee, 1989). The private sector tends to reward individual efforts, and these result in higher 
income for the private-sector employees (Verhoeven et al., 2005). 
Extending the MTT, Nee and Matthews (1996) claimed that as a result of the growing 
importance of human capital, gender-pay gap should also wane with the progression of the 
market reforms. Since the market rewards the effort, women should become more likely to 
invest in their human capital (see Verhoeven et al., 2005). Accordingly, the overall gender-
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pay inequalities should diminish in the transition process, and growing returns to human 
capital investments should favor women.  
According to Nee (1991), social inequalities should not increase as the previously 
disadvantaged benefit from the transition. This argument is premised by (a) compensating 
advantages and by (b) structural determination (Rona-Tas, 1994). Compensating advantage 
argues that the bureaucratic and market order of coordination each have their own exclusive 
set of preferred positions. As result, positions disfavored by the bureaucratic regime should 
be rewarded in the market. The structural determination argument, in turn, states that each 
individual and household has a specific position in the bureaucratic economy. Hence, change 
in economic order would change rewards attributed to the particular positions since the 
preferences in position ranking are mutually exclusive between the market and bureaucracy 
(Nee, 1991; Rona-Tas, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the author concedes that market reforms in the urban sector may result in 
persisting social inequalities because privatization reforms may benefit the redistributors due 
to their higher information awareness, the availability of resources, and better possibilities of 
accessing bank credits. Accordingly, the already advantaged would retain their positions 
resulting in an even “a greater initial continuity in the stratification order” (Nee, 1989, p. 
679). Nevertheless, these (network) advantages should decline after the transition period due 
to the inefficiency of bureaucratic entrepreneurs and the greater importance of transactions 
between direct buyers and sellers. 
2.4 Market transition theory: A critical view 
Empirical assessments of the MTT’s implications on social inequality have not yielded 
unequivocal findings, and the theory has often been criticized (Gerber & Hout, 1998; Rona-
Tas, 1994; Verhoeven et al., 2005; Walder, 1996, 2003). Empirical findings have rather 
pointed to increasing income inequality following the liberalization reforms in former Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries and urban China. Afterwards a decreasing trend in 
income inequalities can be observed in the CEE countries. In rural China, income inequality 
first decreased after the reforms and then increased (see Verhoeven et al., 2005 for literature 
overview). 
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2.4.1 Empirical testing 
Moreover, the “father” of the MTT, himself, did not provide consistent support for the MTT. 
Beyond the fact that the cadres enjoyed higher average income before and after reforms, 
cadres have been found to face an additional advantage (net of education) in the case of 
shifting to entrepreneurial activities (Nee, 1989). However, this has been argued to be a result 
of an effort that is valued by the market. What is ignored is the fact that the cadres might be 
able to take an advantage of power and networks in order to profit more from this effort 
compared with the non-cadres (Walder, 1996). The non-entrepreneur cadres bore an 
additional household income loss that, however, seems to not be statistically significant. 
These results, together with positive returns to education (as market “valued” resources), are 
interpreted as confirmatory evidence for the MTT (Nee, 1989; see Walder, 1996 for 
critisism). 
In contrast to these results, liberalization reforms have been found to have less impact on the 
modification of control power (Gerber & Hout, 1998). In many cases, managers were able to 
privatize the firms they ran during the Soviet Union or to retain control over them. 
Accordingly, former cadres were able to convert their political power into economic benefits 
probably because of their better access to social networks (Rona-Tas, 1994) and/or due to 
being a part of the technocratic elite (I. Szelényi & Kostello, 1996). Moreover, beyond human 
and social capital, cadres are likely to possess skills (e.g., bargaining, brokering, 
administering) valued in market-like economies. By the same token, the strategic positions of 
managers during the Soviet Era enabled the acquisition of favorable positions in the newly 
emerged markets, and these managers were quick to take the advantages in the new corporate 
segments of the private sector via entrepreneurial activities. Hence, in contrast to Nee’s 
(1989)’s findings, the introduction of the market forces is found to favor “entrepreneurship 
and managerial authority” but not to ameliorate human capital returns (Gerber & Hout, 
1998).6   It seems that in this transition, those who already possessed initial (economic) 
                                                
6 Geber & Hout (1998) conclude that human capital itself appears to be a factor less germane to income 
attainment during the liberalization reforms in Russia. Yet, one can have reasonable doubts on that claim. 
Recent meta studies have shown that education was (and is) a decisive tool for career and income attainment in 
Russia (e.g., Lukiyanova, 2010). Social networks as well as personality traits together with individual 
preferences, cultural norms and demand-side discrimination might be crucial factors on the individual level, 
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advantages, in particular, gained even more than those without such advantages (Rona-Tas, 
1994). 
Focusing on income attainment in the transformation processes Verhoeven et al. (2005) also 
found little support for MTT. Meta-analyses have demonstrated that the returns to political 
capital increased after the introduction of market forces in (urban) China, thereby providing 
no support for the market power hypotheses. Nevertheless, since the MTT predicted a relative 
loss, the hypothesis cannot be fully abolished. Furthermore, there is tentative support for the 
market incentive hypothesis in regard to the expected appreciation of education. The results 
underline the fact that human capital returns did not increase after the transformation process 
in (urban) China. Conversely, income returns to education as well as to labor market 
experience appear to decrease. For the CEE, the results indicate decreasing returns to labor 
market experience during the Communist era and increasing returns afterwards, while the 
returns to education suggest a constant increasing trend during the Communist era (the latter 
fact is in contrast with MTT predictions). In post-Soviet Russia, there was a rapid expansion 
in educational returns, which, however, ceased afterwards (Lukiyanova, 2010).7 The market 
opportunity thesis appears to be corroborated for both China and the CCE since the meta-
analyses show the positive effect on income of working in the private sector. However, there 
are no growing advantages with the procession of market reforms. Finally, the gender gap 
seems to have been growing during the transformation process in China and CEE (not 
statistically significant) (Verhoeven et al., 2005), and “women seem to have [had] trouble 
keeping up with the rapidly industrializing economy” (Verhoeven et al., 2005, p. 217). In 
Russia, women now face difficulties in the new markets (Gerber & Hout, 1998) (see Section 
2.5.3). 
                                                                                                                                                  
though human capital seems to be the most important factor on a structural level. In many cases, social and 
cultural capital may operate not independently but interdependently.   
7 The absence of the effect, however, might be due to the measurement of education in years instead of degree 
types (Verhoeven et al., 2005). Such a measurement does not reflect the increased value of academic education 
compared with vocational education (Flanagan, 1998). 
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2.4.2 Elaborations and extensions 
The problem with the MTT (also see Nee, 1989) is that even after decentralization, if the 
cadres still possess power over the resources needed for production – such as capital, labor, 
raw materials, technology, and social networks – the producers would be compelled to bribe 
cadres in order to gain access to these commodities. This issue has been tackled in further 
elaborations of the MTT. Nee (1991), for example, argues that the existence of such 
hierarchical relationships is strongly depended on how far the introduction of market 
coordination has gone. Additionally, the advocates of the MTT address the importance of the 
circumstances under which the market reforms are taking place (Cao & Nee, 2005; Nee, 
1989, 1991; I. Szelényi & Kostello, 1996). In this sense, the results of the market reforms are 
contingent on economic efficiency and on how power and privilege (previously held by 
redistributors) are redistributed during the transition processes from state socialism to the 
market economy. The rapid economic growth is believed to soften the struggle over power 
and privileges among various groups of interest. What is more, the more advanced a 
transition and introduction of market institutions is, the less “room” available for bureaucratic 
power of cadres is, and the more economic transactions would proceed directly between 
sellers and buyers (Nee, 1989, p. 668). 
As rebuttal to this point, (Rona-Tas, 1994) argues that “erosion of the socialist economy” 
keeps cadres away from the private sector because such secondary economy does not require 
higher skills and capital, offers rather small profits, and stills faces many restrictions imposed 
from above. Accordingly, due to its state dependence, this sector does not directly threaten 
cadres’ positions (Nee & Opper, 2010; Rona-Tas, 1994). With the market reform 
progression, the private sector has been growing in importance – which is inevitably 
connected with expanded profits. New modern segments of the economy, the possibility of 
the privatization of state ownership, and opportunities for capital accumulation all develop. 
Since dependence on the state vanishes, the cadres’ former positions are threatened. As a 
result of these developments, cadres are attracted by new opportunities in the private sectors, 
as is outlined in the following section. 
2.4.3 Elite reproduction thesis 
In contrast to MTT predictions, numerous studies have found emerging benefits of the old 
elite to be a consequence of the liberalization reforms (Burawoy & Krotov, 1992; Gerber & 
Hout, 1998; Grossman, 1990; Stark, 1990; see also Rona-Tas, 1994). These growing social 
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inequalities have been argued to be the results of (a) technocratic continuity and (b) power 
conversion (Rona-Tas, 1994).  
The technocratic continuity argument posits that the cadres were able to retain their 
advantages due to their technocratic qualifications, which are highly germane to and valued 
in market economies. This argument contradicts the compensating advantages premise (see 
above) and argues that socio-economic advancement in both market and bureaucracy has 
meritocratic-technocratic character, and highly skilled technocrats are hence demanded in 
both economy types. In this sense, human capital is believed to be valued in both market and 
redistributive economies (though sometimes differently in each), resulting in better 
opportunities for those with more education. Therefore, since party membership is highly 
correlated with educational attainment (Gerber, 2000b; Yanowitch, 1977), cadres are likely to 
be in advantageous positions in the newly emerged markets (Rona-Tas, 1994). 
The power conversion argument states that cadres are able to convert their political capital 
accumulated during the bureaucratic economy order into assets and/or economic capital, 
which is highly valued in the market (Bian & Logan, 1996; Rona-Tas, 1994; I. Szelényi & 
Szelényi, 1995). In line with this argument, many cadres were able to acquire property rights 
in Russia over the enterprises they were located in by using informal (valuable) information 
channels, access to credit, and social networks (Gerber & Hout, 1998; Rona-Tas, 1994). 
These “privatization of the nomenklatura” processes were partly accomplished by networks 
gained during the Communist regime (Hughes & John, 2001, p. 673). Such networks are also 
likely to be worthwhile in the post-Soviet period since the political ruling elite was only 
changed at the top, while the local low- and middle-level administrators as well as ministers’ 
personnel have remained in their positions. Having ties to this state apparatus and local 
administration gave the cadres the possibility of accessing valuable business information, 
knowledge in regard to the new laws and regulations, and informal rules (Hughes & John, 
2001; Rona-Tas, 1994). Accordingly and in contrast to the structural determination argument, 
individuals adapt to the new conditions and institutions. 
Following both arguments, Rona-Tas (1994) demonstrates that former cadres (compared with 
non-cadres) are more likely to begin corporate and non-corporate entrepreneurship, and this 
is net of education. Even more, the ex-cadres enjoyed an additional (economic) advantage if 
they started a corporate business. Among various types of entrepreneurship, only farming 
follows the logic of the MTT and suggests more egalitarian effects on the social stratification 
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order. Perhaps this is due to low entry barriers and low skills requirements. In turn, the more 
progressed types of entrepreneurship, such as corporate businesses (which are also obviously 
more profitable), imply an exacerbation effect on social inequality (Rona-Tas, 1994). 
Moreover, empirical research suggests that – other things being equal – party membership is 
associated with higher earnings, more possibilities for intra-firm mobility, and lower risks of 
job loss (Gerber, 2012) and of mobility to low-wage branches in post-socialist Russia 
(Gerber, 2002). 
Altogether, the process of elite reproduction in the post-socialist countries seems to be 
assured via privatization (Hughes & John, 2001; Stark, 1990; I. Szelényi & Szelényi, 1995; 
Tomusk, 2000). Privatization has resulted in the accumulation of the majority of property by 
few people, while most people have privatized almost nothing. The most powerful and 
privileged have translated their power capital into wealth because they had excellent 
education as well as ties and access to positions in which acquired skills and knowledge were 
also valued in the newly emerged economies (see Tomusk, 2000 for the literature review). 
Moreover, expanded corruption after the collapse, termed “the transition ‘from nomenklatura 
to kleptoklatura’ or ‘from plan to clan,’” has empowered former cadres to accumulate even 
more power than they had before the collapse (Tomusk, 2000, p. 278). 
2.4.4 Selection effects 
Another explanation for the advantaging effect of cadres is provided by the selection 
argument (Gerber, 2000b, 2001b). The main claim here is that “some people succeed 
regardless of institutional context” (Gerber, 2000b, p. 26) and that it is not the political power 
per se that provided individuals with benefits after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but 
rather the selection effect into party members. Personal characteristics such as “ambition, 
career-mindedness, a willingness to submit to organizational discipline, a penchant for 
organizational and administrative work, and perhaps what might be termed ‘opportunism’ 
may characterize Party members” (Gerber, 2000b, p. 47). These characteristics were likely to 
drive individuals to become Party members during the Soviet period and are likely to bring 
material advantages in the post-Soviet Russia (Gerber, 2001b, 2002; see also Gerber & 
Mayorova, 2010). The data gathered at the beginning of the transition period provided no 
unequivocal conclusion. Although selection into the Party before the collapse explained most 
of the post-soviet income premium attributed to Party membership (Gerber, 2000b), the 
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slightly different model specification indeed indicated the additional premium of former 
cadres (Rona-Tas & Guseva, 2001). 
From this debate, we may conclude that such personal traits as ambition, opportunism, and 
ruthlessness are likely to incentivize individuals to acquire career- and non-career-related 
benefits via entering into the Party but are also likely to promote (economic) advantage in the 
market economy (Gerber, 2000b). Party membership in turn may itself be a valuable asset in 
post-soviet Russia, particularly in the first years of transition, when the former administrative 
elite were still at the helm and social and economic institutions had not yet been reformed (as 
shown by Rona-Tas & Guseva, 2001; also discussed by Gerber, 2001b).8 It seems that this 
additional political and social capital advantage wanes with ongoing transition (Gerber, 
2001b), which was also predicted by the MTT (Nee, 1989).9 
2.4.5 Interim summary 
Altogether, party membership promised material and non-material privileges, access to 
authoritative positions, and career promotions during the Soviet period. In turn, after the 
collapse, party members were still better off on average, which was the result of political 
power and access to information, superior education, valuable skills and administrative 
expertise, social capital and network ties, as well as specific cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills. One way or another, those advantaged seemed to be able to adapt to structural changes 
and accumulate even more advantages.  
                                                
8 It should be noted that although empirical evidence finds a protective effect of party membership for Russia 
(Gerber, 2012), this might not be the case for other post-socialist economies. For instance, German re-
unification engendered a punishment effect of party membership in terms of lower income growth but not in 
terms of job losses (see, Kropp, 1988).  
9 An interesting finding is that (other things being equal) Party membership increased the probability of finding 
a job in a finance and insurance sector, which became extremely important and highly paid in post-Soviet 
Russia. What is more, employers (particularly from this sector) are found to be more likely to rely on social 
networks for hiring applicants (Gerber & Mayorova, 2010). Though the authors make no reckoning of these 
facts, these findings might indicate the importance of networks for access to jobs in new expanding economic 
sectors. The finding that party members who find job on the basis of networks face earnings penalties may mask 
these important sector distinctions (which are also not controlled for). 
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2.5 Specificities of the regime change effect: a theory of elite 
opportunity 
Walder (1996) argues that it is not the transition to the market economy per se that affects the 
allocation of power and income and the stratification order, but rather (1) the conditions 
under which this transition takes place as well as (2) the kind of a market that emerges. This 
argument is further elaborated and described in a more detailed way by the “theory of elite 
opportunity” (Walder, 2003). The main idea behind this theory is that in many cases, post-
socialist countries experience their own type of transition to the market, varying from rapid 
transition to market-like institutions and a degradation of the old political elites (e.g., East 
Germany) into dictatorship-like economies, with old elites at the helm (e.g., Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and a mix of both (Walder, 2003, fig. 3). This path dependency 
is likely to affect stratification order and the allocation of income and power in somewhat 
distinct ways.  
Whether and to what extent elites are able to “survive” and to appropriate public assets under 
new conditions of market economies is contingent on two factors: the extensiveness of the 
regime change and policies regulating the appropriation of these assets (Walder, 2003). This 
dependency is summarized in Table 2–1. 
The first factor – the extensiveness of the regime change – describes the extent of de-
monopolization of political power as well as former elites’ loss of control over resources and 
over appointments to key positions. In the case of pronounced extensiveness, the party either 
(a) is completely dismantled with a consequent collapse of elite hierarchies or (b) 
disintegrates and (in the case of survival) competes with other political parties. The latter case 
offers meager privileges and socio-economic advancement opportunities for the party 
members. Low extensiveness suggests the survival of the party via, e.g., a changing 
orientation towards nationalists. As a result, hierarchies resist and retain control over assets 
and power to make appointments to key positions. For elite reproduction, regime change 
reflects the rates of elite turnover: The less extensive the regime change is, the lower the elite 
turnover rate is. An extensive regime change implies elites’ withdrawal from their positions 
in favor of lower-ranking members or of non-party members. 
The second factor – policy and regulation environment – mirrors the opportunities for elites 
to appropriate public assets after a regime change. In this context, the pace of the 
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privatization, regulatory prohibition against the practice, and the degree of asset 
concentration and liquidity are the major elements that determine the opportunities of elites to 
appropriate public assets (see Table 2–1). For elite reproduction, this defines the rate at which 
elites convert their political capital into economic gains and property rights. Strong policies 
and regulation obviously lower this rate and constrain elites’ opportunities for wealth 
accumulation via “theft of state property.”  
As Walder (2003) argues, the least favorable circumstances for elites are in the transitional 
economies of Type 1. On the one hand, the regime change is so rapid that elites lose their 
positions too fast to able to use their power for public asset appropriateness. On the other 
hand, the strong regulations reduce opportunities for privatization. Only superior education 
and expertise can ameliorate the chances of elites for socio-economic mobility. In contrast, 
economies of all other types provide rather favorable conditions for elites’ enrichment 
(greatest with Type 4). 
It is not obvious where to locate Russia’s transition path into the matrix since the regime 
change was less extensive (see McFaul, 1995) and elites were able to retain their 
advantageous positions (Eyal & Townsley, 1995; Hanley et al., 1995; I. Szelényi & Szelényi, 
1995). In regard to the political and regulatory constraints, Russia’s privatization lacked a 
consistent legal framework (Gimpelson, Kapeliushnikov, & Lukiyanova, 2010; OECD, 
2011a). As result of this privatization, two-thirds of Russia’s firms were secured by the 
regime insiders in 1993 (McFaul, 1995), and an oligarchy emerged that kept a considerable 
share of the key sectors (Tomusk, 2000). Accordingly, Russia would match with Type 3 if we 
consider the formal de-monopolization of the party and the changing political structures as 
well as regulatory privatization environment (Walder, 2003). However, because such a high 
proportion of former nomenklatura were able to retain their positions and advantages (Eyal & 
Townsley, 1995), Russia’s case may even verge to the economy of Type 4. 
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2.6 Social inequality and regime change: Empirical evidence 
Sociological interest in how institutional structures shape stratification processes has been 
growing in recent decades (Kerckhoff, 1995). The expanded availability of cross-comparative 
micro data has allowed for studying the association of various institutional arrangements with 
various aspects of social inequality (e.g., Gangl, 2002, 2003; Iannelli & Smyth, 2008; Kogan, 
Matkovic, & Gebel, 2013; Kogan & Müller, 2003; Saar et al., 2008; Yaish & Stier, 2009). 
Another body of literature has taken on a dynamic perspective and focused on the countries 
experiencing change in institutional set-ups and has examined how the regime change has 
affected social inequality (e.g., Bian & Gerber, 2008; Bian & Logan, 1996; Bukodi & 
Goldthorpe, 2010; Cao & Nee, 2005; Gerber, 2000a, 2002, 2003, 2012; Hanley et al., 1995; 
Konietzka & Bühler, 2010; Krueger & Pischke, 1995; Rosenfeld, Trappe, & Gornick, 2004; 
Saar, 2009). The major appeal here is that “[…] the rapid and far-reaching changes in 
political and economic institutions […] offer researchers an especially promising opportunity 
to gauge the effects of institutions in dynamic settings” (Gerber, 2003, p. 242).  
In the following, I briefly review the state of research on the impact of regime changes on 
patterns of social stratification: (1) social class, social mobility, and educational 
opportunities; (2) job-related risks and changes; and (3) gender inequalities.10 Following this, 
I derive my expectations in regard to the impact of the regime change on social inequalities in 
Russia. 
2.6.1 Class inequalities, educational opportunities and intergenerational 
mobility 
Despite the fact that class as a norm was ignored and “classless society” was proclaimed, 
Communism produced its own class – the new class of political bureaucrats (Djilas, 1957), 
i.e., the political and managerial elite (I. Szelényi, 1978), or the “ruling” class (Eyal & 
Townsley, 1995). The “second-best” group consisted of the intelligentsia (professionals), 
followed by industrial workers and agricultural laborers (Eyal, Szelényi, & Townsley, 2000). 
Nevertheless, due to wage compressions, the gaps between classes were narrower than in 
comparable class structures in other industrial societies (Bian & Gerber, 2008; Dobson, 
                                                
10 I do not consider the processes of elite reproduction or circulation because this was discussed in the earlier 
sections. 
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1977). The transition to the market economy favored class inequality in terms of income in 
China, while in Russia, these inequalities expanded at the beginning of the transition period 
but slightly decreased afterwards (Bian & Gerber, 2008).11 
Furthermore, the socialist system was unable to eliminate the intergenerational transmission 
of inequality (Wong, 2002), though it seems to have been less pronounced compared with the 
Western societies (see Dobson, 1977 for review). Empirical evidence has shown – ceteris 
paribus – strong effect of parental cultural capital (in Russia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland) on children’s occupational attainment status. In Russia, additionally, 
parental social capital together with an individual’s own social capital and seniority was 
found to be crucial for socio-economic advancement towards the end of the Soviet Union, 
implying that the “stratification system was turning into an exclusive network where power 
and privileges were largely reserved for Communist party members and their children” 
(Wong, 2002, p. 206) and “favoritism and nepotism was rampant in the Russia society right 
before its collapse in 1991” (Wong, 2002, p. 216). However, other studies detected high 
levels of intergenerational mobility with low social inheritance before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Titma, Tuma, & Roosma, 2003). The Cultural Revolution seems to have 
increased social mobility chances in urban and rural China and reduced thereafter (see C. 
Buchmann & Hannum, 2001 for review; Zhou et al., 1998). Again, liberalization reforms 
promoted the growth of social inequalities. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, social 
fluidity declined in Russia (Gerber & Hout, 2004), Hungary (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2010; 
Robert & Bukodi, 2004; Rona-Tas, 1994), and Estonia (Saar, 2009). 
The patterns of inequality of educational opportunity (IEO) was also found to vary over the 
regime change. For instance, in Czechoslovakia, the IEO decreased after the introduction of 
Communism but later surpassed pre-Communism levels (Mateju, 1993). Throughout the 
Soviet period, social background was a crucial factor for educational decisions (Yanowitch, 
1977), with remarkable stability over time in Hungary (S. Szelényi & Aschaffenburg, 1993), 
Poland (Heyns & Bialecki, 1993), and Russia (in terms of higher education, see Gerber & 
Hout, 1995; Gerber, 2000a). Nevertheless, empirical evidence infers that state-socialism had 
a lessening effect on the IEO (Ganzeboom et al., 2009). Similarly, the comparison of East 
                                                
11 The study measures social class in terms of the Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 
1992) adapted for Soviet and post-Soviet Eras by Gerber & Hout (1998). 
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and West Germany revealed that IEO was less pronounced in East Germany before 
reunification (P. N. Blossfeld et al., 2015). On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that 
IEO was more pronounced in socialist countries than in Western countries (Ganzeboom & 
Nieuwbeerta, 1999). 
The transition from socialism to the market economy was accompanied by an increase in 
educational stratification. In East Germany, the chances of children from lower social strata 
to attend university deteriorated after the reunification (P. N. Blossfeld et al., 2015). The 
introduction of liberalization reforms in Russia has also stimulated the growth of the social 
background based educational inequalities (Gerber, 2000a, 2007). The literature further 
indicates that social origin continued to be decisive for educational transitions two decades 
after introduction of liberalization reforms in the CEE countries, and particularly in those that 
introduced early tracking (Hungary, East Germany and Czech Republic). In Hungary, tertiary 
education became reserved for higher social strata (Kogan et al., 2012). 
2.6.2 School-to-work trajectories and intra-generational mobility 
In the following, empirical results on the regime change effect for job-related inequalities at 
labor market entry and in life course careers are discussed. In this context, the school-to-work 
transition is the most important stage in one’s career because it may frame and even 
determine subsequent career opportunities. At this stage, educational attainment appears to be 
the main driving factor affecting patterns of entry into the first (significant) job, while 
educational inequalities are directly translated into the following life chances. However, the 
extent to which educational attainment matters is found to vary over institutional contexts 
(Allmendinger, 1989; Müller & Shavit, 1998). With career progress, the impact of initial 
education vanishes, whereas other factors, such as labor market experience, accumulated 
specific skills, job performance and productivity, and networks, come into play. Like the 
school-to-work transitions, the subsequent career is argued to be shaped by institutional 
arrangements (Müller & Shavit, 1998). 
Under socialism, the educational system was predominantly oriented to serve the purposes of 
the industrial economy, and the whole system worked in a streamline process, assuring 
maximum usage of human capital (Gerber, 2003; see Chapter 3 for the institutional 
description of Russia). Compared with Western societies, the link between education and the 
first occupation was even stronger (Solga & Konietzka, 1999), resulting in smooth, short, and 
secure transitions from school to work (Gerber & Hout, 1995, 1998; Gerber, 2003; Saar et al., 
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2008; Saar, 2005). In the aftermath of liberalization reforms, this strong former link vanished 
in most post-socialist countries.12 The school-to-work transition phase became much less 
secure, with longer search periods and a shorter duration of the first job as well as higher 
risks of job loss (Bukodi, 2009; Kogan, Noelke, & Gebel, 2011; Konietzka & Bühler, 2010; 
Täht et al., 2009). These risks were particularly pronounced for lower-educated labor market 
entrants (Kogan & Unt, 2005), implying a widening of social gaps due to initial education 
(Bukodi, 2009; Kogan et al., 2011; Täht et al., 2009). The risks of entry into a job below the 
attained level of qualification substantially increased after the collapse (Bühler & Konietzka, 
2011; Bukodi, 2009; Kogan & Unt, 2005 for Hungary and Slovenia; Täht et al., 2009). 
Finally, many more labor market entrants were compelled to enter precarious employment 
(Bukodi, 2009; Robert & Bukodi, 2005). 
Turning to the career process, the state socialism supported stable life-long careers, 
moderating a high level of stability and security (see Dobson, 1977 for review; see also 
Chapter 3). However, the literature is not so unanimous about regime change effects on the 
career paths, as in the case of labor market entry. A comparative study on post-socialist 
economies implies remarkable differences in mobility rates among four countries (Belarus, 
Estonia, Russia, and Ukraine). Belarus (with the lowest levels of upward mobility) and 
Estonia (with the highest levels) represent extreme cases. These differences are explained 
with a degree of transition towards market economies: Belarus proceeded as a command 
economy, and Estonia showed a rapid transition towards a market economy (Titma & Roots, 
2006). Single-country studies also suggest some variation in intra-generational mobility 
patterns. For instance, although labor market mobility grew in Slovenia, it was predominantly 
“directed towards the quantitative adjustment of employment,” such as intra-firm mobility as 
well as exits to unemployment and to retirement (Ivančič, 2000, p. 421). In post-Soviet 
Russia and East Germany, significantly more individuals were downwardly mobile than 
upwardly mobile (Diewald, Goedicke, & Mayer, 2006; Gerber & Hout, 2004). Similar albeit 
less dramatic results were found for Poland (Mach, 2004). On the other hand, the regime 
                                                
12 However, Gerber (2003) finds no impact of the regime change on the school-to-work transition phase in terms 
of the association between education and the first occupation. 
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change opened opportunities for self-employment, which become a path to upward mobility 
in terms of income (Gerber, 2001a). 
The transition from socialism to liberalized market economies impeded but also advantaged 
the youngest cohorts. For instance, youngest cohorts faced many obstacles in terms of 
unemployment risks and job instability in Slovenia (Ivančič, 2000). On the other hand, they 
were more likely to enter self-employment in Russia (Gerber, 2001a) and to experience 
upward mobility in Slovenia (Ivančič, 2000). In the literature, young cohorts are even labeled 
as the “winners of transition.” In East Germany, younger cohorts were better off compared 
with older cohorts, particularly due their higher flexibility, which appeared to pay off more 
than did the (labor market) experience of the older cohorts (Kropp, 1988) (Diewald et al., 
2006). Similarly, in Russia, well-educated young men benefited from new opportunities that 
were prompted by the emerging private sector (Brainerd, 1998). 
2.6.3 Gender inequalities 
Socialism saw gender equality as an essential instrument for industrialization. For these 
purposes, various policies reducing the conflict between and supporting the combination of 
family and employment promoted females’ labor participation (Pascall & Manning, 2000). In 
some cases, Communism was quite successful in promoting gender equality (Dilli, Rijpma, & 
Carmichael, 2014), particularly via granting equal opportunities for men and women in 
education (Gerber & Schaefer, 2004; Gerber, 2007). Gender parity in regard to labor 
participation (Katz, 2001) and in terms of socio-economic status was achieved (Wong, 2002). 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that equality in participation rates does not automatically 
imply wage equality. Similarly, higher socio-economic status does not automatically denote 
higher wages: many female-dominated jobs, such as teacher, were characterized by high 
prestige but lower wages. Women were furthermore found to be overrepresented in white-
collar jobs although they belonged to lower non-manual groups, whereas men were 
overrepresented in the top of occupational hierarchy (Titma et al., 2003). The fact that 
women endured lower average wages than men under socialism is well-established in the 
literature (Brainerd, 2000; Gerber & Hout, 1998; Katz, 2001; Kranz, 2005; Lapidus, 1976; 
McAuley, 1981; Shu & Bian, 2002; Vinokur & Ofer, 1985; Yanowitch, 1977). Moreover, 
women faced obstacles in access to top positions (Lapidus, 1976; McAuley, 1981; 
Yanowitch, 1977) and were virtually absent in the political elite (Eyal & Townsley, 1995; 
Hanley, 2003; Kranz, 2005; Lapidus, 1993; Walder, 1995; Wong, 1996). 
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Studies on the impact that liberalization reforms had on gender differences did not provide 
clear-cut conclusions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, both men and women exited 
labor market due to growing unemployment, but women appeared to gain better access to 
employment (Gerber & Mayorova, 2006; van der Lippe & Fodor, 1998). Post-Communist 
gender inequalities in terms of managerial positions decreased in China but remained quite 
stable in Russia, whereas gender income inequalities were stable and pronounced in both 
countries (Bian & Gerber, 2008; see also Brainerd, 2000; Gorodnichenko et al., 2010). In 
turn, East European countries suggested narrowing the gender wage gap after the collapse 
(Brainerd, 2000).  
Compared with men, women (with similar traits) face fewer opportunities for self-
employment (Gerber, 2001a), for inter-firm mobility, and for high-quality shifts, and they 
face a greater risk of low-quality shifts in post-Soviet Russia (Gerber & Mayorova, 2006; 
Gerber, 2002). Although Russian men are more likely to work in an informal relationship 
(shadow economy), the probability that such informal work relations are initiated by the 
employer (and not by the employee’s desire) is higher for female workers (Bessudnov, 2011). 
In Estonia, women have lower incomes then men, and the income gap even increased with 
the procession of reforms (Titma, Tuma, & Silver, 2013; Titma, 1997). On the other hand, the 
results from the other study for Estonia revealed far better labor market opportunities for 
women in the cohort that finished its studies just before the collapse of the Soviet regime: 
The gender gap in entrepreneurial and managerial activities decreased, and women 
outcompeted men in white-collar occupations (Titma, Roots, & Soidla, 2009). A comparative 
study on Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia revealed that 
after the collapse, women enjoyed more stable careers, but they were also less likely to be 
upwardly mobile than men (van der Lippe & Fodor, 1998). Finally, the gender equality index 
exhibited a growing trend during socialism but dropped with the introduction of market 
reforms (Dilli et al., 2014), suggesting a widening of the social gap between sexes. 
2.7 Guiding hypothesis: social inequalities and regime change in 
Russia 
The Communist regime proclaimed an elimination of social inequalities through the 
equalization of opportunities based on the effort (labor investments). “From each according 
to his ability, to each according to his need” became a compelling slogan of socialism. 
Despite this, various forms of inequalities persisted under the Communist regime, as my 
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literature review has shown. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the magnitude of these 
inequalities was lesser in its extent compared with the capitalist economies (Whyte, 1975).  
According to the MTT, transition to the market economy promised an attenuation of returns 
to political power and a rewarding of effort and productivity and, as result, a reduction of 
social inequality. However, the extensive literature review in this Chapter revealed that the 
reality looked somewhat different in Russia, and in many cases, a persistent or growing 
disadvantage for the previously disadvantaged was found, whereas those in advantageous 
positions gained even more. Access to social networks and growing informal relationships, 
personality traits together with own preference, culture and discriminative practices of 
employers seem to contribute jointly to the growing social gap between various groups of 
individuals. Furthermore, the transition from a rather egalitarian and homogeneous society to 
a more heterogeneous one involved an exacerbation of social inequalities. Moreover, 
individual differences become even more decisive for economic and social success (cf. 
Mayer, 2006). Accordingly, the guiding hypothesis of my thesis is that the (net) social gap 
between various groups of individuals opened up or enlarged after the regime change in 
Russia.  
To test my guiding hypothesis, I conduct three empirical case studies and approach social 
inequality in terms of gender inequalities and differences (Chapter 5), inequality of adult-
educational opportunity (Chapter 6), and consequences of adult education for intra-
generational mobility (Chapter 7). My intend is not disentangling the reasons for growing 
social inequality in Russia, which would also not be feasible with the data at hand. Instead, I 
aim to explore and quantify the development of social inequality in a broader institutional 
context. Nevertheless, the concluding section (Chapter 8) discusses potential reasons for 
changing patterns of inequality in Russia. 
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Chapter 3  
Russia during and after the Soviet Era: The role of 
institutions over the life course 
3.1 Introduction 
I study the regime change impact on social inequality based on three case studies: (1) 
horizontal and vertical gender differences and inequalities at labor market entry, (2) the 
impact of initial educational and occupational resources on access to formal adult education, 
and (3) role of adult education for lowering inequalities due to initial educational and 
occupational attainment. These case studies incorporate school-to-work transitions at the 
career start and school-to-work as well work-to-school transitions in the adult life course 
phases.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, individual actions and outcomes of job allocation 
processes are embedded in and shaped by the institutional and cultural set-up of countries. 
The “allocation model” of status attainment purports that individuals are allocated by the 
educational system and the economy to various social positions (Kerckhoff, 1976, p. 369). In 
this regard, educational systems specify the weight of credentials in the recruitment process, 
while employment systems provide or restrict opportunities for occupational mobility (Saar et 
al., 2008; Scherer, 2004). The welfare state model describes the role of the state in covering 
individual risks and needs (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Fenger, 2007; Ferree, 1995). Welfare 
policies may facilitate or impede a combination of various life domains, such as education, 
career, and family (Leisering & Leibfried, 1999). Additionally, specific attention should be 
given to the gender culture and to state policy in regard to women’s position in society. These 
characteristics are essential factors in shaping gender-typical educational and labor market 
trajectories (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006). 
Altogether, the interplay of the institutional settings described above should be considered 
when talking about inequality patterns and their association with the regime change in 
Russia. Accordingly, in the following, I present institutional and cultural arrangements in 
Soviet Russia and how these arrangements developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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Specifically, I focus on educational and employment systems as well as on welfare regime 
and gender culture. 
3.2 Main characteristics of the Soviet educational system13 
In Soviet Russia, education was a “vital collective resource for building Communism” 
(Gerber, 2003, p. 245) and was aimed at bolstering industrialization.14 In this sense, the 
perfect link between qualifications and occupations was seen as a primary aim and criterion 
for an efficient functioning of both the educational system and the organization of labor. To 
achieve this goal, the educational system was fully institutionalized, centralized, and heavily 
controlled by Soviet authorities. It was further characterized by a high level of 
standardization with defined enrollment targets, a mandatory curriculum, budgets, and 
teacher training. 
Education was strongly vocationally oriented and aimed at creating a supply of skilled 
workers according to economic needs, which, however, were defined by the Soviet planners 
and not based on labor market demand (Gerber, 2007). Employers were bound per legislation 
to follow strict guidelines regarding the qualifications of job applicants and desired positions 
and salaries (Gerber, 2003). Accordingly, credentials played a crucial role in the labor 
market, opening some career pathways and closing others. 
An important distinct characteristic of the Soviet educational system was state-administered 
school-to-work transition, with mandatory three-year job assignments from almost all 
educational institutions according to the aims and intentions of the Soviet regime (Gerber 
2003). The system functioned as follows: Soviet firms had to make a request (about two 
years in advance) with regard to required labor force profiles. The state reviewed this 
information and distributed it to the specific “distribution commissions” in each educational 
                                                
13 The following description of the educational system in Russia is based on the rigorous review of various 
official documents from Russian authorities (Ministry of Education, 2000; NIC ARM, 2012), international 
reports regarding educational system in Russia (GU VShE, 2010; Hoskins, Cartwright, & Schoof, 2010; IQAS, 
2009; NORRIC, 2005; OECD, 2010) and empirical research on education in Russia (Cheidvasser & Benítez-
Silva, 2007; Gerber, 2003, 2007; Kapeliushnikov & Lukiyanova, 2010; Kogan et al., 2012). 
14 The Soviet educational system (which, in fact, still exists despite having been slightly transformed) was 
designed at the end of 1930s. 
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institution. In turn, these distribution commissions made decisions regarding jobs assignment 
and student allocation (see Gerber, 2003 for details). Correspondingly, these state-governed 
systems of school-to-work transition led to a stable, strong link between the educational 
system and the labor market (Bühler & Konietzka, 2011; Gerber, 2003). Graduates were 
obliged to accept an assigned workplace for (at least) several years, even if this meant 
moving to another city or a remote area (Khokhlova, Kozlovskiy, & Veits, 2013).  
The educational system was (and factually is) characterized by a high level of stratification 
that began after compulsory education (grades I-VIII; after 1989 grades I-IX). In addition to 
direct entry into the labor market (mainly into lower non-manual jobs, Gerber, 2003), school 
leavers could pursue their education in an “academic” or “vocational” track. The vocational 
track included two main options, namely lower vocational and secondary professional 
education, while the academic track was a continuation of general education, the successful 
completion (grades IX-X, after 1989 grades X-XI; according to ISCO-98, upper secondary 
level) of which opened access to higher education as well as to some programs of secondary 
professional education (see below). The vocational track included two main options, namely 
lower vocational and secondary professional education In the following, I briefly discuss 
these different options of acquiring professional education. 
Lower vocational education (according to ISCO-98, primary vocational education) was 
aimed at the training of skilled manual workers to acquire professional qualifications. The 
programs of this type were offered by Professional-Technical Uchilishche (PTUs) and, since 
1970s, have been offered by Secondary Professional-Technical Uchilishche (SPTUs). In 
contrast to PTUs, programs in SPTUs incorporated a general education component (an 
educational program of general secondary school) and gave their graduates an upper 
secondary degree in addition to vocational certificate. Lower vocational education was 
mainly obtained on the basis of lower secondary education, but there were several programs 
that required an upper secondary degree. The duration of the education varied between 1 and 
3 years, depending on the program type and initial educational attainment (entry after lower 
or upper secondary education). Graduates of primary vocational training institutions were 
granted a qualified worker degree and could enter the labor market but were able also to 
proceed with their education. PTU graduates could pursue their education in secondary 
professional education, while the qualifications obtained in SPTUs formally opened access to 
higher education. Nevertheless, the continuation into higher education was a rather rare event 
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due to different official and non-official constraints (Gerber, 2003, 2007; Titma & Saar, 
1995). 
Secondary professional education (according to ISCO-98, tertiary education of non-
university level)15 could be obtained in Specialized Secondary Educational Establishments 
(SSUZs) that trained low- and mid-grade non-manual workers. This type of education could 
be obtained in institutions of vocational training (Uchilishche), technical education 
institutions (Technikum), and colleges (beginning in 1989) and encompassed a duration of 2 
to 5 years on the basis of previous educational attainment. Accordingly, some programs could 
be completed immediately after compulsory school, but others required upper secondary 
degree. Technical institutions offered training in technical and business professions, whereas 
the aim of the institutions of vocational training was to train mid-level non-manual 
professionals in areas such as services, teaching, health, culture, and art. Colleges were 
considered to be more “prestigious” (and the most competetive, IQAS, 2009) and offered 
advanced programs with a duration of one year after the completion of a technical of 
professional program. Successful completion of secondary professional educational programs 
was awarded with the Diploma of Middle Level Professional Education and led to the middle 
professional qualification degree. The completion of advanced professional training at 
college earned an additional professional title called “Junior Engineer”. Qualifications that 
could be obtained through secondary professional education included technicians, work 
managers, clerks, accountants, preschool/primary school teachers, nurses, midwives, and 
laboratory technicians. Graduates entered the labor market but could also access higher 
education with recognition of one year of credits (however, only 5% did so, Titma & Saar, 
1995). 
Higher education could be obtained in institutions equivalent to a university and was 
designed to train professionals and skilled experts. Institutions of higher education (VUZs) 
included universities (8%), institutes (80%), academies (1%), uchilishche (9%), and 
conservatories (2%). In these types of institutions, there were no differences regarding terms 
                                                
15 It is important to note that “secondary” is a direct translation of “srednee” – the Russian name for this type of 
professional education. However, the meaning is not secondary, but rather middle-level professional education, 
which is identical to the tertiary education at the non-university level according to the ISCED-98. In this thesis 
the term secondary professional education is used. 
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of admission requirements, academic standards, and awards (IQAS, 2009). Universities 
offered courses in science and humanities; institutes were oriented towards applied sciences 
such as medicine, agriculture, economics, teacher education, technology, and aviation; 
academies were mainly dedicated to academic research; and conservatories were oriented 
towards higher education in music. Some Uchilishche offered programs in higher education 
with courses in engineering, military, and theater. Admission to higher education based 
mainly on an entrance examination and was highly competitive (Gerber & Hout, 1995). 
Studies in higher education typically lasted 5 years, and successful completion was rewarded 
with a Specialist diploma. Graduates could practice in their profession or continue on to 
doctoral studies.16 
In regard to the attainment levels, the Communist regime was very successful in illiteracy 
eradication (Zajda, 2003), and the human capital accumulation of the Russian population 
constantly grew across cohorts (see Gerber & Hout, 1995, pp. 628–629). The proportion of 
the population with tertiary education expanded during the socialist period: During the 1970s 
about 25% and 9% of the graduates entered their first job with secondary professional and 
higher education, respectively, and in the 1980s, these figures increased to 30% and 18%, 
respectively (Bühler & Konietzka, 2011, p. 307). With regard to the gender aspect, women 
had already surpassed men in terms of educational attainment in the 1970s, and they 
exhibited a strong shift towards tertiary education (Gerber & Schaefer, 2004; Gerber, 2003).  
3.3 The educational system after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
In Russia, the regime change affected political, economic, and social life in general and 
dramatically changed the patterns of people’s lives. However, more specifically, this change 
took place in the fields of education and the labor market due to the government’s focused 
endeavors to improve the situation in these spheres and to reintegrate them into the 
tremendously changed economy. The changes in the educational sphere were more inert, 
particularly due to this sphere’s low priority during the turbulent transition times. This 
resulted in a lack of adequate financing, emerging problems with national educational 
                                                
16 There were some important constraints for the medical sciences: graduates of medical educational institutions 
had first had to undertake further comprehensive professional training with a duration of 1-4 years (internatura 
or ordinatura) in the medical institution in order to have the right to practice their profession independently. 
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standards and school budgets, and administrative chaos (Gerber, 2000a; Myant & 
Drahokoupil, 2011). 
3.3.1 Continuity and change 
Some new endeavors have taken place since the early 1990s, and educational reform is still 
on the move. The most prominent events include the fact that the state monopoly on 
education was eliminated, the mandatory job assignment was abandoned, and the whole 
system was decentralized, leading to a growing autonomy of educational institutions and 
teachers. These changes, however, resulted in reducing previous certainty for the graduates 
regarding future employment plans (Gerber, 2003). A host of new programs were launched in 
the existing universities, and public universities were allowed to enroll fee-paying students. 
This, together with a rapid growth of private universities, influenced expanded enrollment 
rates in tertiary education in the middle of 1990s (e.g., Lukiyanova, 2010). During the 
following decade, the number of students in tertiary education institutes doubled (Frumin, 
Kuz’minov, & Semenov, 2013). 
Figure 3–1 depicts the structure of the modern educational system in Russia.17 Overall, the 
formal structure of the Russian educational system did not change compared with the Soviet 
system. The formal educational system in Russia consists of two types of educational 
programs: general and professional education (see yellow and pink/blue/green parts in Figure 
3–1, respectively). General education includes pre-school, primary, lower secondary (basic 
general), and upper secondary (complete general) education. Professional education involves 
all formal programs, which afford the right to practice a profession and include (primary) 
vocational education, secondary professional education, and higher professional education as 
well as doctoral study programs (NIC ARM, 2012). 
                                                
17 It is important to mention that in the scope of this thesis, the period of analysis covers the post-Soviet period 
until 2005. Consequently, the latest reforms in the sphere of professional education in the year 2013 are not 
relevant and will not be discussed in the following. 
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Figure 3–1: Structure of the educational system in Russia 
 
Note: Adapted by Gordey Yastrebov from Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. 
National Information Centre on Academic Recognition and Mobility Center (NIC ARM, 2012). For 
permissions, see Appendix F. 
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One of the most important changes in educational system regards an introduction of the 
Unified State Exam (USE) in schools (obligatory for the 11th graders) in an attempt to assure 
equal access to higher education. The USE was introduced in the Russian Federation in 2009 
(since 2001 on an experimental basis in some regions). Based on the results of the USE, the 
students are awarded a Certificate of upper secondary education and these results (scores) 
appear to be the sole criterion for giving students access to the higher education. 
Additionally, since 2007 some regions have introduced 11 years of compulsory secondary 
education on an experimental level (NIC ARM, 2012). Receiving an upper secondary 
education is currently compulsory nationally (UNESCO International Bureau of Education, 
2011).  
In line with the Bologna process, several further degrees at the level of higher education were 
adopted in Russia between 1992 and 1993 (IQAS, 2009). Accordingly, students have the 
opportunity to attain four degrees at the tertiary university level: Intermediate Diploma (2 
years of Bachelor or Specialist program); Bachelor degree (4 years); Specialist Diploma (5 
years); and Magistr (Master) Diploma (2 years). Magistr studies require a bachelor degree. 
The first two degrees are more or less prerequisites for continued studies and comprise more 
generally oriented education. The latter two degrees offer two options for graduates: 
exercising their profession or entering doctoral studies. 
There are two critical trends concerned with education in post-Soviet Russia. On the one 
hand, in formal education, Russia has one of the highest levels of accumulated human capital 
in the world, even when compared with countries with the same GDP per capita revenues 
(Barro & Lee, 2001). 18 Slightly above half of the Russian population holds tertiary degrees 
                                                
18 It is important to mention that in the ISCED-97 classification, secondary professional programs are defined as 
ISCED 5b level (tertiary education of non-university level), and higher education programs are defined as 
ISCED 5a level (tertiary education of university level). However, Nordic countries do not generally assess 
secondary professional education as being comparable with the ISCED 5b level programs offered in these 
countries (NORRIC, 2005). The reasons behind this include the maturity of graduates, teaching methods, the 
length of programs, historical change, position in the educational structure, and quality assurance (NORRIC, 
2005). Nevertheless, Russian authorities and empirical literature advocate that these programs are comparable 
with the ISCED 5b levels (Cheidvasser & Benítez-Silva, 2007; Gerber, 2007; Kapeliushnikov & Lukiyanova, 
2010; Kogan et al., 2012; NIC ARM, 2012). To account for these controversial factors, the empirical part of this 
thesis considers these types of education separately and accounts for these differences when interpreting the 
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(and particularly women), 19  and the average educational duration is above OECD level 
(OECD 2012). Even more, the authors of the analytical report on Russian education conclude 
that having a certificate of a tertiary degree became a “social norm” (M. Larionova & 
Meshkova, 2007). On the other hand, various Russian surveys indicate that employers 
consider “having a diploma” to be a prerequisite for entering a job, but they do not consider a 
diploma to be a signal of the quality of the employee’s skills or knowledge (Krasil’nikova & 
Bondarenko, 2007a, 2007b). In other words, for employers, a certificate is more of a standard 
criterion than a selection criterion and does not guarantee a working place (Dubin, Gudkov, 
Levinson, Leonova, & Stuchevskaja, 2004; Kljachko, 2006; Lukiyanova, 2010), suggesting 
that education in Russia has become necessary but not sufficient. The mechanisms behind 
these processes are discussed in the following section.  
3.3.2 The role of the certificates in the modern Russia 
Although there was a rapid growth of returns to education in the 1990s, at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, the growth of returns slowed down and returns then decreased (e.g., 
literature review of Kapeliushnikov, 2011; meta-analyses of Lukiyanova, 2010). To 
understand this phenomenon, we might first look at the wage system during the Soviet 
period. In the Soviet Union, there were no competitive labor market and wage system, and 
the worker’s allocation was completely defined and regulated by the central planning system, 
which favored blue-collar workers (Inkeles, 1950). Factually, the government created 
monetary and non-monetary incentives for low-qualified workers in order to attract them to 
the heavy industries and military complex (Gerber & Hout, 1998; Katz, 1997). As result, the 
correlation between education and monetary returns was low.  
The transition to the competitive labor market system in Russia was accompanied by the 
“great human capital reallocation” (Sabirianova, 2002), with an almost instant massive 
devaluation of the skills and knowledge obtained under the “old” system (Kapeliushnikov & 
Lukiyanova, 2010). At the same time, decision autonomy on wages shifted to firms, thereby 
                                                                                                                                                  
obtained results. Table A–1 in Appendix A provides an overview of the Russian equivalent of the educational 
attainment with the corresponding ISCED-97 level. 
19 For gender differences in educational attainment, see, e.g., Gerber (2003, pp. 256–259) and Ogloblin (2005a, 
fig. 14). 
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inducing growing returns to education. Furthermore, higher returns to education in the first 
years of transition suggest a growing demand for higher-educated workers (particularly in the 
service sector). This, in turn, can explain expanded enrollment rates in tertiary education in 
the middle of 1990s (Kapeliushnikov & Lukiyanova, 2010). However, later empirical 
research indicates that the expansion of the tertiary sector overcame the demand of the labor 
market (M. Larionova & Meshkova, 2007), leading to high education-occupation mismatch 
rates (Kapeliushnikov, 2011) and resulting in a reduction of labor market payoffs in post-
soviet Russia (Lukiyanova, 2010). 
Compared with other transitional economies, Russia was characterized by the “medium” 
returns to schooling after the liberalization reforms (Flabbi, Paternostro, & Tiongson, 2008). 
Fleisher, Sabirianova, and Wang (2005) suggests that monetary returns in the early reform 
period in Russia more than doubled compared with the pre-reform period and increased 
further in the later reform period. In contrast, the other longitudinal study on monetary 
returns to education concluded that there was only small improvement during ten years of the 
transition period and that the returns in Russia are far behind the returns found in other 
developed countries (Cheidvasser & Benítez-Silva, 2007). Unfortunately, to my knowledge, 
comprehensive comparative empirical research on the returns to schooling in the 
contemporary Russia is non-existent. Nonetheless, Russian experts indicate that the monetary 
returns to vocational and higher education are smaller in Russia than in other countries 
(Kapeliushnikov, 2008). 
Another trend is that almost 30% of Russian workers consider skills and knowledge obtained 
during the initial educational attainment process to be inappropriate or even useless, and one 
in four people has never used the qualification they obtained (Kapeliushnikov & Lukiyanova, 
2010). The low quality of formal education in Russia can probably explain such 
underutilization of human capital (Agranovich, Kovaleva, Polivanova, & Fateeva, 2009). The 
indirect evidence for the low quality of education can be seen in the performance of Russian 
students on international tests: TIMSS and PISA results suggest that Russian students suffer 
from a lack of knowledge and practical experience and are less able to apply their obtained 
skills outside the educational system (Agranovich et al., 2009; Kapeliushnikov, 2008). In line 
with this finding, Russian employers report that the new employees require additional 
occupational training to be “useful” to the employers (Krasil’nikova & Bondarenko, 2007a, 
2007b).  
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In the area of professional education, no significant reforms were introduced after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Frumin et al., 2013). Correspondingly, institutions and 
educational standards did not conform to the demands of the new economy (Gimpelson, 
Kapeliushnikov, & Lukiyanova, 2009; Tan, Savchenko, Gimpelson, Kapeliushnikov, & 
Lukiyanova, 2007). Moreover, the system of professional education has become much less 
vocationally oriented, with a low involvement of employers in the development of 
professional standards and requirements and a lack of employers’ interest in the cooperation 
in (for example) further education and apprenticeship (Krasil’nikova & Bondarenko, 2007a, 
2007b). The growing sector of private institutions and paid services in vocational education 
has become more oriented towards the demands of students than the demands of the labor 
market (M. Larionova & Meshkova, 2007). 
Altogether, these trends let us to conclude that communication and cooperation between the 
state, educational system, and the labor market has almost disappeared so that the system of 
professional education largely lost its link to needs of the labor market. By virtue of these 
developments, the previously tight link between education and the employment system has 
blurred, and credentials have lost their signaling power (Gerber, 2003). Furthermore, the 
excessive supply of tertiary graduates has initiated “credential inflation” (Collins 1979) and a 
subsequent reduction of the labor market payoffs in post-Soviet Russia (see Lukiyanova, 
2010). Such credential inflation and the growing need for internal firm training reveals that 
skills and knowledge produced by the educational system tend to be of more general nature in 
post-Soviet Russia (Bol & van de Werfhorst, 2013; Kosyakova, 2014). Perhaps this general 
nature of human capital explains the failure of the Russian educational system to produce a 
highly qualified labor force not only in terms of the amount of tertiary diplomas, but also in 
regard to the de facto skills and knowledge. 
The final issue that is discussed in the scope of the aforementioned developments is related to 
their consequences for the school-to-work transition. Educational certificates serve as an 
effective instrument for screening job applicants because they possess a signaling value of 
individuals’ acquired knowledge and skills. The higher this signaling value is, the lower the 
insecurity that employers face with regard to job applicants’ future productivity and 
suitability is (Müller & Gangl, 2003). In countries with educational systems providing 
standardized and occupation-specific certificates, rational employers rely on school 
qualifications to a greater extent because it is very likely that these qualifications resemble 
the true skills and productivity required for a specific job. Vice versa, in countries in which 
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credentials provide less transparent information (signals), employers might be more prone to 
(additionally) rely on other productivity signals (e.g., previous labor market experience, 
Gangl, 2001) or ascriptive characteristics (e.g., gender, race, Chang, 2000) in their hiring 
decisions.  
3.4 The employment system under the Soviet regime 
The Soviet economic scheme was based on (5-year) plans with production goals and required 
resources, while labor was one of the main parts of these resources. Accordingly, Soviet 
ideology emphasized the intrinsic value of work and propagandized its contribution to 
economic independence, social status, and personal satisfaction. Not working was prohibited 
by legislation and could lead to imprisonment (Ahlander, 2001). According to Soviet 
officials, unemployment was eliminated by the end of 1930s (GOSKOMSTAT USSR, 1988), 
whereas empirical evidence reports unemployment rates of 1.2% in the mid-1970s, which 
was, however, quite low compared with other capitalist societies (Gregory & Collier, 1988). 
Employment was guaranteed with very high level of social security for all social groups 
(Buchholz, Hofäcker, & Blossfeld, 2006; Standing, 1996). A rigorous planning of labor and 
the setting of wages assured the efficient functioning of the system. Nonetheless, labor 
allocation often functioned based on market mechanisms, particularly after the Stalinist 
period (Marnie, 1992).  
Although workers were generally free to change their jobs and employers were generally free 
in their hiring decisions (Clarke, 1999, p. 13), 20  workers’ mobility was rigid and not 
desirable. This rigidity was assured via employers’ control of their personnel planning and 
sanctions for high external firm mobility (Uunk, Mach, & Mayer, 2005, p. 395). Moreover, 
workers were encouraged to stay in the same workplace by means of enterprise-based 
privileges for longer working records. Soviet ideology further considered stable careers to be 
a sign of social status (Clarke & Donova, 1999; Clarke, 1999; Dmitriev & Maleva, 1997). 
Strong boundaries between occupation and qualification level limited occupational and job 
mobility (Huinink & Solga, 1994). Finally, access and nomination to the key (administrative) 
positions was completely controlled by the party (Gregory & Kohlhase, 1988), and 
                                                
20 The administrative allocation of labor was mainly concerned with those leaving educational institutions and 
senior positions. 
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occupational mobility was primarily “subject to political control and to changes in policy” 
(Huinink & Solga, 1994, p. 238), while individual choices were rather restricted.21 
In order to match the plan’s requirements, the state used monetary and non-monetary 
incentives as a principal allocation mechanism of individuals to occupations, industries, and 
regions (Clarke, 1999; Gregory & Kohlhase, 1988). For instance, the high-priority sectors 
(heavy industries, mining, and military complexes) were characterized by much higher 
average wages compared with similar jobs in low-priority sectors (light industry and 
services) (Gerber & Hout, 1998; Katz, 1997; Yanowitch, 1977). Nonetheless, individual 
wages depended on centrally set wage scales and bonus regulations as opposite to firms’ 
decisions (Katz, 1997). Wages further correlated with political loyalty to the party (Gregory 
& Kohlhase, 1988). Strong wage compression between less skilled and highly skilled jobs 
also affected the low correlation between schooling and wages: Empirical evidence indicates 
that wage returns to education were much lower than in the capitalist economies (Ivančič, 
2000; Katz, 1997). Another source of administrative allocation included privileges (access to 
scarce goods and services, housing, and utility subsidies) that were mostly accessible to those 
in higher positions and/or those with longer working histories (Clarke, 1999; I. Szelényi, 
1978; Yanowitch, 1977). However, the idea behind this was not to encourage employees’ 
performance, but to assert party control over responsible positions (Gregory & Kohlhase, 
1988). 
3.5 Towards the labor market: liberalization reforms and post-
industrial restructuring 
Radical liberalization reforms in post-Soviet Russia accompanied by a “transition shock” 
were associated with increasing labor market uncertainty and stimulated a considerable 
restructuring of the labor market due to massive military leaves, the implementation of new 
technologies and the re-orientation of firms, the growth of new professions, the changed role 
and functions of the old professions, and the destruction of some economic sectors and the 
creation of new ones (Gerber & Hout, 1998; Gerber, 2002). Many qualifications and skills 
                                                
21 From the workers’ perspective, low labor turnover and rigid mobility were also desired due to intrinsic 
motivation (the workplace was often seen as a “second home” and co-workers as a “second family”), and the 
social safety net was often linked to the working record in the enterprise (Clarke & Donova, 1999, p. 213). 
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obtained under the “old” system became obsolete and inadequate, which led to an instant, 
massive devaluation of the human capital accumulated previously (Kapeliushnikov & 
Lukiyanova, 2010). These processes of overall economic and market developments induced a 
great deal of unplanned job mobility and significant changes in life courses (Sabirianova, 
2002). In the 1990s, the “great human capital reallocation” took place, whereby more than 
40% of Russian workers changed their occupations. In this reallocation process, considerably 
more moves were downward and fewer moves were upward compared with the Soviet 
patterns (Sabirianova, 2002). 
Between 1991 and 1997, the gross domestic product dropped by 40%. The liberalization of 
prices instigated a hyperinflation in 1992 (1,100%), and nominal wages increased while real 
wages dropped. Prices grew four times faster than the average wage (Gerber & Hout, 1998, p. 
4). As a matter of fact, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, an ultimately new field of 
private entrepreneurship (which is crucial for the market economy) began emerging from the 
zero point (it did not exist under the Communist regime). Private-sector employment grew 
and constituted about 40% in 1997. 
Although unemployment rates increased (from 5.2% in 1992 to a peak of 13.3% in 1998), 
they were (and are) generally low and stable and mostly unaffected by economic fluctuations. 
In the course of labor market restructuring, Russian firms did not adapt to the economic 
situation through layoffs, but rather through the reduction of real wages, wage arrears, unpaid 
leave, and reduced working hours. However, such an adaptation strategy did not facilitate 
enterprise restructuring, supported inefficient firms, and kept large segments of less 
productive and technologically obsolete jobs (Gimpelson & Kapeliushnikov, 2013). 
Altogether, it is possible that Russian workers were less likely to be permanently excluded 
from the labor market, yet they were at greater risk of under-employment. 
The employment-protection legislation – which was inherited from the Soviet system with 
marginal adjustments – remained relatively strict in formal terms. Nonetheless, empirical 
research has shown poor enforcement of labor regulations (Gimpelson et al., 2010). Workers 
and trade unions possessed weak collective bargaining power. As result, the Russian labor 
market became very volatile, with high rates of labor turnover and high hiring and separation 
rates (Kapeliushnikov et al., 2011). All this suggests rather low workers’ protection and low 
firing costs. 
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The wage system is flexible and quite non-transparent. A specific feature of the Russian wage 
system is the so-called “variable” (not fixed in labor contract) part of wages that comprises 
about 40% of the total wage bill (Gimpelson & Kapeliushnikov, 2013). This flexible part of 
wages is often even non-official. The flexible wage also correlates with firm performance and 
overall economic conditions: During economic downtowns, this part of wages shrank, even 
in highly regulated public sectors such as healthcare and education. Minimum wages were 
among the lowest in the OECD countries (OECD, 2011a) and had no indexation rules and no 
clear legal framework.22 
3.6 Utilitarian principles of the Soviet social policy 
In the logic of the Esping-Andersen’s (1990) terminology, there is no place for the Soviet 
model of the welfare system due to a lack of market mechanisms. On the other hand, Boyko 
(2003) points out that the Soviet system resembled the social-democratic regime because it 
included universality and corporatism, features characteristic of countries of this welfare type 
(full-employment principle, extensive and universal social insurance, advanced social system 
protection via enterprises). In the following, I review the literature on socialist welfare system 
and discuss its main features. 
The main form of social protection in the Soviet Union can be characterized as universalistic 
and employment-related (Standing, 1996). Accordingly, the state guaranteed social security 
via access to basic services, and there was a redistributive system assuring a low level of 
earning differentials. The social security system was based on three main principles. First, the 
underlying principle of full employment with generally full-time wage employment of men 
and women became a norm, and this was preserved by treating unemployment as a 
“parasitism.” Eligibility for social protection was also guaranteed only by being in (full-time) 
employment. Second, subsidized wholesale consumer prices allowed for keeping the costs of 
living at a lower level. Third, access to social goods and services was determined by the 
employer. This access was further dependent on the employee’s position and tenure in the 
enterprise. However, the allocation of social goods and benefits, access to housing, holiday 
homes, and healthcare was often less based on needs than on the hierarchical position of the 
                                                
22 Between 1992 and 2010, the minimum wage varied between 5 and 25% of average wages (Gimpelson & 
Kapeliushnikov, 2013). 
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beneficiaries (elites such as party members, union leaders, managers, etc. were privileged in 
queues).  
Another important feature was concerned with stratified and segmented labor force 
integration with many socio-economic groups occupying positions at a lower level and paid 
below average (women, workers with physical or mental disabilities, ethnic minorities and 
migrants). Low pensions and a lack of savings (due to low life wages) pushed individuals to 
stay in employment even after official retirement (Standing, 1996). 
Despite the problems detailed above, the Soviet system can be summarized as a strong and 
stable system with a high degree of social protection (Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011; Standing, 
1999). Furthermore, state socialism was characterized by lower levels of inequality and 
higher levels of economic and social security compared with many capitalist economies 
(Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011). 
3.7 Growing inequality and developments towards the “liberal 
welfare regime” after 1991 
The shock therapy of liberalization reforms strongly shaped the social sphere and induced 
growing poverty and inequality in Russia. Figure 3–2 illustrates that various measures of 
income inequality grew immensely. For instance, the GINI inequality index rose from 23.8 in 
1988 to 48.4 in 1993 (to 38.3 in 2005). The ratio of the highest to the lowest decile (based on 
income or consumption) grew from 4.6 in 1988 to 25.1 in 1993 (to 11.6 in 2005) during the 
same period. Such a jump in income inequality is mainly due to the income gap between the 
top-earners and all other incomes. While the highest decile held 19.5% of the total income in 
1988, this almost doubled in 1993, when the highest decile earned 38.2% of the total income 
(28.9% in 2005). In turn, the lowest decile held about 4.2% of total income, and this fell to 
1.5% in 1993 (and to 2.5% in 2005).  
Several studies have attempted to classify the welfare regime in post-Soviet Russia using 
different analytic techniques (Davidova & Manning, 2009; Fenger, 2007; Myant & 
Drahokoupil, 2011). Despite different cluster compositions, these researchers characterized 
Russia as a country with low social protection, low spending on employment policies, a low 
level of well-being, high poverty rates, wide income distribution and high income inequality. 
In general, the reforms in the economic sphere were initially oriented towards the liberal 
model of the welfare states (Davidova & Manning, 2009; Hanson & Teague, 2007; 
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Kapeliushnikov et al., 2011; Knell & Srholec, 2007). In this model, social sphere is of lower 
importance because achieving its goals contradicts the goals of economic efficiency and 
development. Accordingly, the Russian welfare state is characterized by the provision of only 
minimal standards and minimal support for disadvantaged groups, as can be seen from the 
following review of social policies. 
Figure 3–2: Measures of income inequality in Russia 
 
Note: The Poverty and Inequality database of the World Bank, accessed on 19.01.2015; own calculations. 
In the middle of the 1990s and on the eve of the presidential elections, Russia proclaimed an 
orientation towards a “social state,” which, however, was not possible to reach in the 
following decades. There were various social reforms between 1996 and 2009 aimed at key 
social programs, such as health, education, housing, agriculture and demography (see the 
review of the social reform by Davidova & Manning, 2009). However, the character of these 
reforms was instead oriented towards an increase in expenditures, and the social institutions 
were not modernized, resulting in a lower efficiency of social programs (T. Maleva et al., 
2010). 
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Public social expenditures in contemporary Russia are among the lowest compared with the 
other OECD countries. Russia spends about 9% of its GDP (stable since 2002) on social 
protection, whereas this comes to an average of about 12% among other post-socialist 
counties and an average of 27% within the European Union (T. Maleva et al., 2010). The 
social protection system is mostly transfer-based and not efficient enough to reduce the 
poverty risks of the working population (OECD, 2011a).  
After the introduction of liberalization reforms, expenditures on labor market programs in 
Russia were relatively high and varied between 0.2-0.3% of the GDP between 1991 and 1999 
(they peaked in 1995, at which point they made up about 0.4% of the GDP). In the aftermath 
of the reforms in the social sphere in 2001, labor market expenditures dropped by 50% and 
became largely oriented towards passive labor market programs (financial transfers). In 2009, 
the new tax reform was introduced, which allowed for tripling the budget on labor market 
policies (which amounted to 0.29% of the GDP). Nevertheless, Russian labor market 
expenditures are comparably low and constitute only one-fifth of the OECD average (OECD, 
2011a). Moreover, active labor market programs have a very limited budget, and the 
effectiveness of these programs varies significantly across Russian regions (Akhmedov, 
Denisova, & Kartseva, 2003). The personal assistance system for jobseekers is poor and 
inefficient. Moreover, the system lacks access to good jobs, probably due to firms’ low 
interest in collaboration with employment services (OECD, 2011a). Such system 
incompetence may explain why Russian workers fear unemployment much more strongly 
compared with the workers in other OECD countries, and this fear does not depend on the 
actual economy swing (Gimpelson & Oshchepkov, 2012). Furthermore, high administrative 
costs discourage jobseekers from registering as unemployed. Consequently, the level of ILO-
based unemployment (8.5% in 2009) is three times higher than that of registered 
unemployment (2.8% in 2009) (OECD, 2011a). 
Since 2001, social security contributions have been centralized and replaced the previous 
system, which was poorly legislated, decentralized, and characterized by inefficient 
redistribution (OECD, 2011a). Even with these changes, the redistributive power of the tax 
system remained limited and inefficient, particularly due to the system of privileges (an 
inherited Soviet relict, e.g., housing and utility subsides). These privileges can be awarded 
not only to persons with physical and mental disabilities, but also to persons with special 
service records or occupational benefits. As a result, social inequality between various social 
groups might persist or even grow since disadvantaged individuals access privileges along 
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with advantaged ones. Despite the 2005 “monetization reform” aimed at cashing-out these 
privileges, the system remained less efficient and not always transparent (Zubarevich et al., 
2007). 
The statutory retirement age is low: 55 for women and 60 for men (versus a life expectancy 
of 74 for women and 62 for men). Public pensions are insufficient such that Russian 
pensioners have to remain in the labor market (Kolev & Pascal, 2002) in order to maintain 
acceptable living standards. Notably, pension benefits are not associated with the current 
employment status and income. Consequently, from the inequality point of view, pension 
policy is less efficient and increases income inequality between working and non-working 
pensioners (Gurvich & Sonina, 2012). 
3.8 The inheritance of the Soviet “gender order” in contemporary 
Russia  
Another crucial aspect of social policy – neglected by the welfare regimes of Esping-
Andersen (1990) – is concerned with the role of the state and the predominant gender norms 
regarding the (re-)production of gender-stereotyped behavior (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Pascall & Manning, 2000). With the growing labor force participation of women, family and 
childcare policies as well as gender-equalizing welfare policies are becoming an essential 
tool in mediating the relationship between the labor market and family. This is particularly 
relevant for the Soviet case due to its historically high female labor force participation rates. 
In turn, gender norms shape employers’ recruitment decisions and (female) employees’ 
incentives to apply for jobs at the top of occupational pyramid (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006). 
With regard to the gender question, the role of women in Soviet Russia has borne witness to 
many transformations. In the early Soviet period (after the First World War and the Civil 
War), when the Soviet state was oriented towards labor mobilization and industrialization, 
women were seen as “productive units” (Teplova, 2007). Women’s employment was 
supported through a generous state provision of childcare and related services to reduce their 
domestic responsibilities. This negatively affected fertility rates, which, in turn, led to further 
policy changes and the introduction of generous maternity allowance. However, the mass 
urbanization in the 1930s resulted in shortages in various social goods and services as well as 
cuts in generous childcare facilities. Hence, beyond being a productive unit, women were 
expected to be “loving wives and mothers” (Teplova, 2007, p. 288). The developments of this 
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period affected the emergence of the dual ideology regarding gender order in society: the 
formal ideology of equality on the one hand, and the patriarchal ideology in the real life on 
the other hand (Ashwin, 2002; Katz, 2001; Khotkina, 1994).  
After the Second World War, the reproductive role of women intensified and women’s 
maternity and good-wife roles were seen as their primary obligation (Teplova, 2007). While 
women’s productive role was still relevant, women were increasingly considered “second-
class workers” (Ashwin, 2002, p. 23). State policies were aimed prominently at both the 
stimulation of fertility rates and high female labor force participation via maternal and child-
paid leaves, childcare provisions, and family allowance,. Childcare coverage was very high 
and well-developed with about 60% of children aged between 1 and 6 years in nurseries and 
kindergartens (Matthews, 1986, p. 83). At the same time, employment was a main channel to 
access childcare and related services (Teplova & Wooley, 2005). Additionally, labor 
legislation guaranteed a high level of job security and various benefits and privileges for 
working mothers (Teplova, 2007).23 Consequently, the Soviet regime was quite successful in 
achieving a high female labor force participation: In Russia, females’ labor market 
participation amounted to 67% in 1960 and 87% in 1975 (McAuley, 1981, p. 37).24 
Although the state gave a strong impetus for women’s equal labor market participation with 
men, there were no similar attempts to equalize domestic and parental responsibilities (Adler 
& Brayfield, 1996; Schwartz, 1979). In this context, there was an asymmetry in parental 
responsibilities between genders in ideological, legislative, and everyday life: Men were 
legally freed from almost all obligations towards women and children, while women had an 
unlimited liability for their children. Additionally, childcare leave was only available for 
mothers. Thus, women were fully responsible for their children’s social and emotional sphere 
                                                
23 Women enjoyed 112 days of paid maternity leave and up to one year of unpaid leave with a guarantee of 
coming back to their working place and preserving a continuous employment record. Women were further 
protected from firing during pregnancy and before a child turned three years old. Comprehensive childcare 
facilities for pre-school and school-age children as well as extracurricular activities enabled full-time 
employment. The state also provided a maternity grant and a second lump sum payment when the child was 
being weaned (for more details, see Ashwin, 2002; McAuley, 1981, Chapter 9; Teplova, 2007). 
24 As a reference point, the female employment rate among OECD countries was only 58% in 1989 (OECD, 
2015). 
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and considered the unequal distribution of parental duties to be the norm (cf. Chernova, 2007, 
pp. 145–147). Contrary to women, men had more limited and higher status roles in Soviet 
society: Men were expected to serve “as leaders, managers, soldiers, and workers,” and to 
fulfill a role “of fathers and providers” (Ashwin, 2002, p. 23). Hence, men’s status and 
position in society was determined through their occupational position at work and the main 
breadwinner role in the family. A combination of these traditional masculine functions 
reinforced and promoted the patriarchal order of Russian society (Katz, 2001), in which a 
man was seen as “a universal patriarch to which both men and women were subject” 
(Ashwin, 2002, pp. 23–24). This gender order survived the Communist regime into a modern 
times. 
As has been discussed, the turmoil liberalization reforms in 1991 neglected the social sphere 
due to the tight financial constraints and priority of other spheres. The Soviet system of the 
enterprise-based social benefits was “transformed” into the post-Soviet labor market, thereby 
shifting the administration of many social entitlements to private employers. However, in the 
reality of the competitive labor market, private employers become profit-oriented and were 
accordingly forced to minimize their production costs. Social provision became one such cost 
area (Teplova, 2007). Simultaneously, fertility rates dropped and abortion rates increased, 
which induced a demographic crisis in the post-Soviet Russia (Hollander, 1997). Females 
employment dropped by 10% in 1992 (compared with 1975) and lay at 78%, with a further 
reduction of about 10% in the next decade (calculated from GOSKOMSTAT, 2001).25 
The “re-domestication” of women took place in both political and cultural spheres. Russian 
policy-makers and society favored the idea of freeing “over-emancipated” Russian women 
(Katz 2001: 2004) and called for returning women “home to [their] traditional duties and 
position in the family” (Racioppi & See, 1995, p. 824). This patriarchal view also became 
very popular as a rejection of and protest against Soviet-style gender equality (Katz, 2001). 
Attitudes towards traditional gender values were reinforced, with a growing appreciation of 
women devoting themselves to their families (Motiejunaite & Kravchenko, 2008). Women’s 
increased engagement in family life was welcomed and acknowledged as benefiting society 
                                                
25 In East Germany, for instance, female employment shrank by approximately 37% from 1989 to 1992 (Ferree, 
1995, p. 12). 
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as a whole (Teplova, 2007, p. 300). Such a view was further maintained by the growing 
influence of the Orthodox Church (Degtiar, 2010). 
To facilitate these policy aims – predominantly oriented towards female labor market exit – a 
number of changes concerned with maternity and childcare were launched. Paid 
employment-linked maternity leave was extended (to 170 days), state-supported maternity 
leave was introduced for women who faced lays-off during pregnancy and for full-time 
students. Likewise, mothers benefited from prolonged paid childcare leave (until the child 
reached 18 months) along with a “parental leave benefit”, as well as unpaid childcare leave 
(until the child reached 36 months) in post-Soviet Russia (Teplova, 2007). Since policy 
became more oriented towards in-home caregiving, social policy budgets were drastically 
cut, which also resulted in diminishing public childcare support (Hofäcker, Stoilova, & 
Riebling, 2011). 
These policy changes led to women’s prolonged career interruptions and increased the 
conflict between unpaid (particularly childcare) and paid work. Russian women increasingly 
entered into “reproductive” or non-market work. Contrary to many other post-socialist 
countries, the number of housewives increased substantially in Russia (van der Lippe & 
Fodor, 1998). At the same time, low wages did not allow for relying only on one income 
(LaFont, 2001), which mostly explains moderate reductions in female labor market 
participation rates. Entitlement to different leaves was also extended to fathers, though 
Teplova (2007, p. 298) argues that these instead “reinforced a perception of women as […] 
main care providers” due to the lack of policies designed to redistribute care responsibilities. 
All these changes were likely to enhance the patriarchal gender order that dominated Russian 
society and to strengthen society’s perception (and also that of women themselves) of 
Russian women as being primarily responsible for domestic work and homemaking (O. 
Zdravomyslova, 2003). Conjointly, the gender role in Russia with regard to the childcare 
remained strongly directed towards women (OECD, 2011a). This was able to instigate 
employers’ growing discrimination practices against women (Liborakina, 2001; The World 
Bank, 2003), and against mothers and pregnant women, in particular (CEDAW, 1999; 
Sinyavskaya, Zaharov, & Kartseva, 2007). Self-selection of women into low-paid jobs in the 
public sectors was one of the consequences. What is more, reforms in the social sphere 
potentially affected the employment and occupational patterns of working mothers as well as 
of women in fertile ages more generally. Empirical research emphasizes that combining work 
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and family life became difficult to manage in Russia (Sinyavskaya et al., 2007; Teplova, 
2007; Vovk, 2006). Moreover, in terms of poverty risk children belong to the most vulnerable 
groups (Denisova, 2007; Karabchuk & Pashinova, 2011; Spryskov, 2003). All in all, the 
available evidence increasingly reports a marginalization of women’s labor market position 
in the post-Soviet Era (see Brainerd, 2000; Gerber & Mayorova, 2006; Linz, 1996; Ogloblin, 
1999). 
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Chapter 4  
Data and methods 
4.1 General description 
The empirical analysis in the thesis is based on the statistical analysis of the best available 
longitudinal survey data for Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. The core interest of this thesis is 
to describe the trajectories of growth and development over the life course, to analyze the 
role of educational transitions by and in adulthood, and to approximate the analyses of 
pattern of casual relationships over longer time spans. Therefore, the first data requirement 
for the research of educational trajectories over the life course are the availability of the panel 
and/or life-history data. Moreover, since the main focus of this thesis is the comparative lens 
between Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, the second data requirement regards a long-enough 
time horizon to cover both periods.  
The foremost survey that fulfills all aforementioned requirements is the linked data from the 
Russian Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) and the Education and Employment Survey 
for Russia (EES), which are exploited for the empirical analyses in this thesis.26  
The GGS Programme is a cross-national panel survey designed to study demographic and 
social developments and the determinants of these developments in European and some non-
European countries (Vikat et al., 2007). The first wave of the Russian GGS was carried out in 
2004 and was based on a nationally representative sample of the 11,261 respondents (7,038 
women and 4,223 men; calculated from the first wave of GGS, version 4.2.) aged between 18 
and 79 years, with each respondent representing one household. The sampling covers 32 
                                                
26 The GGS data were obtained from the Generations and Gender Programme Data Archive and were created by 
the Demoscope Independent Research Center (Moscow) (United Nations, 2005). The EES for Russia was 
conducted by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Rostock), the Independent Institute of Social 
Policy (Moscow), and the Demoscope Independent Research Center (Moscow) (Bühler et al., 2007). 
For my analyses, I used the merged file of the GGS and EES data (file “GGS_Wave1_Russia_V.4.1mergedees-
versionIISP”) received from Max-Plank Institute for Demographic Research. I thank to Sigrid Gellers-
Barkmann for giving me access to the data.  
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regions in Russia. The response rate was around 15% in St. Petersburg and Moscow and 
around 57% in all other areas (IISP, 2014).  
The EES was conducted in 2005 and represents a unique follow-up study of 18-to-54-year-
old respondents who participated in the first wave of the Russian GGS (Bühler et al., 2007). 
The survey was carried out by the Max Plank Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, 
Germany together with the Independent Institute for Social Policy in Moscow. The EES 
covers detailed biographical information on respondents’ employment, education, fertility, 
and residential histories from age 17 until the time of the interview.27 The respondents were 
chosen based on the multistage probability sample of dwelling units, with a random selection 
of eligible respondents within listed household members. The survey relied on a face-to-face 
interviewing approach and is claimed to be random at each step of the selection (Bühler & 
Konietzka, 2011). The response rate was around 85%, resulting in a the sub-sample of 6455 
individuals (3995 women and 2460 men).28  
Regarding the GGS data, it should be noted that low response rates in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg is a general problem of Russia’s surveys (Sinyavskaya, 2012). 29  Previous 
literature utilizing the same data acknowledges the problematic of low response rates in these 
two major cities (Billingsley, 2011; Bühler & Konietzka, 2011; Konietzka & Bühler, 2010). 
Despite this limitation, comparisons with Census data showed that the GGS sample mimics 
well the major characteristics of the Russian population and, thus, is representative for the 
whole population (Houle & Shkolnikov, 2005). To account for possible selection and attrition 
bias,  I adopt the strategy of previous studies by controlling for residence in St. Petersburg 
and Moscow at the GGS interview date. Yet, I recognize that the empirical analyses may not 
                                                
27 For survey instruments, see Bühler et al. (2007). 
28 I checked official data for female-male proportions in the Russian populations. Between 1926 and 2012, the 
composition of the Russian population consisted of 47% men (45% in 2012) and 53% women (55% in 2012) 
(ROSSTAT, 2012, p. 180). 
29 For example, Mu (2006) explored sample attrition for the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 
and found out that the leavers (those who dropped out) are more likely to live in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as 
well as in other urban areas. It seems that the higher the urbanization grade is, the lower the level of cooperation 
of the households is. One explanation for this is a high criminality rate in Russia, and in urban regions in 
particular (Sinyavskaya, 2012). 
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be fully representative for the population in Moscow and St. Petersburg. For sensitivity 
checks, I additionally conduct all analyses excluding the GGS Moscow and St. Petersburg 
residents. No substantial conclusion did change. 30 
Regarding the EES data, a comparison with the 1994 microcensus, the 2002 population 
census data, as well as data from Federal service of state statistics points to a rather relatively 
good representativeness of the EES sample for the Russian population even though the 
correspondence of the EES with the 1994 microcensus regarding educational attainment 
seems to be less sufficient (Soroko & Konietzka, 2006). 31 My own comparison of the EES 
data with the official data for female/male proportions in the Russian populations revealed 
that between 1926 and 2012, the composition of Russian population consisted of 47(45)% 
men and 53(55)% women (ROSSTAT, 2012, p. 80).  
4.2 Data preparation and major coding strategy 
The EES was designed to gather data for event-history analyses and contains monthly 
information on various biographies, including educational, employment and non-
employment, childbirth and migration ones. Additionally, the survey captures main and 
additional (performed parallel to main) activities, such as education + parallel 
employment/parental leave, gainful employment + education/parallel gainful 
employment/parental leave, housework + education/parallel gainful employment/parental 
leave, and unemployment + education/parallel gainful employment. Education episodes cover 
information on whether studies were interrupted, the kind of education, and whether the 
education was part-time and qualified with a diploma. Within the employment biography, 
information on the occupation, the status in employment, the type of the forms of property, 
industry position, working hours, and working schedule is available. For the last three 
indicators, the information is gathered when the person took up and left each job. Non-
employment activities include paternal leave, housework, unemployment, military (only for 
                                                
30 Results are available from the author upon request. 
31 My empirical investigations might be slightly biased in favor of the higher-educated because I conduct 
examination on the basis of retrospective data. Empirical research has shown that the lower educated and those 
working in manual jobs or low services have higher risks of mortality (Bessudnov et al., 2011; Bessudnov, 
2011). 
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men), and retirement. To recover the partnership biography, I used information from the GGS 
partnership module. 
The data covers the period between 1965 and 2005 and allows for reconstructing the 
individual life courses with all episodes in and outside the labor market in the period of these 
40 years. On the basis of educational, residence and family histories, I was further able to fill 
in information on education and training events, partnership states and number of children, 
and regional mobility events that occurred during labor market related episodes. For each 
episode, the month and year of the start and end date was available.32 Altogether 1,701,292 
monthly episodes were generated. Each episode is described by the month and year of the 
beginning and the end of the episode.33 
4.2.1 The definition of the main analyses sample  
For the purpose of this study, only individuals who have completed initial education were 
selected. Individuals are considered as having completed their initial education when they left 
formal education for at least 12 months. I decided in favor of 12 months to ensure that 
persons were actually available in the labor market and not in a “waiting line” to continue 
initial education, for example, due to early family roles or labor market participation in order 
to finance education (continuation). In order to visualize my approach and possible problems 
connected with inappropriate sample definition, Figure 4–1 explains how the point of leaving 
the educational system was specified. 
In the presented example, all individuals were enrolled in education at the start of the 
observation period, i.e., in January of year they turned 17 years old. As mentioned, the point 
of leaving education is defined as being when the respondent left education for 12 months or 
more and entered another activity (respondents 1, 4, and 6). In the case that the respondent 
returned to education within 12 months (respondents 2 and 3), the point of leaving the 
educational system is defined when he or she left the educational system for at least 12 
months again. However, there are also individuals who never left education (respondent 5), 
                                                
32 Parts of the analyses on EES data used a syntax for generating the episode data written by Kreynfeld and 
Konietzka (2012). 
33 For more efficient data use, I join similar episodes so that relevant information is not lost. For this purpose, I 
use “stjoin” Stata syntax. 
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or the point of leaving education cannot be observed (respondent 7). In the former case, 
individuals do not represent any analytical interest for my study as they are not yet available 
in the labor market. In the latter case, an individual enters the educational system again 
within next 12 months; however, we are not able to observe this due to the right-censoring at 
the interview date. Consequently, to reduce potential selectivity bias, individual histories in 
which the gap between education and the date of interview was less than 12 months were 
censored on the right (excluded from the analyses). 
Figure 4–1: Definition of the point of leaving the educational system in the sample 
 
Note: Own illustration. 
Considering these criteria, the subsample of 6,046 individuals (3,762 women and 2,284 men) 
was selected. Further restrictions to the sample are different in each empirical chapter and are 
thus presented in detail in the research design section of the respective chapter. 
Importantly, due to the design of the EES, there are 660 respondents for whom the first spell 
is not educational, i.e., they were not in education in January of the year when they turned 17. 
The consequence is that the actual gap between the previous and the next educational spell 
cannot be precisely identified. A comparison with the GGS data shows that those individuals 
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had mainly incomplete secondary education. In contrast to Bühler and Konietzka (2011), I do 
not exclude these respondents since their exclusion might lead to biased results towards the 
higher-educated. Instead, I assume that these respondents have left the educational system by 
the start of the observational period if they do not return to formal schooling within next 12 
months (as defined above). For these individuals, I set the educational level as incomplete 
secondary education by default. This may increase if they attain the next (higher) level. In the 
multivariate analyses, I add the control “approximate education” for such cases. More 
detailed information on the coding strategy of educational attainment can be found in 
Appendix B. 
4.2.2 The construction of variables used in the empirical analyses 
Table 4–1 provides an overview of variables used in my empirical chapters and their 
measurement. 
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Table 4–1: Information about the coding of variables 
Adult education enrolment (completion) 
Based on the reported type of education (Card 4 of the EES questionnaire) the individuals received. Only 
education after attaining initial education level is considered. 
= 1 No adult education No enrolment (completion) into (of) adult education 
= 2 Upgrading Enrolment (completion) into (of) education that is of higher level than 
previously attained 
= 3 Sidestepping Enrolment (completion) into (of) education that is at the same level of below 
compared with previously attained 
Age of labor market entry 
Calculated using year when labor market entry has occurred (Y_LME) deducted reported year of birth (Y_B). 
= 1 below 20 (Y_LME – Y_B) < 20, (min. 17) 
= 2 20-25 20 >= (Y_LME – Y_B) <= 25 
= 4 over 25 (Y_LME – Y_B) >= 25, (max. 36) 
Approximated education  
= 0 No Was in education in the January of the year when turned 17 
= 1 Yes Was not in education in the January of the year when turned 17; 
As a result, educational attainment in the January of the year when turned 17 
is assigned to be as incomplete secondary, but is changed if the respondent 
attains next (higher) level 
Authoritative position 
Based on the question on position in a job (Card 8 of the EES questionnaire) 
= 0 No Unqualified worker; qualified worker; highly-qualified worker; employee 
who performs relatively simple tasks; employee who performs more 
complex tasks, implying some autonomy; self-employed, i.e., a person who 
has a business of his or her own in industry, trade, or the service sector, and 
does not hire his/her own employees; self-employed lawyer, doctor, notary, 
who has a private practice and does not hire his/her own employees; farmer; 
agricultural employee 
= 1 Yes Team leader; foreman; employee who performs autonomously an important 
task or has a few subordinates; leader with significant managerial authority 
with the right to take important decisions; self-employed, i.e., a person who 
has a business of his or her own in industry, trade, or the service sector, and 
hires his/her own employees; self-employed lawyer, doctor, notary, who has 
a private practice and hires his/her own employees; 
Branch of economy 
Based on the question on industry the person worked in (Card 7 of the EES questionnaire). Coded according 
to the Russian Classification of Economic Activities (Russian acronym: Obshherossijskij klassifikator vidov 
jekonomicheskoj dejatel'nosti, OKVED) 
= 1 Agriculture Agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishery and fish breeding 
= 2 Mining Mining 
= 3 Manufacturing Manufacturing 
= 4 Power industry Production and distribution of electric energy, gas, water 
= 5 Construction Construction 
= 6 Trade and consumer 
services 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair services, hotel business, and catering 
= 7 Transport and 
communication 
Transport, mailing, communication, and telecommunication services 
= 8 Finance services Banking, insurance, marketing, and other financial activities; real estate, 
legal, leasing services, information technologies, etc. 
= 9 State services Federal state administration; regional state administration; municipal state 
administration; national defense, ministry for emergency, police, and fire 
departments; compulsory social provision 
= 10 Health Health and social protection, social assistance 
= 11 Education  Education, science/academy  
= 12 Other personal, social, 
and communal services 
Culture and art; other communal and personal services 
= 13 Other or miss Other; non-reported 
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Table 4–1: Continued 
Cumulative experience of unemployment 
= Months in unemployment Months of unemployment (cumulated) within the last five years at the start 
of the current spell, after leaving education. Any experience of 
unemployment is considered. 
Educational level b 
Based on type of education (Card 4 of the EES questionnaire) the individuals received. 
= 1 Incomplete secondary Highest attained education is unfinished secondary; assigned to every person 
for whom higher attainment level could not be identified 
= 2 Lower vocational Highest attained education is unfinished or finished secondary and 
vocational education 
= 3 Secondary completed Highest attained education is finished secondary 
= 4 Secondary professional Highest attained education is secondary professional based on incomplete or 
complete secondary 
= 5 Higher Highest attained education is higher or post-graduate 
Employment status 
Based on the question on main activity (-ies) the respondent was engaged in during the current spell (Card 3 
of the EES questionnaire). 
= 1 Employed If was working for payment or received income from his/her activity and did 
not get a pension; was working without payment for a family enterprise or 
farm and did not get a pension; was a working pensioner. 
= 2 Unemployed If was not working and was looking for a job or was officially registered 
unemployed, and did not have parallel employment 
= 3 Inactive If was on maternal leave/parental leave; or a housewife/looked after the 
household; or in the military or alternative civilian service for a fixed period; 
a pensioner and did not work; or studied; or any other status when 
respondent did not have a parallel employment or was unemployed. 
Entered the first job 
First job is defined as any job after leaving initial education. 
= 0 No If did not enter the first job 
= 1 Yes If entered the first job 
Experience of adult education  
= 0 No Have never been enrolled into adult education at the start of the current spell 
= 1 Yes At least one episode of enrollment in adult education at the start of the 
current spell 
Experience of interruption 
= 1 No Zero episodes of being not in the labor force and/or unemployed before start 
of current spell 
= 2 Not in the labor force At least one episode of being not in the labor force before start of the current 
spell 
= 3 Unemployed At least one episode of being unemployed before start of the current spell 
Female   
= 0 No Male 
= 1 Yes Female 
GGS residence area in Moscow or St. Petersburg  
Based on the GGS variable on region or administrative unit of residence. 
= 0 No Residence in other areas than Moscow or St. Petersburg during the GGS 
interview (in 2004) 
= 1 Yes Residence in Moscow or St. Petersburg during the GGS interview (in 2004) 
Married 
Measured using GGS dates of co-habitation, marriage, separation, divorce and widowhood and (start and end) 
date of the current spell. The method of episode-splitting was implemented (Blossfeld, Golsch and Rower 
2007:137ff). Episodes were split into sub-episodes when partnership status have changed. 
= 0 No Not married (never married, live together, divorced, separated or widowed) 
at the start of the current spell 
= 1 Yes Married at the start of the current spell 
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Table 4–1: Continued 
Occupational class 
Based on the question on occupation in a job (Card 5 of the EES questionnaire); military personnel of the 
Russian army is coded to missing category 
= 1 Manager Senior manager in state administration, in a public or political organizations, 
and trade-unions; top manager 
= 2 Professional Professional with higher education in technical and medical fields, the 
natural sciences and humanities 
= 3 Semi-professional Professional with special technical education; professional with special 
education in medicine, teaching, the natural sciences; professional with 
special education in finance, trade, commerce; state official; professional 
with special education in other areas 
= 4 Services Employee in an office, waiting rooms, a warehouse, a post office; worker of 
state and non-state defense bodies; worker in the service sector and trade 
= 5 Skilled Qualified worker in timber, the fishing industries, and agriculture; qualified 
manual worker and worker using special tools; qualified worker who uses 
complex mechanical mechanisms and machinery 
= 6 Unskilled Unqualified worker in different industries of the national economy 
Presence of children 
Measured using birth date of a child and (start and end) date of the current spell. The method of episode-
splitting was implemented. Episodes were split into sub-episodes when each child was 0 and 216 months old. 
= 0 No children No child at the start of the actual spell or (all) children are aged 216 months 
and more 
= 1 Children aged 18 years old 
and below 
At least one child is aged between 0-216 months at the start of the current 
spell 
Post-Soviet labor market entry 
Based on the period when labor market entry has occurred. For the empirical analyses in Chapter 5, labor 
market entry is defined as entry into first significant job (6 months or more). For the empirical analyses in 
Chapter 7, labor market entry is defined as entry into any first job. Only jobs after leaving initial education are 
considered. 
= 0 No Job episode starts between 01.01.1965 and 31.12.1990 
= 1 Yes Job episode starts between 01.01.1991 and 31.12.2005 
Post-Soviet period 
= 0 No Spell ends between 01.01.1965 and 31.12.1990 
= 1 Yes Spell ends between 01.01.1991 and 31.12.2005 
Previous labor force experience 
= Months in employment Months of employment (cumulated) at the start of the current spell. Only 
employment episodes after leaving initial education and labor market entry 
are considered.  
Previous number of jobs 
= N of jobs Number of (any) jobs (cumulated) at the start of the current spell. Only jobs 
after leaving initial education are considered. 
Previous number of non-employment episodes 
= N of non-employment 
episodes 
Number of not in the labor force or unemployment episodes (cumulated) at 
the start of the current spell. Only non-employment episodes after leaving 
initial education and labor market entry are considered.  
Private sector 
Based on (1) the question on property type of an enterprise or organization the person worked in (Card 4 of 
the EES questionnaire), and (2) the question on type of employee 
= 0 No Mixed property enterprise; state or municipal enterprise; non-for-profit, 
public organization 
= 1 Yes Newly established private enterprise; former state, privatized enterprise; 
international organization, regional office of a foreign company; worked for 
a private person; self-employed; worked for payment at a family enterprise; 
worked without for payment at a family enterprise 
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Table 4–1: Continued 
Rural area 
Based on the question on the type of the settlement the respondent lived in (moved into) during actual spell  
= 0 No Residence in a regional, territorial, or republican center; another town/city 
= 1 Yes Residence in an urban-type village; a village 
Sector of economy 
Based on variable for branch of economy 
= 1 Primary Agriculture; mining 
= 2 Secondary Manufacturing; power industry; construction 
= 3 Tertiary Trade and consumer services; transport and communication; finance 
services; state services; health; education; other personal, social and 
communal services 
= 4 Other or miss Other; non-reported 
Self-employed, family worker or farmer 
Based on (1) the question on property type of an enterprise or organization the person worked in (Card 4 of 
the EES questionnaire), and (2) the question on type of employee 
= 0 No Working and is not self-employed, family worker or farmer 
= 1 Yes Self-employed; worked for payment at a family enterprise; worked without 
for payment at a family enterprise; self-employed, i.e., a person who has a 
business of his or her own in industry, trade, or the service sector, and hires 
his/her own employees; self-employed, i.e., a person who has a business of 
his or her own in industry, trade, or the service sector, and does not hire 
his/her own employees; self-employed lawyer, doctor, notary, who has a 
private practice and does not hire his/her own employees; self-employed 
lawyer, doctor, notary, who has a private practice and hires his/her own 
employees; farmer; agricultural employee 
Socio-economic origin 
Based on the GGS constructed variable for father’s and mother’s highest educational attainment, coded as 
ISCED level. The highest educational attainment level among parents was calculated. The original labels for 
variable are provided in parentheses. 
= 1 High Secondary professional and higher (first stage of tertiary; second stage of 
tertiary) 
= 2 Medium Secondary completed and post-secondary non-tertiary (upper secondary 
level; post-secondary non-tertiary) 
= 3 Low Lower vocational and incomplete secondary (pre-primary education; 
primary level; lower secondary level) 
Note: a For EES survey instruments, see Bühler et al. (2007). GGS survey instruments are available at 
http://www.ggp-i.org/data/questionnaires.html. b For more details on educational level variable, 
Appendix B 
4.3 Method and software 
In my thesis, I employ different statistical method model specifications to examine my 
research questions, and they are thus described in the respective chapters. 
For statistical computation and graphical analysis I employ Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2014). 
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Chapter 5  
Horizontal and vertical gender inequalities at labor 
market entry and regime change34 
5.1 Introduction 
Gender segregation in the labor market is a decisive feature of all modern societies (e.g., 
Abendroth, Maas, & van der Lippe, 2013; M. Buchmann & Charles, 1995; Charles & 
Grusky, 2004; Charles, 2005; Estévez-Abe, 2006; Meulders, Plasman, Rigo, & O’Dorchai, 
2010; OECD, 2011b; Steinmetz, 2012) because it is often connected to a systematic 
disadvantaging of women (compared with men) in the workplace in terms of wages (Marini 
& Fan, 1997; Perales, 2013; Petersen & Morgan, 1995), occupational rewards such as fringe 
benefits (Gundert & Mayer, 2012; Perman & Stevens, 1989), access to authoritative job 
positions (Kraus & Yonay, 2000; Reskin & Ross, 1992; Smith, 2002; Yaish & Stier, 2009), 
and promotion possibilities (Bukodi & Dex, 2009; Glass, 1990).35 Remarkably, these female 
disadvantages in occupational rewards still persist despite women’s striking gains in the 
educational arena (OECD, 2012). This suggests that vertical gender inequalities might be a 
result of the separation of the labor market into men’s and women’s jobs, occupations, 
industries and sectors. In the following, I refer to this separation as horizontal gender 
differences.  
Whereas gender segregation in the labor market has been studied extensively in most 
Western countries (e.g., Abendroth et al., 2013; Charles, 2005; Gundert & Mayer, 2012; 
                                                
34 This chapter is a modified and extended version of Kosyakova, Y., Kurakin, D., and Blossfeld, H.-P. (2015). 
Horizontal and Vertical Gender Segregation in Russia – Changes upon Labour Market Entry Before and After 
the Collapse of the Soviet Regime. In: European Sociological Review, 31(5), 573-590. For permissions, see 
Appendix F. 
35 The inequality recognized in the context of this chapter reflects the way women and men behave differently in 
the labor market. This may be a result not only of systematic discrimination but also of their preferences. 
Nevertheless, I speak of female disadvantage simply to have a term with which to describe the direction this 
gender gap is taking. 
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Steinmetz, 2012), investigations of post-Communist societies are rare (however, see Gerber 
& Mayorova, 2006; Ogloblin, 2005a; Trapido, 2006). Even fewer studies have examined the 
dynamics of gender segregation across the collapse of Communist regimes. This research gap 
is particularly striking because these societies have transformed from centralized planned 
economies characterized by highly egalitarian configurations (in formal and ideological 
terms) into decentralized and market economies with privatized individual risks and 
decisions. Studying societies experiencing such a “regime change” provides a unique 
opportunity to understand how gender differences and inequalities respond to fundamental 
changes in their economic, social, and cultural settings (Wong, 2002, p. 222). 
Despite gender-egalitarian Soviet ideology, women’s (full-time) labor force participation in 
paid work and equalized educational opportunities, horizontal differences, and vertical 
inequalities prevailed in Soviet Russia. The collapse of the Communist regime instigated an 
unprecedented change in Russia’s labor market structure. Job opportunities and wages 
declined for many vulnerable groups, particularly for women (Brainerd, 1998). 36  This 
transition even reinforced cultural gender-specific stereotypes, with women being 
increasingly considered a “secondary” labor force in the new Russian labor market (Ashwin, 
2002; Posadskaya, 1993). 
Existing studies on (Soviet) Russia as well as other empirical studies on Western societies 
usually consider all workers and compare individuals in very heterogeneous career and life-
course biographies, and in different stages of their careers. Contrarily, I concentrate on a 
specific group of employees: labor market entrants. This group is particularly responsive to 
structural changes in economic, social, political, and cultural spheres due to its members’ 
relatively vulnerable labor market positions as “outsiders” and their short work experience 
(Gangl, 2002).37 Hence, it is also the group that has been most likely to be affected by 
liberalization reforms in Russia since 1991. Because the first step into the labor market 
                                                
36 Though, see van der Lippe and Fodor (1998) for contra-evidence. 
37 A major reason is that – ceteris paribus – employers are more reluctant to higher labor market entrants 
(compared to more experienced workers) as they have to invest more in training to make them productive 
(Thurow, 1975). Nevertheless, higher initial investments into firm-specific training are profitable for employers 
under the condition of mutual long-term relationships. Moreover, hiring labor market entrants might still be 
appealing to employers, due to lower start-off rewards (such as wages or non-monetary benefits). 
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impacts substantially on the subsequent career (H.-P. Blossfeld, 1987; Bukodi & Dex, 2009; 
Scherer, 2005), studying patterns of gender segregation among labor market entrants may 
also shed some light on the future production and reproduction of gender inequalities over the 
later life course. Importantly, labor market entrants are less likely to be recruited via “internal 
job ladders” that create path-dependent career trajectories by amplifying initial (dis-
)advantages over time (cf. DiPrete & Eirich, 2006). Likewise, gender differences in tenure 
and occupation-specific training – which affect subsequent career stages – have not yet 
emerged (Marini & Fan, 1997). Therefore, occupational outcomes at the career start are less 
dependent on these factors, and gender differences in job positioning cannot be attributed to 
path-dependent outcomes. 
Drawing upon retrospective data from the Russian Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) 
and the Education and Employment Survey for Russia (EES), I aim to contribute to the 
literature on gender inequalities in the labor market by studying how gender segregation upon 
labor market entry has changed through the transition from socialism to a liberalized market 
economy in Russia. I distinguish gender segregation in terms of both horizontal gender 
differences and vertical gender inequalities (Blackburn & Jarman, 2006). The horizontal 
dimension concerns the way in which men and women jointly distribute themselves over 
different sectors of economic activity (e.g., occupations, industrial sectors). The vertical 
dimension refers to inequalities between men and women with respect to “desirable 
attributes” of jobs, such as job rewards and further job opportunities (Bettio & 
Verashchagina, 2009, p. 30).  
Because the data used provide no information on wages, I refer to the other important vertical 
outcome: authority positions. Authority in the workplace is a good proxy for higher 
occupational remuneration because such positions are usually better paid and characterized 
by more responsibility for and influence over other workers (Smith, 2002).38 For the purpose 
of this study, I consider the job authority outcome to even be superior to wages for two 
reasons: (1) the very high compression of wages during the Communist regime and (2) the 
way authoritative positions “opened” access to different privileges (e.g., special medical care, 
                                                
38 According to Yanovitch (1977, p. 40), the distinction between those making decisions and commanding 
others and those “executing” these decisions was “a source of significant inequalities in earnings” under the 
Communist regime. 
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housing, transport, travels, etc.) and so-called “deficit goods” (Yanowitch, 1977). 39  One 
could argue that authoritative positions are generally less available to labor market entrants. 
However, this argument, in particular, reveals how job authority is a crucial outcome because 
earlier gender inequalities in access to power and decision-making positions might promote 
gender-inequalities in the later career (Kanter, 1977; see also Hultin & Szulkin, 2003). 
Hence, studying the gender gap in early access to authoritative positions will enhance our 
understanding of the emergence of gender inequalities in the Soviet and post-Soviet labor 
force in a broader sense.  
In the next section, I discuss the main features of the gender employment structure in Russia 
during the period covered in this study, and I review the available empirical literature on 
gender segregation in the Russian labor market before and after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In doing so, an additional focus is set on the role of the educational system, family 
policies, and cultural aspects for the (re-)production of labor market related gender 
disparities. Afterwards, I discuss the theories on gender segregation and elaborate my 
hypotheses for Russian labor market entrants. It is important to mention that I do not test a 
specific theory, but rather use these theories as the ground for my argumentation. Following 
this, the data, methods, and variables are described before moving to the main results. 
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings and their implication for social 
inequality with regard to gender during and after the regime change in Russia. 
5.2 The historical context of gender segregation in Russia 
5.2.1 The labor force participation of Soviet women and “gender equality”  
The Soviet regime was characterized by a state-driven, centralized, planned economy. Soviet 
socialist culture emphasized the high intrinsic value of work – primarily in production 
industries – and propagandized its contribution to socialization, economic independence, 
social status, and personal satisfaction. Strict employment regulations prohibited non-
                                                
39 Although communist party membership increased the chances of having an authoritative position, it was not a 
sole criterion (Rona-Tas & Guseva, 2001; Yanowitch, 1977, p. 34). For instance, such professions as “gang 
foreman” or “head of construction department” did not require party membership. Furthermore, not all party 
members had access to privileges, and among party members, access to privileges was stratified by different 
positions in the party. 
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working. Based on the comparatively low productivity of the Socialist regimes, female work 
was also highly demanded (Lapidus, 1993). Based on these factors, the Soviet social 
consciousness denied the idea that women could be not participating in the social production 
(Ajvazova, 1998). Female labor force participation in paid work was consequently very high 
in the Soviet times (between 66.7% in 1965 and 86.9% in 1975; McAuley, 1981, p. 37) and 
usually full-time (Ahlander, 2001). 
This high women’s labor market participation was a result of Soviet policies that “recognized 
the potential contribution of women to both production and reproduction” (Lapidus, 1993, p. 
138). In order to encourage women’s integration into the workforce, government policies 
guaranteed them high minimum wages, generous maternity leave, and the provision of 
daycare (Brainerd, 2000; Meshcherkina, 2002). Employment was virtually a main channel for 
accessing childcare and related services (Teplova & Wooley, 2005). However, this “generous 
public support” and the low Soviet wages seemed to not be enough to sustain a family with 
only one earner (Lapidus, 1976). Hence, women also worked in order to ensure sufficient 
household material well-being. Nevertheless, women still had the primary responsibility of 
domestic tasks, resulting in a higher burden of reconciling work and family duties at the price 
of their career prospects (Ogloblin, 1999, p. 604). Soviet studies indicate that although 
women and men spent roughly equal amounts of time in paid employment, women spent 
more than double the amount of time on housework compared with men (for a literature 
review, see Lapidus, 1993). 
Soviet employment regulations were very strict and did not allow discrimination against 
women. However, while Soviet women officially enjoyed equal rights in terms of wages and 
employment, the literature reports that they earned only 60–65% of male wages (Katz, 1997; 
McAuley, 1981). It is worth mentioning that due to the Soviet ideology of the working class 
domination (Inkeles, 1950), manual workers in blue-collar occupations enjoyed higher 
average wages than employees in comparable position in white-collar occupations 
(Yanowitch, 1977, pp. 29–33). Accordingly, one reason for the earning differentials between 
men and women might be seen in women’s different occupational distribution: Women were 
traditionally more likely to be employed in the low-priority sectors such as health and 
education as well as trade and semi-skilled professional occupations (textiles and banking 
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industries) (Ahlander, 2001; Lapidus, 1976, 1993). 40 Such industries as coal, lumber, electric 
power, and mineral extraction belonged to priority sectors (and were accordingly 
characterized by high average wages) and were strongly male-dominated, with less than 30% 
being female workers (Lapidus, 1993). For many jobs with extra remuneration for dangerous 
working conditions, lifting and carrying weight, and harmful work, employers were 
prohibited by law from hiring women (20% of all occupations) (Lapidus, 1993; Mezentseva, 
1994).41 
What is more, the literature reveals that Soviet women had less access to head positions 
(McAuley, 1981; Yanowitch, 1977), even in occupations with higher proportions of women 
(Katz, 1997). For instance, although women increasingly occupied professional and 
“specialist” positions, they were still more prominent in subordinate positions and were 
underrepresented in supervisory jobs and jobs with executive power (McAuley, 1981, pp. 86–
91). These patterns are also reflected in a male dominance in the political realm (Carnaghan 
& Bahry, 1990) and the de facto absence of women from the Soviet political elite (Lapidus, 
1976, 1993). 
Another important aspect in terms of the gendered occupational distribution refers to the role 
of the educational system. Enrolment rates in education, the number of study places, and the 
school-to-work transition were also state-administered in Soviet Russia (according to 
planning-economic goals). Job assignments from almost all educational institutions were 
mandatory, ensuring a tight link between the educational system and the labor market (see 
Section 3.1). Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, women gradually attained more 
education and caught up with men (Gerber & Hout, 1995; McAuley, 1981). Nonetheless, 
women were concentrated in educational fields characterized by lower wage returns – mostly 
education, the social sciences, the humanities, medicine, law, and economics – whereas men 
were concentrated in the most remunerative fields such as skilled manual work and 
engineering (Gerber & Schaefer, 2004). However, since the industrial sector was the largest 
                                                
40 These occupations were prominently female-dominated, with about 80% of female workers in healthcare and 
over 70% in light industry (Ahlander, 2001). Moreover, the proportion of female workers in the food and textile 
sectors comprised over 80% and was over 90% in garment production. 
41 Despite labor legislation restrictions, female employments in such jobs persisted: Employers could pay female 
workers lower wages as a penalty for violating the law (Lapidus, 1993). 
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and not working was forbidden, women also had to choose among traditionally “male” 
professions.42 
Notably, there were – based on both cultural stereotypes and informal instructions – some 
official and latent discriminatory practices against women and unofficial quotas for women 
with regard to enrollment in post-compulsory education. Some very prestigious educational 
institutions and professions were also virtually inaccessible to women (Voronina, 1998). 
Considering these special features of the educational system in Soviet Russia, we may 
assume that gender segregation in educational choices was reproduced in the labor market 
(Gerber & Schaefer, 2004; Solga & Konietzka, 1999) and that both vertical and horizontal 
occupational segregation in Soviet Russia was often rooted in the first allocation to the job. 
5.2.2 The evolution of gender segregation after the regime change 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was hit by a “transitional shock” characterized 
by increasing employment uncertainty and a considerable restructuring of the economy and 
the labor market. The educational system was decentralized, mandatory job assignment was 
abandoned, and formerly centralized hiring (and wage) decisions shifted to private 
companies. Growing returns to education resulted in the quickly expanding enrolment in 
tertiary education from the mid-1990s onwards (e.g., Lukiyanova, 2010). However, 
professional education was only loosely linked to employers’ requirements in the new market 
economy (Gerber, 2003). These developments triggered a so-called “credential inflation” 
(Collins, 1979) resulting in a decline in the signaling power of educational certificates. 
At the same time, women were surpassing men in terms of educational attainment through a 
strong shift towards tertiary education (e.g., GOSKOMSTAT, 2001). Nonetheless, the 
empirical literature has found that women were strongly penalized in terms of the growing 
gender wage inequality (Brainerd, 2000; Gerber & Mayorova, 2006). Although it remained 
rather high, female labor force participation declined from 77.5% in 1992 to 68.8% in 2005 
                                                
42  Notorious examples include female tie layers, technical house-painters, and other physically strenuous 
professions that were ultimately female in the USSR. 
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(GOSKOMSTAT, 2001).43 Occupational allocation was very gender-typical, with women 
concentrating on low-paying jobs (Klimova, 2012). For instance, Russian employers reported 
higher preferences for male workers in occupations such as insurance or advertising agent, 
economist, programmer, sales, and engineering, whereas women were preferred in 
accountant and secretarial positions (Roshchin & Zubarevich, 2005). Research further 
indicates that Russian firms are characterized by the so-called “glass-ceiling” phenomenon 
(Wirth, 2009), or in other words, that female applicants were hired to jobs with fewer 
promotion possibilities (Linz, 1996). 
Notably, empirical literature points to the changed value of some professions after 1991 and 
the so-called “masculinization” of those professions/occupations that became more 
remunerative. There is compelling evidence that traditionally female-dominated sectors, such 
as finance, insurance, and lending institutions – which were less prestigious in the Soviet era 
and became of high value (with growing wages) in the post-Soviet era – turned into male-
dominated sectors. In addition, in “priority sectors of the economy,” such as energy, metal, 
and transportation, men could retain and even strengthen their wage and occupational 
advantages and virtually “squeezed” women out of those sectors (CEDAW, 1999; Roshchin 
& Zubarevich, 2005). 
Russian women were evidently less able to convert their educational advantages into 
occupational opportunities. To address this issue, I distinguish between two forms of 
occupational gender segregation: horizontal differences and vertical inequalities. My research 
agenda follows two major questions: (1) To what extent can we observe these two types of 
gender segregation upon labor market entry in Russia? (2) How did these two types of gender 
segregation change through the collapse of the Soviet Union? 
                                                
43 However, from a comparative perspective, the employment of Russian women was hit by the transition 
process to lesser extent compared with women in other post-Socialist societies (Flanagan, 1995; Monousova, 
1997; van der Lippe & Fodor, 1998). 
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5.3 A theoretical framework on gender segregation upon labor 
market entry 
Several sociological and economic theories conceptualize gender segregation in the labor 
market. I discuss three major categories, i.e., naturalistic, cultural, and institutional 
explanations and apply them to the Russian context.  
5.3.1 Naturalistic explanations 
Naturalistic arguments relate the male–female difference in positioning in the labor market to 
biological differences between men and women, such as maternity concerns and physical 
advantages, and these differences increase in the process of gender-specific socialization.44 
Traditional gender roles and prevailing expectations about gender in society lead to 
horizontal gender differences in the labor market because women are pushed towards specific 
jobs that are close to their family tasks, such as services, education, care, and nursing (H.-P. 
Blossfeld, 1987). In line with this and despite high female labor force integration and a broad 
range of opportunities for women that emerged during industrialization, the Soviet patterns of 
female employment resemble those found in Western countries. Women were 
overrepresented in trade, procurement, suppliers, public dinning, nursing, and teaching, 
whereas men were overrepresented in heavy industries (Lapidus, 1976). These gender-typical 
choices survived Communist times and have lasted up to contemporary Russia (Ogloblin, 
2005b). 
Human capital theory begins from the same premise, explaining vertical gender inequalities 
as an outcome of rational cost–benefits calculations. Women anticipate future family 
obligations and invest less in their human capital than men, resulting in lower occupational 
chances and future earnings (G. S. Becker, 1985). Similarly, self-selection and skills-
atrophy 45  theories trace vertical inequalities back to women’s preferences for jobs that 
                                                
44 In psychology, socialization process involves interdependence of experience and biology. Accordingly, girls 
and boys would be socialized via different experiences to acquire gender-differentiated adult roles appropriate in 
the given cultural context (Grusec & Hastings, 2007). 
45 Atrophy refers to a loss in future earnings when skills are not used continuously (Polachek, 1981). Because 
women tend to interrupt their careers more often, they act rationally and choose occupations with lower atrophy 
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promise a better reconciliation of family and work (e.g., more flexible and shorter working 
hours). 46 These require less commitment and upgrading of human capital but are also less 
well-paid (Hakim, 2006; Polachek, 1981). Hence, even if women attain the same level of 
education as men, they are likely to invest in different types of education or in different 
educational fields that already offer lower occupational rewards in the first job (Gerber & 
Cheung, 2008). Importantly, these theories assume higher labor market absenteeism among 
women, but this can hardly be applied to Soviet Russia. These arguments are valid only if we 
consider the dual role of working mothers in Soviet Russia, which also survived the 
Communist regime. As result, Russian women are quick to invest in less remunerative types 
of education or educational fields (Gerber & Schaefer, 2004) and/or to choose less ambitious 
careers in order to balance work and family duties (Ogloblin, 1999). 
In turn, the same arguments – that supposedly incline many women to gender-specific 
strategies – affect employers’ hiring decisions, resulting in discriminatory practices. 
Accordingly, intentional discrimination assumes that discrimination persists due to the 
prejudices of employers, workers, or customers against specific “social groups” (G. S. 
Becker, 1971). Consequently, employers pay higher wages to male workers or hire female 
workers with lower reservation wages (Steinmetz, 2012). Contrarily, statistical 
discrimination predicts that women’s exclusion from particular (highly paid) occupations is a 
result of employers’ expected higher costs due to women’s potentially higher absenteeism 
                                                                                                                                                  
rates to reduce these negative effects on life-course earnings. Although these jobs are characterized by lower 
wages, they “remunerate” women better.  
46 Even if the percentage of mothers is likely to be lower among labor market entrants, expectations about future 
family responsibilities and their potential combination with working life might affect (female) employees’ 
application decisions as early as in the first stages of the career (Barbulescu & Bidwell, 2012) 
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and turnover rates (Arrow, 1973).47 Theories of segmented (also internal/external) labor 
markets argue that one’s occupational position is more determined by the organizational 
structure of the labor market than by human capital (Meulders et al., 2010). The key element 
here is a firm’s investments in occupation-specific training, which influences job mobility 
and promotions. Hence, applicants are chosen based on the probability of how long they will 
stay in the firm in order to cover training costs (H.-P. Blossfeld, 1987). Due to employer’s 
higher uncertainty regarding long-term mutual relationships and the correspondingly higher 
investment risks of training female workers, employers would prefer to invest in – and thus 
also to hire – men. 
Although discrimination against women was officially restricted under the Soviet regime, 
compelling empirical evidence points to its persistence. For instance, women were believed 
to be less creative, authoritative, and initiative compared with men. As a result, women 
choosing ambitious careers faced subtle challenges in terms of promotions and access to 
positions of responsibility (see Lapidus, 1993, p. 145; Linz, 1996, p. 161). In post-Soviet 
Russia, women reported regular discriminatory practices in access to private-sector jobs 
(Manning, 1998). By the end of 1990s, about one third of job vacancies were found to be 
non-gender-neutral, and these numbers have been growing since then (Roshchin & 
Zubarevich, 2005). A study of Russian firms has disclosed discriminatory practices of 
employers with regard to women’s labor and social rights as well as the recruitment and 
dismissal of women (CEDAW, 1999; Liborakina, 2001). Additionally, several empirical 
studies have attributed a sizable part of unexplained variance to discrimination on the part of 
employers (Oshchepkov, 2008; Standing, 1994). 
                                                
47 Since job seekers’ productivity is not fully evident in the labor market, employers face uncertainty when 
making hiring decisions. Facing such an information gap, employers not only rely on a candidate’s current 
human capital but also on stereotyped information based on the productivity characteristics of the specific group 
the candidate belongs to (Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs, 1999). For instance, due to women’s higher tendency 
to leave or interrupt their careers after childbirth, employers are inclined to evaluate female candidates (even 
though they might not have children yet) as a more risky investment compared with male candidates (Arrow, 
1973; Phelps, 1972). Hence, statistical discrimination can lead to gender inequalities in labor market outcomes, 
even for equally educated and still childless men and women. 
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5.3.2 Cultural explanations 
Cultural arguments also stress the role of socialization and gender-specific roles, but as an 
autonomous factor. They focus on the meaning-related foundations of gender differences, 
such as tradition, worldview, moral constraint, and the power of aesthetic conventions. Thus, 
from the perspective of cultural sociology, people’s perceptions are strongly shaped by 
dominant cultural structures that are organized both implicitly and explicitly as dichotomous 
oppositions (Alexander and Smith, 2004). The male–female opposition is one of the major 
cultural dimensions structuring domestic and labor market roles in line with gender 
stereotypes. Thus, even though men and women are equally endowed for a particular 
educational or occupational track, worldview and traditions push both employers and 
employees to single out certain professions as typically masculine or feminine. Also 
according to the gender identity theory, individuals choose occupations based on their sense 
of self, whereby gender is an important aspect of the self-identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). 
Self-identity leads women to choose typical “female jobs” and motivates men to reduce 
women’s access to typical “male jobs” in order to preserve the masculine nature of these 
occupations. In line with these theories, the survey on gender and job suitability demonstrates 
a prevalence of gender-specific social attitudes and stereotypes in jobs in Russia (Ogloblin, 
2005b, pp. 13–15). Soviet policies have even promoted official attitudes and stereotypes, e.g., 
by restricting women’s employment in heavy and dangerous work considered to be “harmful 
for [the] female organism” and encouraged women to opt for occupations corresponding to 
their “biological and psychological peculiarities” and “moral-ethical temperament” (Lapidus, 
1993, p. 145). 
Like naturalistic arguments, cultural arguments inevitably link horizontal differences to 
vertical inequalities. Thus, the cultural principle of male primacy suggests that vertical 
inequalities are a result of the persistent societal presumption of male superiority and 
dominance as well as their better representativeness and higher status worthiness (Charles, 
2005; Kanter, 1977; see also Bass, 2015; Lips, 2000). It is a matter of fact – alongside 
equality in the law and statutes – that the Russian society historically can be characterized by 
a pronounced patriarchal culture and the belief in male superiority (Ashwin, 2001, 2002; 
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LaFont, 2001; Posadskaya, 1993). 48  Although these attitudes were suppressed under the 
Communist regime, the policymakers not only failed to eliminate patriarchy but even 
“promoted” it in the private and public social life, for example, by supporting women’s equal 
participation in the labor market but not men’s equal participation in domestic work (LaFont, 
2001; McAuley, 1981). Despite liberalization reforms, this patriarchal order of society has 
not changed, and women continue to be considered a secondary labor force (Ashwin, 2002; 
Posadskaya, 1993). Even more, during the Perestroika period, the so-called “patriarchal 
renaissance” was observed, with an enormous reduction of women’s representation in politics 
and their encouragement to return to their “natural” role as homemaker (Katz, 2001, p. 204), 
in addition to an overall drop in gender equality (Dilli et al., 2014). Consequently, despite a 
considerable advantage in educational attainment, the perception of Russian women (and 
their self-perceptions) as less suitable workers for positions marked by authority and 
responsibility (Ogloblin, 2005b) may reduce women’s opportunities in these jobs and 
contribute to their self-selection of lower-status jobs (Roshchin & Zubarevich, 2005) during 
the early stages of their careers. 
Based on both naturalistic and cultural arguments I formulate following expectations: 
 H1: There are horizontal gender differences at labor market entry in Russia. 
H2: There are vertical inequalities to the disadvantage of females at labor market entry 
in Russia.  
5.3.3 Explanation concerned with regime change 
To evaluate change in gender segregation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is 
important to consider institutional arguments. Four major factors of regime change could 
affect horizontal differences and vertical inequalities.  
First, a shift from an industrial socialist economy to a post-industrial service and knowledge 
economy should stimulate a growth of horizontal gender differences because during the 
                                                
48 According to the Soviet gender order, women’s role was seen as “a worker-mother who had a duty to work, to 
produce future generations of workers, and to oversee the running of the household. […] Men, meanwhile, had 
an at ones more limited and higher status role to play […] as leaders, managers, soldiers, and workers […]” 
(Ashwin, 2001, pp. 23–24). 
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Communist regime, females’ preferences were effectively constrained by the state, and since 
the industrial sector was the largest, there were many more job opportunities. As women 
were forbidden not to work, they worked in many sectors, which can historically be seen as 
predominantly “male.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, two important processes were 
in place: the elimination of state restrictions and a service-sector expansion. Since the service 
sector increases job opportunities in “female” occupations (such as caring, teaching, etc.), 
this allows women to pursue their gender preferences, thereby facilitating a gender 
polarization of occupations (Charles, 2005). In other words, women would increasingly enter 
a growing “female” sector, whereas men would concentrate in a shrinking “male” sector.  
Second, these trends should be reinforced by abandoning the state-controlled enrolment rates 
and distribution in education as well as by a school-to-work transition that provides room for 
gendered preferences and choices in education and work.49 Third, in post-Soviet Russia, 
employers “gained” more opportunities to discriminate against (female) workers due to 
reduced state control and labor union power (Liborakina, 2001; Manning, 1998). Fourth, 
vertical gender inequalities might be bolstered by the introduction of family policies 
encouraging mothers to withdraw from the labor market: In the 1990s, maternity and 
childcare leaves were extended, and childcare facilities were reduced (Hofäcker et al., 2011; 
Teplova, 2007). In this sense, longer maternity leaves lead to higher labor market protection 
for mothers but also to a higher reluctance of employers to hire women for managerial and 
powerful positions (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006). In turn, generous state support in childcare 
is able to compensate for the practical effects of the basic difference between male and 
female workers concerning maternity.50  Missing state support can reinforce “traditional” 
family formation patterns in which women tend to choose a “conservative” career strategy 
(which effectively means low-paid). Likewise, these new policies may have influenced 
employers’ expectations regarding women’s career ambitions and behavior (Polavieja, 2012; 
Teplova, 2007).  
                                                
49 The fact that women increasingly pursued their gender preferences is partly reflected in their labor market 
exit, for example, because they followed their preferences for family (see van der Lippe & Fodor, 1998; the 
number of housewifes increased significantly in Russia). 
50 In other words, generous public support in childcare enables mother to maintain longer employment and may 
thus reduce employers’ reluctance to higher women. 
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Finally, returning to cultural arguments, new stereotypes have emerged in Russia that 
reinforce the gender-specific occupational culture. Whereas we can observe a gradual 
reduction of traditional gender stereotypes in many stable economies, being subject to abrupt 
social change can reverse this process. In Russia, this turnabout came from the heart of the 
new economy: the emerging sphere of entrepreneurship. The explosive growth of 
entrepreneurship, accompanied by weakening state control, became an appropriate context 
for emerging brutal and violent standards of interactions in business life, which is more a 
male style of business interaction than a female one (Radaev, 1998; Volkov, 2002). These 
business ethics pushed women out of the most important processes that reshaped the whole 
economy in the transition period. The implication from these arguments coincide with the 
predictions of the institutional arguments, and the expectations are thus: 
H3: Horizontal gender differences among labor market entrants will have grown since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
H4: Vertical gender inequalities to the disadvantage of female labor market entrants 
will have grown since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
5.4 Research design 
In my empirical investigation I use the linked data from the Russian Generations and Gender 
Survey (GGS) and the Education and Employment Survey for Russia (EES). For more 
information on both surveys, see Chapter 4.1. 
5.4.1 Risk sample 
My analytical sample contains individuals who have completed initial education (for detailed 
description, see Section 4.1.2.1) and entered a first significant job. First significant job is 
defined one that has lasted for at least 6 months to avoid a misclassification of short-term 
labor as significant labor market entry. Accordingly, jobs that started while still in education 
are considered as first significant jobs only if they also lasted 6 months or more after leaving 
education.51 
                                                
51The sensitivity analysis reveals that the selectivity concern is negligible, as more than 90% of individuals 
entered their first significant job. For those born from 1948 to 1965, we observe an entry into a first significant 
job for 99.91% of men and for 99.29% of women in the risk sample; for those born from 1966 to 1987 the rate 
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I further exclude job entries that occurred in the last 6 months before the EES interview to 
reduce a potential selectivity bias due to right censoring (3 women and 4 men). Finally, cases 
with missing values on job position were excluded list-wise (5 women and 4 men). After all 
restrictions, I ended up with 5,825 individuals (3,599 women and 2,226 men) representing 
90% of the EES data. 
5.4.2 Analytical strategy 
5.4.2.1 Horizontal gender differences 
I measure horizontal gender differences by branch of economy, i.e., „where” people are doing 
their work (H.-P. Blossfeld, Buchholz, et al., 2015).52 Thirteen branches of economy are used 
(1) agriculture; (2) mining; (3) manufacturing; (4) power industry; (5) construction; (6) trade 
and consumer services; (7) transport and communication; (8) finance services; (9) state 
services; (10) health; (11) education (including culture and art); (12) other communal, social, 
and personal services; (13) other or miss.  
My analyses embrace two steps. First, I explore in which specific economic branches male 
and female labor market entrants tend to enter. I refer to descriptive analyses in this empirical 
part. Second, I assess the degree of overall gender segregation at labor market entry by 
calculating the widely used index of dissimilarity (Duncan & Duncan, 1955) and the IP index 
(Karmel & Maclachlan, 1988). 
The Duncan index can be interpreted as the fraction of men or women who would have to 
change their occupation in order to arrive at an equal distribution on the labor market. This is 
calculated as follows:53 
                                                                                                                                                  
is 95.81% for men and 91.50% for women. In the youngest cohort, the higher-educated have slightly higher 
risks of non-entry, probably due to the right censored cases. For more information on selectivity in a first job 
using the same data, see Bühler and Konietzka (2011). 
52 I decided against using occupations to measure horizontal differences because the occupational classification 
in EES data represents a rather ordinal (i.e., vertical) ordering of occupations (similar to ISCO-08 1-digit). Even 
with a more fine-graded occupational classification, insufficient or missing case numbers in the segregation 
table could have distorted the segregation analyses. 
53 Notation for both formulas from Steinmetz (2012, p. 59). 
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! =	12 &'& −)')*'+,  
with &  for total number of females in employment, )  for total number of males in 
employment, &' for number of employed females in occupation	-, )'for number of employed 
males in occupation - , .  for number of occupations. The Duncan index ranges from 0 
(complete similarity) to 1 (complete dissimilarity). However, the Duncan index is very 
sensitive to the sample sizes and number of categories. The IP index is found to be more 
stable and more appropriate particularly in the comparative context. It is also more reliable 
for studying change over time. The IP index can be interpreted as the fraction of all labor 
market entrants who would have to change their occupation in order to arrive at an identical 
distribution of men and women. This is calculated as follows: 
/0 = 11 )1 &* − &1)'*'+,  
with 1 for total number of employed persons and all other parameters defined as above. The 
IP index ranges from 0 (complete similarity) to 1 (complete dissimilarity). 
5.4.2.2 Vertical gender inequalities 
I examine vertical gender inequalities with a binary variable for having an authoritative 
position at the beginning of the first job. This comprises: being (1) team-leader, (2) foreman, 
(3) employee who performs autonomously an important task autonomously or has a few 
subordinates, (4) leader with significant managerial authority with the right to take important 
decisions, (5) free-lancer hiring own employees, or (6) an individuals having own business 
and hiring own employees.54 
                                                
54 In additional analyses, I assessed vertical gender inequalities by defining to additional specifications of the 
dependent variable: (1) authoritative position at the beginning and/or end of the first job, (2) authoritative 
position at the beginning of the first job and/or managerial occupational position. Additionally, models with 
exclusion of self-employed individuals were examined. Results were robust overall and are available upon the 
request. 
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In the first step, I provide a descriptive account of gender gap in authority position among 
Russian labor market entrants. In the second step, I employ multivariate regression using 
non-linear function (logistic). The models are presented in a step-wise fashion starting with a 
baseline model assessing the total effect of gender on the probability of obtaining 
authoritative position in the first job.55 Moreover, I add an interaction term between female 
and period in order to test my change hypotheses (i.e., H3 and H4). I model two additional 
interactions – gender by education and gender by branch – to assess whether and how the 
gender gap varies by educational level or branch of economy. 
For each model, I calculate average partial effect (APE) of females, which represents the 
average difference to men in predicted probabilities of entering authoritative positions, 
conditional upon the covariates in the model and their distribution in the sample. This effect 
can be interpreted as a gender gap on the probability scale. Contrary to logit coefficients or 
odds ratios, the APE is more suitable and less spurious for cross-model comparison (cf. 
Mood, 2009). 
5.4.2.3 Independent variables 
The main independent variable is gender, coded one for female and zero for male. To capture 
the transition process in Russia, I define a dummy for post-Soviet labor market entry (entry 
during 1991–2005 vs. 1965–1990).56 I further account for differences in human capital by 
controlling for educational level. Educational level is measured at the labor market entry and 
includes five attainment levels: (1) incomplete secondary, (2) lower vocational, (3) secondary 
completed, (4) secondary professional, and (5) higher. Importantly, I include branch of 
economy to explore how vertical gender inequalities are attributable to horizontal differences, 
since the latter are have been argued to “drive” vertical inequalities (see theoretical 
discussion).  
Several potential confounding variables are included in my analyses. Following the 
theoretical explanations, maternity is one of the main factors influencing women’s gender-
                                                
55 See Appendix C for a complete overview of model specifications (Table C–1, left part with 2 periods) and fit 
statistics (Table C–2, left part with 2 periods). 
56 Alternative specifications with four periods did not substantially improve the model fit (see Table C–1 and 
Table C–2 in Appendix C). 
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typical entry and increasing vertical inequalities to their disadvantage. Therefore, I control for 
presence of children. Additionally, women entering into the private sector might face more 
discrimination in this sector, leading me to include a control for this. Since demand for 
different types of occupations might vary by the type of area, I control for residence in a 
rural area. I include a dummy for being self-employed, a family worker, or farmer because 
this might be associated with gender. I further include an indicator for whether a respondent 
lived in Moscow or St. Petersburg at the time of the GGS survey to control for possible 
attrition bias due to the underrepresented population in these two cities (see section 4.1). 
Finally, I control for approximate education (see section 4.2.1) and missing values in the 
multivariate models. For more information on construction of variables, see Table 4–1 in 
Section 4.2.2. 
5.5 Results 
In the following, I first provide a brief overview of the changes in educational attainment 
levels of labor market entrants over last decades in Russia. Afterwards, I explore how 
horizontal gender differences in the first significant job changed over time. Finally, I analyze 
vertical inequalities between men and women in their first significant job and whether these 
patterns changed over the regime change in Russia. 
5.5.1 Educational attainment upon labor market entry 
How did the educational attainment levels of labor market entrants change after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in Russia? Table 5–1 reports the distribution of educational qualifications 
upon the transition to the first significant job by gender and over historical periods of entry. 
One major trend is that those entering after the collapse are more educated than those 
entering before. Nonetheless, there are noteworthy gender differences. 
In general, male entrants tend to obtain lower vocational and complete secondary education, 
although there is an increasing trend towards tertiary education (which includes secondary 
professional and higher education) for those entering after the collapse. Conversely, female 
entrants more often graduate from institutions of secondary professional education, and this 
trend together with the attainment of higher education has grown since the collapse. Almost 
one-half of female entrants have attained tertiary education. 
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Table 5–1: Educational attainment levels of labor market entrants by gender over 
period of labor market entry (column percentages) 
 Soviet period Post-Soviet period 
 Men Women All Men Women All 
Incomplete secondary 17.49 12.32 14.14 16.69 10.60 13.36 
Lower vocational 30.44 21.54 24.67 31.37 18.50 24.33 
Secondary completed 30.51 26.66 28.01 16.94 15.18 15.97 
Secondary professional 13.44 28.78 23.38 19.82 33.58 27.35 
Higher 8.12 10.69 9.79 15.18 22.14 18.99 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total (N) 1,429 2,637 4,066 797 962 1,759 
Note:  Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. 
Finally, comparing the educational level of female and male entrants, we find that women 
surpass men in terms of education during both periods. 
5.5.2 Horizontal differences  
Table 5–2 presents the frequencies of branches entered by men and women before and after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consistent with official data,57 we notice fewer entries for 
both men and women to the primary and secondary economy sectors and more entries in the 
tertiary sector after the collapse. These findings also suggest that the EES data is quite 
reliable for the retrospective analyses and reflects in appropriate way the societal and 
economical restructuring of Russian labor market over time.  
A closer look reveals that during the Soviet period, about 52% of male entrants entered 
agriculture, mining, power industry, construction, and transport and communication 
compared with only 21% of female entrants. About 30% of men (and the same proportion of 
women) entered manufacturing. At the same time, about 37% of female and only 7% of male 
entrants went into trade and consumer services, health, and education.  
This changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now, both men and women enter the 
tertiary sector more often, with a stronger increase for female than for male entrants. These 
gendered patterns may be explained in terms of the political and societal developments in 
Russia since 1991. Simultaneous expansion of the tertiary sector, reduction of the primary 
                                                
57  For official data and the labor market structure before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, see 
GOSKOMSTAT USSR (1988, p. 15) and GOSKOMSTAT (2001, p. 141). 
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and secondary sectors, and abandonment of the state-defined school-to-work transition 
“released” females’ preferences for occupations that are closer for their gender identity. This 
results in an even stronger female concentration in the tertiary sectors. In turn, men “stay” in 
more male sectors. Yet, fewer opportunities in the shrinking “male” sectors might have 
motivated some men to enter the expanding “female” sector of economy. Nonetheless, the 
collapse has evidently led to a stronger gender polarization upon labor market entry. 
Table 5–2: Entry into branch of economy by gender and period of labor market entry 
(column percentages) 
 Soviet period Post-Soviet period 
 Men Women All Men Women All 
Primary sector       
Agriculture 26.94 8.89 15.17 14.30 7.17 10.40 
Mining 2.66 0.99 1.57 2.63 0.62 1.53 
Secondary sector        
Manufacturing 29.60 30.15 29.96 23.21 13.41 17.85 
Power industry 2.03 0.80 1.23 1.38 0.83 1.08 
Construction 10.57 5.16 7.06 10.16 2.49 5.97 
Tertiary sector       
Trade and consumer services 2.80 14.37 10.39 14.05 27.65 21.49 
Transport and communication 9.94 5.54 7.08 8.66 3.12 5.63 
Finance services 0.00 0.83 0.54 1.13 2.29 1.76 
State services 7.49 4.02 5.24 12.17 4.68 8.07 
Health 1.33 7.85 5.56 2.26 12.68 7.96 
Education 2.87 14.75 10.58 2.76 18.92 11.60 
Other communal, social, and 
personal services 2.38 4.32 3.64 4.39 4.37 4.38 
Other or miss 1.40 2.43 2.07 2.89 1.77 2.27 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total (N) 1,429 2,637 4,066 797 962 1,759 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. 
Table 5–3 reflects the degree of segregation patterns in labor market entrants across Soviet 
and post-Soviet periods in Russia. The overall patterns of segregation indices suggest that 
male and female labor market entrants enter into different branches of economy. 
According to the Duncan index, about 35% of women (or men) would need to change their 
occupation, in order to attain an equal distribution with men (women) during the Soviet 
period, and this number increased by 43% during the post-Soviet period. The IP index states 
that 16% of entrants who started their first job under the Soviet regime would have to change 
their occupations, in order to attain equal distribution of male and female entrants over 
occupations. This trend reached a benchmark of 22% after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Hence, both dissimilarity and IP indices suggest that entry is more gender-segregated by 
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branches of the economy since the collapse. Confidence intervals show that this change is 
statistically significant. 
Table 5–3: Overall sex segregation across branch of economy by period of labor market 
entry 
 Overall Soviet period Post-Soviet period 
 Coef. CI a Coef. CI Coef. CI 
Duncan index 0.35 (0.33, 0.37) 0.35 (0.33, 0.38) 0.43 (0.39, 0.48) 
IP index 0.16 (0.15, 0.18) 0.16 (0.15, 0.17) 0.22 (0.19, 0.24) 
Categories b 15  15  15  
Total (N) 5,825  4,066  1,759  
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. a The confidence intervals (CI) are 
computed using bootstrapping (1,000 draws). Statistical test for change in Duncan index: z=3.20, 
p<0.01; statistical test for change in IP index: z=4.36, p<0.001. b Fifteen branches of economy are used 
(1) agriculture; (2) mining; (3) manufacturing; (4) power industry; (5) construction; (6) trade and 
consumer services; (7) transport and communication; (8) finance services; (9) state administration and 
compulsory social provision; (10) national defense; (11) health; (12) education; (13) culture and art; 
(14) other personal and communal services; (15) other or miss.  
Taken together, results support Hypothesis H1 that horizontal gender differences will be 
pronounced upon labor market entry. My findings also support Hypothesis H3, predicting 
increasing horizontal gender differences after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
5.5.3 Vertical inequalities 
5.5.3.1 Descriptive results 
Table 5–4 quantifies the overall (i.e., not adjusted by covariates) gender gap in job authority 
in the first job before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Table 5–4: Proportion of men and women entering authoritative position in the first 
significant job by period of labor market entry 
 Soviet period 
(S) 
Post-Soviet period 
(PS) 
Risk ratio period 
(PS/S) 
Total 
Male (M) 11.55% 15.93% 1.38 13.12% 
Female (F) 16.00% 18.09% 1.13 16.56% 
Risk ratio gender (F/M) 1.39 1.14  1.26 
Total (%) 14.44% 17.11% 1.19 15.24% 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. 
In my sample, about 13% of male and 17% of female entrants enter authoritative positions. 
Thus, I find a gender gap with a female advantage over both periods in Russia. The risk ratio 
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of women entering authoritative positions during the Soviet period is 1.39. After the collapse, 
this advantage declined to a risk ratio of 1.14. Compared with the Soviet period, entry into 
authoritative positions is more frequent in the post-Soviet period. One reason might be that 
the newly established economy values the new skills and knowledge provided by younger 
graduates. Moreover, for male entrants, the likelihood of job authority rises by a factor of 
1.38 compared with only 1.13 for female entrants. Evidently, male entrants have gained more 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
5.5.3.2 Multivariate results 
The results of the binominal logistic regression equations predicting the likelihood of entry 
into authoritative position in the first significant job are presented in Table 5–5.58  
Consistent with the descriptive results, I find that female entrants generally have a higher 
probability of entering authoritative positions (Model 1) that remains stable even after 
controlling for the period of entry (Model 2). Accordingly, the odds of entry in an 
authoritative position are 34% (=100×[1–exp(0.30)]) higher for females than males, net of 
entry period. The average predicted probability59 amounts to 13% for men and 17% for 
                                                
58 The statistical test of the interaction terms between female and the corresponding categorical variable should 
be always interpreted relative to the reference category. The interaction tests whether the contrast between the 
reference category and category of interest is the same for men and women. Non-significant contrast suggests 
that contrast is constant on the scale of odds. It might be different on the scale of probability due to different 
baseline probabilities (see Table C–4 in Appendix C). 
59 The average predicted probability of outcome (having an authoritative position) for female and male entrants 
is the average of the probability among actual persons in the data. In this sense, I compare two hypothetical 
populations – one with all female and one with all male entrants – that have the exact same values on the 
covariates in the model. Accordingly, the difference between these two populations is their gender, and gender 
might be a “cause” of the differences in the probability of having an authoritative position (see Williams, 2012 
for similar explanation). 
This is different than predicted probability at the average of covariates. That is, the probability of a person with 
average characteristics (e.g., female entrants who might have entered 7/10 during the post-Soviet period and 
attained 13/100 higher educational level). Average predicted probability can also be termed a typical predicted 
probability for someone within a group (e.g., female); predicted probability on average can be termed the 
predicted probability for someone with typical values on the explanatory variables for someone within that 
group (Buis, 2007). For my purposes, I have found the average predicted probability is more convenient than 
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women; this gender gap is statistically significant. Furthermore, individuals entering during 
the post-Soviet period are more likely to be in authoritative positions than those entering 
under the Soviet regime. 
Table 5–5: Logistic regression models predicting entry into authoritative position in 
first significant occupation (results as log odds ratios). N=5,825 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female (ref. Male) 0.27*** 0.30*** -0.15 -0.59*** -0.59*** 
Post-Soviet labor market entry (ref. Soviet 
labor market entry) 
 0.23** -0.37*** -0.46*** -0.43*** 
Educational level, ref.: Secondary 
professional 
     
Incomplete secondary    -2.61*** -2.44*** -2.70*** 
Lower vocational   -1.98*** -1.76*** -1.77*** 
Secondary completed   -1.73*** -1.76*** -1.76*** 
Higher   1.91*** 1.90*** 1.91*** 
Branch of economy (ref. Manufacturing)      
Agriculture    0.15 -0.07 
Mining    -0.12 -0.10 
Power industry    0.16 0.14 
Construction    0.52* 0.50* 
Trade and consumer services    0.06 -0.03 
Transport and communication    0.10 0.03 
Finance services    1.04** 1.00** 
State services    0.79*** 0.70*** 
Health    0.39* 0.28 
Education    2.41*** 2.29*** 
Other communal, social, and personal 
services 
   1.03*** 0.91*** 
Other or miss    0.32 0.32 
(Controls in model 5 omitted; see Table C–3 in Appendix C) 
Constant -1.89*** -1.98*** -1.12*** -1.52*** -1.54*** 
Model fit      
Log Likelihood -2,480 -2,476 -1,7776 -1,588 -1,578 
χ2 13 22 1,422 1,798 1,818 
Degrees of freedom 2 3 7 19 27 
AIC 4,965 4,958 3,566 3,214 3,209 
BIC 4,978 4,978 3,613 3,340 3,389 
Adjusted McFadden R2 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.35 0.36 
Female APE 3.44*** 3.71*** -1.37 -4.85*** -4.87*** 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. APE=average partial effect, scale in percentage points.  
Educational level is connected to higher chances of job authority in the first job, net of gender 
and period effect (Model 3). Yet, I note two interesting shifts in the effects of gender and 
                                                                                                                                                  
e.g., predicted probability on average because no real person can have such characteristics as 13/100 higher 
educational level. 
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period: First, vertical inequalities (which disadvantaged males in Model 2) between female 
and male entrants disappear. Estimates show that compared with men, women’s odds are 
lower by a factor of 0.86. The average predicted probability is 15% for women and 16% for 
men, which, however, does not differ statistically. Second, the coefficient for post-Soviet 
entry period becomes negative. Correspondingly, entrants in the post-Soviet period seem to 
have lower chances of gaining authoritative positions, net of gender and educational level. 
Hence, educational level appears to mediate the overall and partial effects of gender and entry 
period as already found in the descriptive analyses (Table 5–4) and Models 1 and 2. 
Accordingly, the observation that women compared with men and post-Soviet compared with 
Soviet entrants in total have a higher likelihood of job authority can be traced back to their 
higher educational level. 
Model 4 accounts for horizontal differences in the first job by including dummy variables for 
branches of the economy. Ceteris paribus, the education sector is associated with the highest 
likelihood of obtaining job authority (the average predicted probability is 38%), followed by 
finance services and other communal, social, and personal services (19%); state services 
(16%); construction (14%); health (13%); agriculture and the power industry (11%); 
manufacturing, trade, and transport (10%); and finally, mining (9%). These results highlight 
important differences between sectors in opportunities of getting an authoritative position in 
the first job: More opportunities can be found in the rather feminized branches, whereas 
employers are probably more reluctant to hire labor market entrants in predominantly male 
areas (with the exception of the trade sector) requiring previous labor market experience.  
Model 4 additionally shows a statistically significant gender gap that inverts the sign (female 
APE=–4.85 percentage points, p<0.001), accounting for differences in education, period of 
entry, and entered branch. The gap remains significant even after including several controls 
in Model 6 (Female APE=–4.87 percentage points, p<0.001). Thus, net of education, period, 
and branch, we find support for Hypothesis H2 predicting vertical inequalities disadvantaging 
females already at labor market entry. 
Turning to the question of changes in vertical inequalities over time (Model 6, Table 5–6), 
the significant interaction effect implies that female entrants were less likely than male 
entrants to enter authoritative positions under the Soviet regime. Although I find no 
statistically significant effect of entry period for men, the interaction effect reveals that the 
chances for women to obtain authoritative positions have been declining in the post-Soviet 
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period (coefficient: -0.41−0.50=–0.91). I plot the relationship between gender and entry 
period (expressed in predicted probabilities) in Panel A of Figure 5–1. This reveals an 
increased gender gap to the disadvantage of females (see also Table C–4 in Appendix C) due 
to a growing disadvantage of female entrants and not to a growing advantage of male 
entrants.60 Taken together, the results support Hypothesis H4, which predict an increase in 
vertical gender inequalities to the disadvantage of females after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
Examining interaction effects between gender and educational level (Model 7, Table 5–6), I 
find that the gender gap emerges only among more-educated individuals, being largest among 
entrants with the highest degree (see Panel B in Figure 5–1 for prediction, and Table C–4 in 
Appendix C for a statistical test of the gender gap). Among higher-educated entrants, 
women’s odds of entry into an authoritative position are reduced by 64% compared with men 
(odds ratio=0.36). In absolute terms, this means that the probability of entering an 
authoritative position is 71% for higher-educated male entrants compared with only 49% for 
higher-educated female entrants (a gender gap on the probability scale of 22 percentage 
points). 
The final model revisits the relationship between horizontal differences and vertical 
inequalities, that is, whether the gender gap varies by branch of economy (Model 8, see Panel 
C of Figure 5–1). Regression results indicate that the female disadvantage is by far the 
highest among those entering the education sector. On average, females’ predicted 
probability is 16 percentage points lower than that of males, and this difference is statistically 
significant (see Table C–4 in Appendix C). Furthermore, we find a gender gap to the female 
disadvantage among those entering state services and trade and consumer services 
(statistically significant), and in finance services (however, this trend does not attain the 
conventional significance level). Intriguingly, most of the sectors revealing a statistically 
significant female disadvantage are highly feminized occupational areas. 
  
                                                
60 The Wald test of the female effect for those entering during the Soviet period: p<0.01, during the post-Soviet 
period: p<0.001. The Wald test of post-Soviet entry effect for males: p=0.496; for females: p<0.001. 
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Table 5–6: Logistic regression models predicting entry into authoritative position in 
first significant occupation with interaction terms (results as log odds ratios), 
N=5,825 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Female (ref. Male) -0.41** -0.36* -0.41 
Post-Soviet labor market entry (ref. Soviet labor market entry) -0.12 -0.43*** -0.42*** 
Female × Post-Soviet labor market entry a -0.50*   
Educational level, ref.: Secondary professional    
Incomplete secondary  -2.70*** -2.53*** -2.67*** 
Lower vocational -1.75*** -1.82*** -1.76*** 
Secondary completed -1.75*** -1.64*** -1.77*** 
Higher 1.92*** 2.37*** 1.90*** 
Female × Incomplete secondary a   -0.18  
Female × Lower vocational  0.21  
Female × Secondary completed  -0.15  
Female × Higher  -0.67**  
Branch of economy (ref. Manufacturing)    
Agriculture -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 
Mining -0.12 -0.07 0.21 
Power industry 0.16 0.13 0.37 
Construction 0.51* 0.53* 0.46 
Trade and consumer services -0.02 -0.08 0.33 
Transport and communication 0.03 0.05 0.12 
Finance services 1.02** 0.99** 1.8 
State services 0.69*** 0.66*** 1.07*** 
Health 0.29 0.26 0.51 
Education 2.30*** 2.27*** 2.72*** 
Other communal, social, and personal services 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.10 
Other or miss 0.30 0.31 0.41 
Female × Agriculture a   0.19 
Female × Mining   -0.87 
Female × Power industry   -0.51 
Female × Construction   0.14 
Female × Trade and consumer services   -0.53 
Female × Transport and communication   -0.15 
Female × Finance services   -1.00 
Female × State services   -0.90* 
Female × Health   -0.31 
Female × Education   -0.53 
Female × Other communal, social, and personal services   1.06 
Female × Other or miss   -0.17 
(Controls in models 6, 7, and 8 omitted; see Table C–3 in Appendix C) 
Constant -1.68*** -1.70*** -1.65*** 
Model fit    
Log Likelihood -1,575 -1,573 -1,569 
χ2 1,824 1,829 1,836 
Degrees of freedom 28 31 39 
AIC 3,206 3,207 3,216 
BIC 3,392 3,414 3,476 
Adjusted McFadden R2 0.36 0.36 0.35 
Female APE -4.70*** -4.58*** -5.44*** 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. APE=average partial effect, scale in percentage points. 
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Figure 5–1: Predicted probabilities for authoritative position based on logistic 
regressions in Table 5–5 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Panel A for interaction period × gender; 
Panel B for interaction educational level × gender; Panel C for interaction branch of economy × 
gender. 
Linking our findings for vertical and horizontal outcomes, the growing vertical gender gap 
among post-Soviet entrants (found in Model 6) might be attributable in part to the more 
pronounced horizontal segregation following the collapse of the Soviet Union (see Table 5–2 
and Table 5–3). 
Notably, the descriptive inquiry revealed higher odds of job authority for women, pointing to 
a female occupational advantage in total. Conversely, when accounting for educational and 
sectorial heterogeneity among sexes in the regression analyses, we detected a gender gap in 
.1
.1
2
.1
4
.1
6
.1
8
.2
Pr
(A
ut
ho
rit
at
ive
 p
os
itio
n)
Soviet Post-Soviet
Period of labour market entry
A. Predictive margins by period of entry and gender with 95% CIs, Model 6
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Pr
(A
ut
ho
rit
at
ive
 p
os
itio
n)
1 2 3 4 5
Educational level
Educational level
 
1 Incomplete secondary
2 Lower vocational
3 Secondary complete
4 Secondary professional
5 Higher
B. Predictive margins by education and gender with 95% CIs, Model 7
0
.2
.4
.6
Pr
(A
ut
ho
rit
at
ive
 p
os
itio
n)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Branch of economy
Men Women
Branch of economy
 
1  Agriculture
2  Mining
3  Manufacturing
4  Power industry
5  Construction
6  Trade and consumer services
7  Transport and communication
8  Health
9  State services
10 Health
11 Education
12 Personal, social, and communal services
13 Other or miss
C. Predictive margins by branch of economy and gender with 95% CIs, Model 8
 
105 
the odds to the reverse. Obviously, educational level and sectorial choice represent factors 
suppressing the actual negative effect of being female. Women are more likely to have higher 
educational levels and are more likely to begin their careers in sectors providing more 
opportunities for job authority. Consequently, that makes them more likely to enter 
authoritative positions in total, whereas we found a substantial female disadvantage when 
comparing men and women and holding educational level and sector constant. In this sense, 
if there were no genuine gender differences in job allocation (i.e., no adjusted significant 
negative coefficient for females) we would find a higher total female surplus in authority 
positions due to their educational surplus and stronger tendency towards branches providing 
better opportunities for authoritative positions. 
5.5.3.3 Robustness check: factual and synthesized probabilities 
The multivariate analyses have demonstrated that gender inequalities in job authority in the 
first job might be regarded as (a) inequalities in educational attainment and branch choice, 
but also as (b) inequalities in the propensity of entering authoritative positions, conditional on 
educational attainment and branch choice. In other words, there is a total effect of gender on 
the outcome, and this effect is positive (as shown in descriptive analyses). However, there are 
correlates of gender that also correlate with the outcome under study. In substantial terms, 
this means that women more often enter higher education, and this levels up the odds of 
entering authoritative positions. The same holds for specific branches (e.g., finance). The part 
of the total gender effect that is mediated by educational attainment and branch choice can be 
termed the “indirect effect” of gender (the confounding or, as in my case, the suppressing 
effect). What remains is the “direct effect” of gender, that part of the total effect that cannot 
be attributed to education or the entered branch, which is negative in sign.61 
In the following, I use a counterfactual analysis to calculate the relative importance of the 
direct and indirect effects of gender on the probability of entering an authoritative position 
among Russian labor market entrants. This method is widely used in the research on 
inequalities in educational opportunities (Jackson, 2013) and was first introduced by Jackson, 
                                                
61 This way of thinking is very prominent in research on inequalities in educational opportunities when referring 
to primary (indirect) and secondary (direct) effects of social origin (e.g., Jackson, 2013). 
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Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Yaish (2007) and generalized by Buis (2010).62 By applying this 
method, I additionally provide a robustness check of my results. The general logic behind is 
to calculate “synthetized”, i.e., potential, predicted probabilities in a hypothetical situation, in 
which female (male) educational and sectorial distributions are combined with male (female) 
propensities of entering authoritative positions (cf. Kartsonaki, Jackson, & Cox, 2013). For 
instance, one could ask how the proportion of men (women) entering authoritative positions 
would change if men (women) had educational attainment and met women’s (men’s) branch 
choices but had their own propensity of entering job authority. Otherwise, we may assess the 
proportion of men (women) entering an authoritative position if men (women) had their own 
educational and sectorial distribution but took on women’s (men’s) propensity of entering job 
authority (conditional on educational and sectorial distribution). 
Table 5–7 presents the factual and synthesized predicted probabilities of entry into an 
authoritative position in Russia. The rows display synthetized predicted probabilities and log 
odds calculated using the education and sector distribution of male and of female entrants. 
The columns denote the predicted probabilities and odds after exchanging the conditional 
authority probability functions for male and female entrants. These probability functions can 
be understood as a combination of employers’ and employees’ gender-specific choices. 
Employers’ gender-specific choices may designate discrimination behavior, while 
employees’ choices may refer to their own preferences for job-specific attributes, such as 
authority. 
The factual predicted probability of entry into authority is 16.7% for female entrants. If these 
female entrants had an educational endowment and met the sectorial choices of male entrants, 
their predicted probabilities of entering an authoritative position would decrease by 7 
percentage points to 9.7%. However, if female entrants had the authority probability function 
of male entrants (i.e., their propensity of entering an authoritative position), their predicted 
probability would increase by 5.5 percentage points to 22.2%. In turn, when looking at men, 
we find that the factual predicted probability of entry into authority is 13.6%, and this would 
                                                
62 More information and a formal description of the method can be found in Buis (2010), Erikson, Goldthorpe, 
Jackson, Yaish, & Cox (2005), Jackson et al. (2007), Kartsonaki et al. (2013) 
. 
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(a) increase by 8.6 percentage points (to 22.2%) if they had females’ educational and 
sectorial distribution but (b) decrease by 3.9 percentage points (to 9.7%) if they had females’ 
propensity for entry into authority. 
Table 5–7: Estimated factual and synthesized predicted probabilities and odds of entry 
into an authoritative position with respect to gender a 
 Choice of employers or employees (Probability function) 
Distribution in 
education and sector 
Male Female 
Probabilities   
Male PMM = 0.136 PMF = 0.097 
Female PFM = 0.222 PFF = 0.167 
Log Odds   
Male OMM = 0.158 OMF = 0.108 
Female OFM = 0.285 OFF = 0.200 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. a Estimates are calculated using the Stata 
ldecomp add-on program (Buis, 2010). In a given row, education and sector are held constant. In a 
given column, propensity to enter authoritative position is held constant. The diagonal elements 
represent factual combinations. Percentages can deviate from those shown in Table 5–4 due to the 
estimation procedure (cf. Buis, 2010; Kartsonaki et al., 2013). PP = predicted probabilities; O = odds; 
MM = men with education/sector distribution of men; MF = women with education/sector distribution 
of men; FM = men with education/sector distribution of women; FF = women with education/sector 
distribution of women.  
Altogether, we can conclude that women would benefit if they had males’ propensity of 
entering an authoritative positions (e.g., males’ preferences for authority and employers’ 
lower discrimination against male employees), whereas men would be disadvantaged in the 
case of female propensity functions. Contrarily, females’ educational and sectorial 
distribution can be beneficial for men, while women would be disadvantaged by that of men. 
These findings indicate that women make a range of appropriate choices in their education 
and entered branch, and these choices would also increase the chances of male entrants for 
authoritative positions. However, due to specific gender preferences of employers and/or 
employees, women’s propensity of entering an authoritative position is much lower (ceteris 
paribus) compared with men, and this is supported by the fact that men with female’s 
propensity function would also be less likely to enter authority positions. 
The total, direct, and indirect effects of females on the probability of entering an authoritative 
position are captured by a log odds ratio in Table 5–8. The total, direct and indirect effects of 
gender are expressed as:  
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Overall, the odds of entry into authority for females are 1.27 times as high as for males (total 
effect). Males would have 1.81 times higher odds of entry into authority if they had the same 
educational and sectorial distribution as females (indirect effect according to method 1), 
while females would have 0.70 times lower odds of job authority than males if we kept the 
educational and sectorial distribution constant at the level of females (direct effect according 
to method 1). Notably, if there were no direct effect of being female (i.e., choices of 
employers and employees), the odds of females for authority would be 1.81 (1.81*1) times 
higher than those of males. 
Table 5–8: Log odds ratios and estimates of the relative importance of the direct effect 
 Log odds ratio SE b CI b 
Total effect 1.27 0.08 (1.12, 1.43) 
Indirect effect, method 1  1.81 0.08 (1.65, 1.97) 
Direct effect, method 1 0.70 0.04 (0.62, 0.79) 
Indirect effect, method 2 1.85 0.10 (1.67, 2.06) 
Direct effect, method 2 0.68 0.05 (0.60, 0.78) 
 Relative importance of the 
indirect effect 
SE CI 
Method 1 2.48 1.22 (0.29, 4.68) 
Method 2 2.59 1.21 (0.22, 4.96) 
Average 2.54 1.16 (0.26, 4.82) 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. a Estimates are calculated using the Stata 
ldecomp add-on program (Buis, 2010). b The standard errors (SE) and the confidence intervals (CI) are 
computed using bootstrapping (50 draws) (see Buis, 2010). 
To assess the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects, following formulas are 
used: /AB2?34<86	27	><=>?683	677683 = 	 ln ><=>?683	677683 ln 32345	677683  /AB2?34<86	27	=>?683	677683 = 	 ln =>?683	677683 ln 32345	677683  
As can be seen in the lower panel of Table 5–8, the relative importance of the indirect effect 
is 248% of the total effect. This can be read as a size of the indirect effect relative to the size 
of the total effect (Buis, 2010, pp. 25–26). Accordingly, the relative importance of the direct 
effect is -148% (248%–100%) of the total effect. These results may be interpreted as a 248% 
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indirect effect (educational and sectorial endowment) and a –148% direct effect (choices of 
employers and employees). Correspondingly, the education and sectorial endowment 
components are stronger than the employers’ and employees’ choice components, which 
favors women in total.  
5.6 Discussion 
Using retrospective data from the EES, I have examined the extent of horizontal gender 
differences and vertical gender inequalities upon labor market entry in Soviet and post-Soviet 
Russia. As expected, I have found that gender is an important factor influencing allocation in 
different branches of the economy and different hierarchical positions in the first job.  
More specifically, my results confirm sectorial gender segregation in the first job. This 
represents one of the most important triggers for earnings differentials between the sexes in 
Russia (Katz, 1997; Ogloblin, 1999; Oshchepkov, 2008). The explanation for such 
differences is a higher female concentration in tertiary sectors of the economy (e.g., health, 
education, and trade) that were of low priority for policymakers under the Communist regime 
and consequently less well-paid (GOSKOMSTAT USSR, 1988), and this gendered behavior 
did not change with the transition to a liberalized labor market economy (Ogloblin, 2005b). 
Although some of the previously female-dominated sectors (e.g., the finance sector) have 
experienced a strong post-Soviet expansion, women seem to have been pushed out of sectors 
with growing wages in favor of men (Roshchin & Zubarevich, 2005). My analyses have 
shown that the vertical gap to the female disadvantage is particularly pronounced in those 
sectors that female entrants tend to enter. 
Moreover, my analyses imply that Russian women invest a great deal in education, thereby 
gaining a serious educational advantage, which is further consolidated by entry into branches 
with more opportunities for authoritative positions. Correspondingly, female entrants do 
enjoy an occupational advantage overall. Nevertheless, when controlling for educational 
achievement and choice of branch, it becomes evident that female Russian entrants are 
effectively disadvantaged in terms of access to authoritative positions, suggesting that some 
other mechanisms are in place that affects females’ lower returns to education compared with 
those of men. This might be caused by females’ self-selection into lower occupational 
positions, e.g., because of higher preferences for a family–work balance. Moreover, 
prevailing cultural values and societal gender norms might cause men to pursue educational 
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choices and careers that comply with an anticipated male-breadwinner role. In turn, women’s 
choices in favor of higher education are guided by a wider scope of aims. In this sense, 
Russian men seem to use education more instrumentally, while Russian women use it more 
strategically. Otherwise, these vertical inequalities might be a result of employers’ 
discrimination against women (e.g., because of higher expectations of females’ lower job 
commitment and higher absenteeism) or due to women’s lower access to social networks 
(Reskin & McBrier, 2000; see also Ashwin & Yakubovich, 2005; Gerber & Mayorova, 2010 
for Russia; Kogan et al., 2013 for Croatia, but not for Ukraine).63  Because authority is 
associated with higher earnings, inequality in earnings might be attributed in part to 
inequality in authority. A closer look has revealed that the gender gap is most pronounced 
among the higher-educated labor market entrants (ceteris paribus), suggesting that women 
frequently do not fully convert their increasing educational advantage into an occupational 
one.64 
Furthermore, despite gender equality principles, I have found that in Soviet Russia, there was 
– ceteris paribus – a strong gender gap to the female disadvantage upon entry into 
authoritative positions and that this has even grew since the regime change in Russia. 
Notably, these growing gender inequalities can be traced back to declining chances of female 
entrants along with virtually no negative consequences for men. I explain this in two ways: 
institutionally and culturally. Following the institutional argument, “credential inflation” (i.e., 
the devaluation of degrees and the signaling power of certificates in post-Soviet Russia) 
might have affected women more than men due to an oversupply of female graduates with 
tertiary degrees (Roshchin & Zubarevich, 2005). Following cultural theories, three aspects 
might have reinforced gender stereotypes in the gendered division of labor that embraces 
domestic and labor market work: (1) growing labor market uncertainty, (2) new cultural 
                                                
63 Employers are more likely to rely more on informal recruitment channels like social networks if employment 
protection is very rigid (Gërxhani, 2016) as it has been the case in (post-)Soviet Russia (see Sections 3.4 and 
3.5). Moreover, social networks seems to matter more for highly-educated job applicants in the case when 
educational credentials do not provide clear signals (Di Stasio & Gërxhani, 2015). That might have been true for 
Russia in the times of educational expansion particularly after the Soviet union collapse. 
64 This finding lends support to the claim that (Soviet) women opted for more education due to other incentives 
than a promise of more “material rewards”: “Higher education meant that someone could do non-manual work 
and avoid hard physical labor” (Titma et al., 2003, p. 293). 
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forms of male primacy shaped during the transition period, and (3) the introduction of family 
policies oriented towards “bringing women back home” (Teplova, 2007, p. 291). In turn, this 
rise of gender-stereotyped behavior might have not only “reduced” the ambitions of female 
entrants but also affected the hiring decisions of employers by favoring male entrants for 
“premium” jobs (Ogloblin, 1999). In this sense, one could view women as “the losers” of the 
transition from socialism to the market economy (for similar conclusions, see Brainerd, 1998; 
Gerber & Hout, 1998; Verhoeven et al., 2005).  
My study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence for the existence and 
reinforcement of gender inequalities in the first job in the transition from the socialist to the 
post-socialist system in Russia. Nevertheless, to obtain a more complete picture of how the 
collapse of the Soviet regime and the subsequent regime changes have affected social 
inequalities, future research should study other post-socialist countries with various 
institutional transformations in order to better understand whether and how far cultural and 
regime changes shape gender inequalities. Moreover, although labor market entry may 
undoubtedly impact upon the following career developments, a further investigation of post-
socialist countries should broaden the focus to encompass longer career trajectories: Are 
gender segregation and vertical gender inequalities stable over the life course? Do women 
and men converge or diverge in their labor market outcomes over the career path? Further 
studies on these issues will allow us to assess the long-term consequences of regime-related 
shifts in life-course inequalities. 
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Chapter 6  
Inequality of adult-educational opportunity and regime 
change65 
6.1 Introduction 
Previous literature has emphasized that the (educational) attainment process is socially 
structured and implies the existence of inequalities at the time of attaining initial education 
(Boudon, 1974), which are further reproduced and amplified over the labor market career 
(Müller & Shavit, 1998). This effect of “cumulative advantage” (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006) 
over the life course for already-advantaged individuals is also called the “Matthew Effect” 
(Merton, 1968). By enhancing one’s educational level and access to better jobs, adult 
education is believed to provide an effective means of reducing these initial inequalities and 
accordingly of offsetting the Matthew Effects (Hällsten, 2011). 66  In this context, adult 
education has been described as a “second chance” system that offers opportunities for “those 
who failed in their schooling” or for those who “never had a first chance” (Jarvis, 2007, p. 
191).  
Access to adult education, however, is not allocated equally and is more accessible for 
individuals who have already achieved relatively advantaged educational or labor market 
positions (Elman & O’Rand, 2004; Hällsten, 2011; K. Kim, Hagedorn, Williamson, & 
Chapman, 2004). This phenomenon can be viewed as inequality of educational opportunity in 
the later life course. Understanding how adult education is socially stratified is essential for 
understanding whether and to what extent (initial) social inequalities may be alleviated or 
even amplified by lifelong educational attainment processes. The purpose of this study, 
                                                
65  This chapter is a modified and extended version of Kosyakova, Y. (forthcoming). Inequality of adult-
educational opportunity and regime change in Russia. In preparation for submission to European Sociological 
Review.  
66 The reasons to return to education as an adult are very heterogeneous and vary from personal to social and 
professional goals. However, in the scope of this study, I concentrate on adult education that is relevant for 
professional goals. 
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therefore, is to analyze participation in adult education in Russia, conditional on the 
structures of the social inequalities that emerged over earlier attainment processes. As I 
argue, one might expect very different effects of participation in adult education on overall 
levels of opportunity. Adult education may have an equalizing effect on educational 
inequality if initially disadvantaged individuals (educationally and/or in the labor market) 
have either equal or more access to adult-education opportunities. Otherwise, if the initially 
advantaged groups also have a higher propensity for participation in adult education, this may 
result in an exacerbation of educational inequality, and thereby social inequality in general. 
I focus on the case of Russia as an example of the “transitional societies” characterized by a 
“very distinctive social reality” (Titma et al., 2003, p. 281). Studying stratification in access 
to adult education should be particularly interesting and relevant in such societies which have 
experienced immense institutional and cultural shifts and an expansion of social inequalities 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.   
Although the core dogma of the communist regime asserted that everyone had equal life 
chances, some levels of social inequality did exist in the Soviet Union, e.g., in terms of 
income (Dobson, 1977) or education (Gerber & Hout, 1995). Therefore, it is of sociological 
interest to examine whether and to what extent the inequality in access to adult education 
existed under the communist regime. In the aftermath of liberalization reforms and radical 
structural changes, an essential part of the labor force was compelled to (re-)invest in 
education in order to pursue successful integration into the newly restructured and/or newly 
emerged labor market segments (Bocharova, 2002). Since investment in education usually 
involves considerable time and monetary efforts, it is obvious that the opportunities for adult 
education were unequally distributed. Hence, it is important to study whether adult education 
was effective for coping with social inequalities that developed during and after institutional 
restructuring as well as how these patterns have changed compared with the communist 
regime. In a broader sense, studying stratification in access to adult education and its role for 
social inequality in post-socialist countries is particularly relevant for a better understanding 
of how institutional and political change may affect individuals’ life courses. 
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Nonetheless, adult education has received little attention in Russia from the sociologists in 
recent years.67 To my knowledge, only few studies have examined adult education in the 
form of upgrading and obtaining a formal degree in contemporary Russia (Kilpi-Jakonen et 
al., 2012; Kosyakova, Dämmrich, & Blossfeld, 2016; Kosyakova, 2014). Even less is known 
about the participation patterns of the so-called “sidesteppers,” i.e., those who obtain a formal 
degree at the same or a lower level as that of their initial educational attainment.68 The 
qualitative distinction between upgrading and sidestepping is crucial because in the case of 
upgrading, the individual builds up his or her previous education. In contrast, sidestepping 
often implies a depreciation of the previously accumulated human capital (Li, Buchmann, 
Konig, & Sacchi, 1998). Yet, for many individuals sidestepping might be the only strategy to  
keep up with rapidly changing demands of labor markets in restructuring economies where 
many former industries and qualifications suddenly have disappeared. Hence, sidestepping 
should be a very important mechanism to lessen the inequalities that have developed, 
particularly when viewed against Russia’s background of structural economic changes in the 
labor market after 1991, which have led to the “great human capital reallocation” 
(Sabirianova, 2002, p. 191). 
In light of the aforementioned arguments, the following research questions on inequality in 
adult-educational opportunity emerge: First, “who” takes part in adult education in 
transitional societies? Second, has the social structure of adult education changed from before 
to after the fall of the Communist regime (i.e., by institutional structures), and if so, how? 
Third, “who” opts for which strategy of adult-education – upgrading or sidestepping? To 
address these questions empirically, I examine the gap between initially advantaged and 
disadvantaged individuals (in terms of the initial educational and labor market attainment) in 
enrollment to formal schooling in the later life course. I use retrospective data from the 
Russian Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) and the Education and Employment Survey 
                                                
67 Available research in Russia has focused primarily on the training and been mainly from the economic 
perspective (e.g., Berger et al., 2001; Clarke & Metalina, 2000). 
68 Using a field of studies (which is not available in the data used) would be another possibility to measure 
sidestepping. Nonetheless, individuals enrolling in education that is at the same level or below are likely either 
to change their field of study or to study an additional qualification that is complementary to the previous one. 
In contrast, studying a qualification in the same field of studies at the same or a lower level is less meaningful. 
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for Russia (EES), which cover the years between 1965 and 2005, thus enabling the analyses 
of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The rich data on educational trajectories allows for 
distinguishing between enrollment in education that is higher than that previously attained 
(upgrading in the following) as well as for enrollment in education at the same level or below 
(sidestepping in the following). 
The next section provides a short overview of the framework of adult education before and 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in Russia. Furthermore, based on theoretical 
considerations and a review of empirical studies, I establish a link between social inequality 
and adult education which I call inequality of adult-educational opportunity. I thereby 
explicitly concentrate on initial educational and labor market attainment and derive 
hypotheses for the Russian case. Subsequently, my data, methods, and variables are described 
before moving to the main results. Finally, I summarize the main findings and discuss their 
implication for social inequality in Russia.  
6.2 National context 
The Soviet government has emphasized the importance of adult education as an essential 
component of lifelong learning. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, adult education was an 
established system (Kljucharev, 1997) with a considerable network of participating 
educational institutions and included compulsory education and improvement of 
qualifications (Zajda, 2003). In the middle of the twentieth century, the adult education 
framework included evening schools and correspondence schools and was under state 
control.  
With the growing concept of lifelong learning between 1960s and 1970s adult education 
became more abstract and included voluntary and governmental institutions (Zajda, 2003). In 
fact, every adult was involved in some type of education every 5 to 7 years (Berger, Earle, & 
Sabirianova, 2001; Zajda, 2003). Between 1940 and 1980, participation rates in qualification 
upgrading grew from 1.7 to 32.7 million workers and employees. In turn, obtaining new 
qualifications (i.e., changing specialties or professions) grew from 1.9 to only 5.9 million 
workers (GOSKOMSTAT USSR, 1981, p. 376). Such small increase can be traced back to 
the communist view of discontinuity and instability of the working path: Being re-trained or 
needing to find a new job was considered a life failure (Kljucharev, 1997). By the end of the 
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communist period, 42.7% of the active population participated in adult education in various 
forms (Bim-Bad, Sokolova, & Zmeyov, 1992). 
Nonetheless, despite on the full equality principles, the access to education was quite 
ambivalent. For instance, there were quotas and reserved places, financial support for 
working mothers, disabled, ethnic minorities, military people and workers. Yet, Jews and the 
so-called “enemies of the people” (and their families) faced problems in access to adult 
education (Khokhlova et al., 2013). Also, the access to prestigious courses such as 
management, economics and law was heavy restricted (Kljucharev, 1997).  
With the demise of the Soviet Union, a series of official acts regarding adult education were 
adopted.69 The main goals of adult education became (a) preventing structural unemployment 
through re-training, (b) preparing qualified workers for the new economy, and (c) the 
compensation of inequalities in access to secondary education (Zajda, 2003). Nonetheless, 
despite various important presidential decrees, free access, and guaranteed funding, the whole 
education sector suffered from a lack of adequate financing (Berger et al., 2001; Zajda, 2003; 
see also Section 3.3, for discussion).  
At the times of the economic restructuring, adult education was provided in the form of so-
called evening classes for adults. However, these evening schools had a bad reputation by 
employers due to the heterogeneity of the student. Due to the displacement of millions of 
people after the fall of the Soviet Union, the learners at evening schools became more 
heterogeneous and comprised (apart from working adults) military members, the 
unemployed, migrants, ex-prisoners, pensioners. Additionally, unemployment among youth 
and school graduates became very high, forcing them to continue their education in evening 
schools (Zajda, 1991). There were, moreover, problems related to equivalence of academic 
standards, the academic status of these schools, and the recognition of diplomas (Zajda, 
2003). First in the year 1996 the Attestation and Accreditation Act concerned with 
educational systems standards, excellence and quality was adopted and also included adult 
education (Zajda, 2003). 
                                                
69 Reforms of the educational sector included decrees related to part-time evening schools for adults, to adult 
education infrastructure, to its organizational structure, educational programs, a shorter working week on full 
pay for working adult learners. 
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Although Russia implemented new lifelong learning policies in accordance with UNESCO 
proclamations in the late 20th century (Ministry of Education, 2009), there is no separate 
branch of adult education within the formal educational framework, the only exception being 
for post-graduate studies. The normative legal base is weak, and there is no special legislation 
(Khokhlova et al., 2013). Formally, the main types of formal adult education include all 
forms of initial education, post-tertiary professional education, and supplementary 
professional education. The latter can be obtained in formal educational institutions and 
includes additional training (i.e., qualification updating) and re-training (professional training 
programs to acquire a new or additional qualification). The participation rates in formal adult 
education (including post-graduate studies) are much lower compared with the Soviet times 
and comprised only 4.5% of the population in 2006 (GU VShE, 2010).  
Nevertheless, it is a matter of fact that obtaining a second or even third tertiary degree is 
typical for Russia (Aistov, 2009) and has become increasingly relevant for professional 
career mobility (Dubin et al., 2004). This is corroborated by the finding that almost half of 
university graduates are planning to return to education in future in order to gain a second 
tertiary degree (MEMO, 2013). A share of 20% of Russian young adults consider obtaining a 
second tertiary degree as a suitable instrument to enhance their prospects for socio-economic 
upward mobility (Dubin et al., 2004). 
6.3 Theoretical framework on participation in adult education  
From a sociological viewpoint, (formal) adult education is an important tool for lessening 
social inequalities that emerged in the earlier life course because it creates the possibility to 
improve an initial educational level, to change a qualification, and to update skills and 
knowledge. All these adjustments, in turn, might be essential for the labor market position 
enhancement and career development (Hällsten, 2011). Nevertheless, there is no consensus 
on how opportunities for adult education are socially structured, and empirical findings with 
regard to the initial human capital investments and labor market situation of the adult learners 
are inconclusive. For instance, it has been shown that (a) adult learners tend to be individuals 
who have already achieved relatively higher initial education but have experienced some 
disadvantages in the labor market (Felmlee, 1988; Hällsten, 2011; Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012 
for Sweden), or (b) adult learners have a rather lower educational background but more 
advantageous labor market positions (Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012 for Russia and the UK; 
Kosyakova, 2014).  
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I argue that these manifold results regarding both initial educational and current labor market 
attainment on the propensity of participating in formal adult education may arise because 
previous research has neglected the difference between upgrading (investments in higher-
level education) and sidestepping (investments in the same or lower-level education). These 
two strategies differ substantially in the role of the accumulated human capital. Upgraders 
use initial investments in human capital and build upon their previous educational attainment 
and field of studies. Conversely, sidesteppers experience some depreciation of the initial 
human capital investments (Li et al., 1998, p. 53) and instead opt for a different field of 
study, probably owing to frustration with their current job or to a lack of prospects for a 
further career. On the other hand, additional qualifications might be in a similar or close field 
of study. In this way, sidesteppers would not loose but enlarge their qualification which could 
provide better opportunities for reaping labor market returns. 
In the following section, I discuss how the previous initial educational level and labor market 
experience may encourage but also constrain adults to upgrade and to sidestep. 
6.3.1 Initial educational attainment 
Higher-educated individuals should be more reluctant to return to formal schooling in the 
later life course because the higher the initial investments in education are, the higher the 
forgone earnings in the case of enrolling in formal adult education tend to be (Schömann & 
Becker, 1995). Additionally, the higher-educated should be less likely to upgrade due to the 
so-called “ceiling effect” (H.-P. Blossfeld et al., 2014, p. 9). This means that the higher the 
initial education is, the less room there is for attaining education that is at a higher level than 
previous education. However, among those who are seeking to broaden or change their 
qualification field (i.e., sidesteppers), particularly higher-educated individuals may be prone 
to return to formal schooling in the later life course due to the positive attitudes toward 
learning and the greater appreciation of education (Bills, 2000; Elman & O’Rand, 2007).  
Although lower-educated individuals would have enough room to move up in terms of 
educational level, they may be deterred by negative earlier life-course experiences with 
schooling, a lack of self-efficacy, or merely due to the fact that they place a lower value on 
(adult) education (Valentine & Darkenwald, 1990). In general, it is actually the medium-
educated who should be the most likely to upgrade. This expectation can be further supported 
by the fact that Russians put great importance on education, and more than half of working-
age population have tertiary degrees (see Section 3.3.2). These peculiar developments in 
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Russia are likely to impose a pressure particularly for medium-educated individuals to 
upgrade their qualifications, leading to a “catching up effect” (Kosyakova, 2014).  
In sum, I expect that: 
H1: Having a medium (compared with lower or higher) initial-educational level 
increases the probability of enrolling in upgrading. 
H2: Having a higher (compared with lower or medium) initial-educational level 
increases the probability of enrolling in sidestepping. 
If both hypotheses are valid, then upgrading would contribute to some equalization of adult-
educational opportunity, whereas sidestepping would contribute to an exacerbation of 
unequal adult-educational opportunity.  
6.3.2 Occupational resources 
Empirical findings reveal that adult learners tend to be employed (see Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 
2012 for Russia and the UK; K. Kim et al., 2004), have higher earnings (Hällsten, 2011), and 
have higher occupational status and/or positions (Elman & O’Rand, 1998; K. Kim et al., 
2004; Kosyakova, 2014). These individuals not only have the economic resources to return to 
time- and cost-intensive formal adult education, but may also have a stronger need for 
keeping up to date (Carr & Sheridan, 1999; Elman & O’Rand, 2007) or for maintaining an 
occupational status (Hällsten, 2011). Thus, individuals in advanced occupational positions 
should be particularly prone to upgrading in order to retain their competitive advantage in the 
labor market. Conversely, they should be particularly averse to sidestepping as they would 
“have more to lose” due to the potential for lost income (Carr & Sheridan, 1999; Schömann 
& Becker, 1995) and might consequently be the least interested in it (Valentine & 
Darkenwald, 1990). 
Individuals in less-favorable economic circumstances might also be responsive to adult 
education. For instance, lower wages (Jepsen & Montgomery, 2012; Stenberg, 2011; Zhang 
& Palameta, 2006), working part-time (Zhang & Palameta, 2006), and (previous) 
unemployment experience (Hällsten, 2011; Stenberg, 2011) were found to “push” individuals 
toward adult education. Although both upgrading and sidestepping may be good instruments 
to exit such disadvantaged labor market positions, these individuals should obviously be 
more inclined to change their qualifications over sidestepping, owing to rather negative 
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experiences with the current qualification. In support of this expectation, it has been shown 
that adults tend to obtain new qualifications, particularly when they have had experience of 
unemployment and belong to lower classes in the occupational hierarchy (Berger et al., 
2001).  
As a result, I expect that upgrading would contribute to an exacerbation of adult-educational 
opportunities while sidestepping would have an equalization effect. This effectively means 
that I hypothesize that: 
H3: Having more (compared with less) favorable occupational positions increases the 
probability of enrolling in upgrading. 
H4: Having more (compared with less) favorable occupational positions decreases the 
probability of enrolling in sidestepping. 
6.3.3 Regime change 
Another important aspect relates to the role of regime change in Russia with regard to 
inequality of adult-educational opportunity. In the following section, first I discuss how the 
regime change can shape the amount of adult education and second, I detail this change’s 
effect on the patterns of participation in adult education. 
Technological change, globalization, and innovations lead to the fast deterioration of 
outdated skills and knowledge and to a stronger depreciation of previously accumulated 
human capital (Bartel & Sicherman, 1998; Buchholz et al., 2006). These structural changes 
may increase the incentives of firms and workers to invest in adult education in order to be 
able to meet the requirements of the changing labor markets and to stay competitive (see 
Bartel & Sicherman, 1998 for similar arguments). However, the same macro trends 
contribute to growing labor market uncertainty. As a result, risk-averse firms and workers 
would be less likely to invest in adult education due to the vague returns to adult-education 
investments and the potential obsolescence of the new skills (Berger et al., 2001). 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the processes of overall economic and market development 
accomplished by the devaluation of the skills and knowledge obtained under the Soviet 
Union suggests a growing demand for adult education on the one hand. Additionally, 
individual productivity is rewarded by the market’s instigation of growing returns to human 
capital investments (“The market incentive thesis,” Nee, 1989). This, in turn, should increase 
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individuals’ incentives and effort to return to formal schooling, which results in the following 
expectation: 
H5a: Being exposed to the post-Soviet period increases the probability of enrolling in 
both upgrading and sidestepping. 
On the other hand, liberalization reforms and labor market restructuring were associated with 
more “shock” than “therapy,” with high labor market uncertainty and growing unemployment 
(Gerber & Hout, 1998). In turn, unemployment rates are found to be inversely related to 
participation in adult education (Wolbers, 2005). This might be further intensified by a lack 
of funding and a shortage of qualified trainers in post-Soviet Russia (Berger et al., 2001). 
Additionally, while adult education under the Soviet Union suggests improvements in the 
labor market situation almost in all cases (owing to the strong link between educational 
qualification and occupations) (Gerber, 2003), after the fall of the Soviet Union, the low 
signaling function of the certificates and the subsequent vague returns may reduce incentives 
to enroll in adult education. As result, the contrasting hypothesis is: 
H5b: Being exposed to the post-Soviet period decreases the probability of enrolling in 
both upgrading and sidestepping. 
It is less clear how regime change has affected the inequalities in access to adult education in 
terms of both initial educational and labor market attainment. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to 
assume that these inequality in adult-educational opportunity has been growing since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. First, the structural changes made after 1991 and the 
liberalization of the labor market have led to growing stratification in labor market 
opportunities and risks, benefiting those already in good positions while disadvantaging those 
in less-secure positions (Brainerd, 1998; Gerber, 2003, 2012). Second, decentralization and 
the growing privatization of the educational sector have led to increased costs of education, 
which also implies fewer chances for disadvantaged groups. These arguments predict an 
exacerbation of inequality of adult-educational opportunity after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
which means that: 
H6: The negative effect of the post-Soviet period on the probability of enrolling in 
upgrading and sidestepping should be weaker for those with a higher (compared with 
lower- and medium-)initial-educational levels. 
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H7: The negative effect of the post-Soviet period on the probability of enrolling in 
upgrading and sidestepping should be weaker for those with more (compared with less-
)favorable occupational positions. 
6.3.4 Gender  
Finally, the existing literature suggests that choices for adult education differ by gender, 
albeit unequivocal answers are missing in the literature. While some studies report a higher 
probability for women to participate in formal adult education (Dämmrich, Vono de Vilhena, 
& Reichart, 2014; Fouarge & Schils, 2009; Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012 for Russia and 
Sweden), other studies find higher participation rates for men (Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012 for 
Spain; Wolbers, 2005) or no significant gender differences at all (Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012 
for the UK; Kosyakova, 2014).  
Particularly competing family roles may propel women to return to education later in life in 
order to compensate loss of labor market experience caused by employment interruptions 
(Dieckhoff & Steiber, 2011). However, there are also several arguments for female 
participation to be lower than male. First, the double burden of paid and unpaid work hinders 
adopting again a students’ roles. (Married) women may be burdened with both market and 
domestic work limiting time available for alternative and not directly productive activities 
like adult education (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000). In line with that it has been 
shown that women’s decision to obtain formal adult education seems to be more dependent 
on family or household characteristics: Lower family income (Zhang & Palameta, 2006), 
being married or cohabited (Cai, 2011; Zhang & Palameta, 2006; though, see Hällsten, 2011 
for contra-evidence) and having (young) children (Hällsten, 2011; Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012 
for Sweden; Zhang & Palameta, 2006; though, see Kosyakova, 2014 for contra-evidence) 
decrease women’s probability to attend adult education.70  Moreover, women are said to 
invest less in education due to their (potentially) higher labor market absenteeism, their desire 
for a life-work balance, and/or their preferences for jobs requiring less human capital 
                                                
70 Males participation patterns seems to be more driven by employment characteristics (Zhang & Palameta, 
2006), such as lower wages (Elman & O’Rand, 2002; Zhang & Palameta, 2006), working part-time (Zhang & 
Palameta, 2006) and working in larger firms (Zhang & Palameta, 2006). 
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upgrading (G. S. Becker, 1985; Hakim, 2006; Polachek, 1981), and this pattern may persist in 
regard to adult education (Bills, 2005).  
In the Russia’s context specifically, the quite early retirement age for Russian women (55 for 
women and 60 for men) may impede the recouping of (later) human capital investments. This 
shorter horizon in working life, in turn, may further reduce incentives of Russian women to 
return to education in the later life courses. Therefore, overall the I expect that: 
H8: Being female (compared to male) reduces probability of enrolling in upgrading 
and sidestepping. 
One could argue that gender differences in participation in adult education are less 
pronounced in the socialist period compared to the post-socialist period due to a stronger 
labor market attachment of women in Soviet Russia. In the post-Soviet Russia, both men and 
women should face stronger impediments for adult education participation but particularly 
women. First, the ‘return’ to a more traditional family formation patterns and their increased 
labor market absenteeism are likely to reduce females’ incentives and necessity for adult 
education. At the same time, these traditional gender roles are said to reduce employers’ 
support (investment) for adult education participation of female workers (Dieckhoff & 
Steiber, 2011) due to higher risk of losing returns to these investments. Second, reduced state 
support for formal childcare should even further lower female opportunities for time- and 
finance-consuming formal adult education (Kosyakova, 2014). Third, higher levels of overall 
labor market uncertainty and uncertainty regarding adult education returns may particularly 
affect women, because they are generally more risk averse than men (Borghans, Golsteyn, 
Heckman, & Meijers, 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). 
H9: The negative effect of the post-Soviet period on the probability of enrolling in 
upgrading and sidestepping should be stronger for women (compared with men). 
6.4 Research design 
My empirical investigation is based on linked data from the Russian Generations and Gender 
Survey (GGS) and the Education and Employment Survey for Russia (EES). For more 
information on both surveys, see Chapter 4. 
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6.4.1 Risk sample 
For research on adult education participation, I restrict my data to “adults,” i.e., to those who 
are at risk of enrolling in adult education. Individuals enter the risk sample when they have 
completed initial education. This is assured by two conditions: First, completion of initial 
education is defined as having left formal education for at least 12 months (to allow for gaps 
in the educational career). Second, individuals are considered to still be in initial education if 
they are enrolled in educational qualification in the “normal age range.” I define the normal 
age range by using the upper values of the regular age at which the specific level of education 
is usually attained in Russia (see OECD, 2014) and allow for two additional years of 
studying. For example, normal enrollment age in university-level tertiary education is 18. 
Thus, individuals enrolled in this type of education are defined to still be in initial education 
if they are aged 20 and below. By this formulation, all previous spells of those enrolled in 
age-appropriate qualifications are also excluded.71 Finally, I consider individuals to be out of 
the risk sample if they are currently enrolled in adult education.72  
After these restrictions, the risk sample includes about 93% of EES respondents, thereby 
comprising of data from 3,738 women and 2,279 men. 
6.4.2 Method 
In contrast to previous studies on adult education obtainment (e.g., Jenkins, Vignoles, Wolf, 
& Galindo-Rueda, 2003; Kosyakova, 2014) and participation (e.g., K. Kim et al., 2004; 
Wolbers, 2005), I examine enrollment in adult education. Studying enrollment in rather than 
attainment of adult education allows for a more precise investigation of the factors that lead 
to the transition to education in the later life course (H.-P. Blossfeld et al., 2014, p. 123). 
                                                
71 For consistency reasons, I checked a median age of enrollment in different types of education in my data. The 
results indicate that it generally corresponds to the average national age, with exception of education below the 
upper-secondary level. The overestimated age of enrollment in this educational level is due to the EES design as 
educational trajectories were surveyed since each responded turned 17. In Russia, 17 is the average age for 
finishing upper secondary school. 
72 I put one month at risk for individuals who left adult education and enrolled in another adult education in the 
same month (there were 25 such cases). 
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I differentiate between two major types of adult education: upgrading and sidestepping. 
Upgrading is defined as being enrolled in education that is higher than that previously 
attained, whereas sidestepping is any other adult education that cannot be defined as 
upgrading. Table 6–1 provides an overview of how both types of adult education were 
defined (conditional on previous educational achievements) and of the respective number of 
enrollments in the sample. Overall, there are 1,369 enrollments in upgrading and 563 in 
sidestepping. 
Several aspects of definition should be discussed in more detail. For individuals with a 
general type of education, such as low or upper-secondary (without vocational training), most 
of the educational activities result in the upgrading of the educational level, which may 
produce the ceiling effect discussed earlier. Full-time professional training is defined as an 
upgrading for individuals who had attained a maximum of low or upper-secondary education 
since they do not possess any vocational qualifications. Professional training and courses are 
not associated with changes in educational level, but they may lead to qualifications and 
certificates that are nationally recognized. Importantly, according to the ISCED (1997) 
classification, such professional training and courses can be classified as post-secondary non-
tertiary education (ISCED 4, see Appendix A, Table A–1). 
In the multivariate analyses, I rely on an event-history framework (H.-P. Blossfeld, Golsch, 
& Rohwer, 2007). Methods of event-history are particularly well suited for my study since 
they allow for explicitly considering the time-dependency of the process of enrollment in 
adult education, particularly how it unfolds over the life course. Moreover, these methods 
provide effective methods for exploring the effects of time-varying covariates (like 
occupational position or family formation). Third, by reconstructing populations of at-risk 
individuals, event-history methods can properly deal with right-censored observation, 
meaning that they also include those individuals who have not yet enrolled in adult education. 
Fourth, event-history methods are an appropriate tool for modeling adult education as a 
transition that can occur repeatedly in the life course. 
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To model adult-education enrollment appropriately, I apply a competing-risk approach. This 
is the best choice because (1) upgrading and sidestepping are mutually exclusive outcomes 
(2) that are also highly distinct in terms of opportunity costs and potential labor market 
outcomes (Li et al., 1998), and (3) individuals can move to any of these types of adult 
education from the origin state. 
For modeling time-dependency, I opt for a piece-wise constant approach by splitting the time 
axis into seven intervals at the following monthly based split points: 12 (one year), 24 (two 
years), 48 (four years), 72 (six years), 120 (ten years), 180 (fifteen years), and 240 months 
and more (twenty years and more) since completing initial education.73 Piece-wise constant 
models assume the baseline hazard to be constant within the intervals but not between 
intervals. As a result, this specification is particularly useful for approximating any time 
shape of the hazard while avoiding complex assumptions about the time-dependence of the 
process (H.-P. Blossfeld et al., 2007). From a theoretical point of view we would nevertheless 
expect the hazard to be non-monotonic by increasing and decreasing, as individuals should be 
more reluctant to return to education (and particularly time- and investment consuming 
formal adult education) shortly after initial education but also with increasing age or time 
since leaving initial education, due to the diminishing remaining time-horizon of life-course 
educational returns (G. S. Becker, 1962), potential competing adult roles (Elman & O’Rand, 
2007), and higher reluctance of employers to invest in skills upgrading of older employees 
(Fouarge & Schils, 2009). 
Consequently, I model enrollment in upgrading and sidestepping by employing continuous 
time competing risk piece-wise constant exponential transition rate model with repeated 
events. Alternative specifications of the functional form of the model were also tested. The 
comparison with various model specifications (see Appendix D) yield the conclusion that the 
piece-wise constant model has a superior model fit. Additionally, the piecewise constant 
model is more robust against misspecifications regarding the shape of the rate, albeit less 
                                                
73 More fine-grained splitting did not significantly improve the model fit and did not alter any substantial 
conclusions. 
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efficient (with higher standard errors).74 The transition rate to adult education enrollment for 
upgrading (k = 1) and sidestepping (k = 2) is defined as follows: 
!" # = 	 lim)*→) , )	-	./)* .0)))*2) . 
The probability that the time to enrollment lies within the infinitesimal interval (t, t”) given 
that an individual “survived” up to t, standardized by the time interval (t, t”). Hence, the 
continuous rate can be interpreted as the spontaneous propensity to experience a transition to 
adult education. In the piece-wise constant approach, the durations are assumed to follow an 
exponential distribution. The log-hazard is parameterized by covariates as follows: ln !"(#) = 56 + 89 + :;, 
where A is a vector of eight time dummies, X a vector of time-constant covariates, and Z is a 
vector of time-varying covariates. 6, 9, and ; are vectors of parameters to be estimated from 
the data. Importantly, in the analyses of upgrading, individuals who have already attained 
post-graduate levels are excluded as there is no way to make an upward educational move. 
6.4.3 Independent variables 
As discussed, I address social inequality in terms of inequality of adult-educational 
opportunity. More specifically, I study access to adult education in terms of initial education 
and labor market attainment. Initial educational level is a time-constant variable measured at 
the time one has completed initial education. Labor market attainment is approached by a 
time-dependent indicator for having an authoritative position in the previous or current 
occupation. Authoritative position is a particularly good approximation of “more favorable 
occupational resources” as these positions are usually higher paid and are characterized by 
greater influence (e.g., Abendroth et al., 2013; Kraus & Yonay, 2000; Wright, Baxter, & 
                                                
74  More specifically, I tested a piecewise exponential model against the standard exponential, Gompertz, 
Weibul, log-logistic, and log-normal models. As a test, I exploited 1) the LR improvement test on model fit 
(Table D–1, Appendix D), 2) Akaike’s information criterion and Bayesian information criterion (Table D–2 and 
Table D–3, Appendix D), and 3) plots of pseudo-residuals based on the Cox & Snell approach (1968) (Figure 
D–1 and Figure D–2, Appendix D). It is important to mention that although piecewise exponential models do 
provide the best fit, these methods of testing are heuristics that could guide model selection (H.-P. Blossfeld et 
al., 2007), and theoretical considerations are always necessary. 
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Birkelund, 1995). I operationalize with the previous or current occupational position because 
most individuals enroll in formal adult education when they are not currently working. 
Authoritative position includes positions such as (1) team-leader, (2) foreman, (3) employee 
who performs autonomously an important task or has a few subordinates, (4) leader with 
significant managerial authority with the right to take important decisions, (5) free-lancer 
hiring own employees, and (6) an individuals having own business and hiring own 
employees. 75  Authoritative position includes additionally occupations such as (1) senior 
manager in state administration, in a public or political organizations, and trade unions, and 
(2) top manager. I operationalize with the last or current occupational position, because most 
of the individuals enroll in formal adult education when they are not currently working. 
Additional tests with (a) only current occupational status, (b) exclusion of managerial 
occupations, and (c) control variable for self-employment yielded similar results. To address 
gender differences in adult education enrollment, I include an indicator for being a female. 
To examine the issue of the societal and political transformation in Russia, I defined a time-
dependent dummy for the post-Soviet period if the spell is related to the time between 1991 
and 2004 (versus the Soviet period, i.e., the time between 1965 and 1990). Since the main 
structural, institutional, and also societal changes in Russia took place with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, I consider this dichotomy to be an appropriate variable for studying the 
“regime change” effect. 
In the multivariate models, I include further potential confounders, i.e., factors that may 
influence enrollment in adult education as well as initial educational and occupational 
achievements. 
I account for socio-economic origin as measured by the highest educational attainment 
among parents. 76  Socio-economic origin predicts not only the attainment process in the 
                                                
75 The EES (2005) asked respondents about their position when they took up a job, and additionally their 
position in this job when they left if this job continued for twelve months or more. In my analyses, I consider 
any authoritative position, i.e., being this at the begin or/and at the end of the job. Since individual may enter 
into non-authoritative position and than move to authoritative one (for example after probability period), 
considering authoritative position only at the start of the job spell might underestimate such “promotions”. 
76 I use parental educational rather than occupational attainment due to the following reasons. Under the Soviet 
regime, there was no private property and wage differentiation was low. This restricted abilities of families to 
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educational career (e.g., Reimer & Pollak, 2009) but may also have a “direct” effect on the 
adult educational career (Elman & O’Rand, 2007), thereby confounding the relation between 
initial and adult education. 
Several time-varying variables should additionally be considered. Competing family roles are 
expected to discourage enrollment in adult education (Dieckhoff & Steiber, 2011; Elman & 
O’Rand, 2007), and are likely to impede occupational attainment, particularly of women (see, 
e.g., Härkönen & Bihagen, 2011, p. 464). Thus, I account for (1) being married and (2) 
presence of children by capturing having children aged below 18 years old. Since both 
structural opportunities and a supply of educational institutions are likely to vary by place of 
residence in Russia, I include a binary indicator for rural residence area (see Kilpi-Jakonen 
et al., 2012). Positive experiences with education result in a growing appreciation of further 
education (Elman & O’Rand, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2003), meaning that participation in adult 
education might increase the propensity of enrolling in it again. Additionally, adult education 
is found to return better employment outcomes (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2003). Hence, I account 
for having the experience of adult education. 
The next set of (time-varying) variables captures individuals’ attachment to and experience 
with the labor market. The previous number of jobs is used to address the propensity of 
changing jobs (Elman & O’Rand, 2007). Since adult education is a time-consuming process, 
it is likely for individuals to enroll in adult education when they are not currently working 
(Elman & O’Rand, 1998, 2007). I account for this by including an indicator for a working 
spell. Additionally, the motivation to enroll might be sensitive to unemployment: 
Unemployment experience may incline individuals to return to education to improve their 
labor market position (Hällsten, 2011; Stenberg, 2011). I capture this by cumulative 
experience of unemployment in months for the previous five years and its squared term (see 
                                                                                                                                                  
accumulate material asserts for providing more educational opportunities for their children (Titma et al., 2003). 
In turn, since higher education was the main route to access higher occupational groups, higher-educated parents 
focused on education as “the fundamental asset to convey to their children” (Titma et al., 2003, p. 294). Hence, 
parental educational attainment may approximate parental cultural capital. 
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Hällsten, 2011 for similar approach). This variable may also function as additional proxy for 
occupational resources.77 
I further control for the sector of economy because requirements for initial educational 
attainment may vary by sector, and in some sectors (e.g., educational and health sphere), 
there is a higher need for constant skills upgrading and re-certification (Clarke & Metalina, 
2000). Moreover, in the labor market restructuring process, many branches have been 
shrinking – particularly in production sector – which may incentivize individuals to re-train 
for a new profession (for indirect empirical evidence, see Berger et al., 2001). Expanding 
tertiary sector could also open up opportunities for adult education. 
Importantly, since I consider occupational resources and the sector of economy in the current 
and previous job, I lack this information for those who have not yet entered their first job 
after completing initial education. To account for this, I include an indicator for whether an 
individual has already entered the first job. Finally, I control for approximate education (see 
Section 4.2.1), for residence in Moscow or St. Petersburg at the time of the GGS survey (see 
section 4.1), and for missing values in the multivariate models. For more information on 
variable construction, see Table 4–1 in Section 4.2.2.  
6.5 Results 
Before testing my hypotheses using multivariate analyses, I present a series of descriptive 
analyses providing first insights on enrollment in adult education in Russia. In the following, 
first the prevalence of upgrading and sidestepping in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, and 
second the relationship between the transition to both adult education strategies and (1) initial 
educational, (2) occupational attainment, and (3) gender are presented and discussed. 
6.5.1 Descriptive results 
Figure 6–1 displays Kaplan-Meier estimations for the enrollment in upgrading and 
sidestepping in Russia over the observation period. Overall, only few individuals enrolled in 
                                                
77 I do not examine social inequality in terms of unemployment experience, due the following two reasons. 
According to the Soviet ideology, there was no unemployment under the Soviet Union (though, for contra-
evidence see Gregory & Collier, 1988; Moskoff, 1992). With the collapse of the Soviet Union it increased but 
never reached more than 13.3% (Gimpelson & Kapeliushnikov, 2013). 
  
133 
adult education within first two years after completing initial education. The results clearly 
reveal that upgrading is a much more used investment strategy compared with sidestepping, 
and individuals upgrade faster than they sidestep. This difference is not surprising since 
sidestepping is a rather “risky” investment (see discussion above). After duration of 
approximately five years, only about 4% of individuals enrolled in sidestepping, while 12% 
enrolled in upgrading. Within the next ten years, an additional 5% re-entered the educational 
system to proceed with sidestepping, and 8% re-entered to proceed with upgrading. However, 
88% of individuals never actually participated in sidestepping, and 76% never upgraded. 
Figure 6–1: Plot of survivor functions (product-limit estimation) for upgrading and 
sidestepping 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. 
Table 6–2 offers a brief overview of the proportions of adult learners in Russia during the 
Soviet and post-Soviet periods and gives first hints of the impact of the regime change on 
incidences of adult education in Russia. Comparing both periods, the overall enrollment rates 
in the post-Soviet period are almost twice as low as during the Soviet period. Interestingly, 
while the proportion of upgraders decreased sharply, this is not the case for sidesteppers. The 
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lower value of previously accumulated human capital (owing to economic and labor market 
restructuring) probably resulted in a lower incidence of upgrading because many fewer 
individuals were motivated to build upon these “devaluated” skills (i.e., to upgrade). It should 
be noted that the proportion of enrollments in adult education in the post-Soviet period could 
be expected to be slightly higher if the observation period were as long as for the Soviet 
period (the observational window during the Soviet period was 25 years, whereas it was 14 
years during the post-Soviet period). 
Table 6–2: Proportion of adult learners in Russia overall and by period  
  Analytical sample Any adult 
education 
Upgrading Sidestepping 
Overall     
In % 100% 26.21% 19.91% 8.03% 
Individuals  6,016 1,577 1,198 483 
Soviet period     
In % 100% 22.66% 17.94% 5.64% 
Individuals  4,219 956 757 238 
Post-soviet period     
In % 100% 11.70% 7.79% 4.42% 
Individuals  6,016 704 469 266 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Adult-education enrollment is considered 
as at least one-time enrollment per observation period. Thus, sample sizes and proportions across rows 
and columns do not add up in total. 
Figure 6–2, Figure 6–3, and Figure 6–4 display Kaplan-Meir survival curves by initial 
educational level, by occupational position (in the current or previous job), and by gender and 
examine how previous educational and occupational attainments as well as gender are 
associated with enrollment in upgrading and sidestepping. 
For upgraders, I find the lowest propensity for adult education for the individuals with higher 
professional education, followed by individuals with lower vocational and secondary 
professional education, and by individuals with incomplete secondary and secondary 
completed education (Figure 6–2). It seems, that particularly a lack of specialization pushes 
individuals to upgrade in the later life courses. For sidesteppers, there is low variation among 
individuals attained secondary professional and higher levels and among individuals attained 
incomplete and completed secondary in the first eight years. In turn, those attained lower 
vocational level tend to enroll faster compared to their more-educated counterparts and this 
trend holds for about 10 years since having left initial education. Nonetheless, after fifteen 
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years those initially higher-educated have slightly higher enrollment rates into sidestepping 
(with growing trend in the next years) than others. 
Figure 6–2: Plot of survivor functions (product-limit estimation) for upgrading and 
sidestepping, by initial educational level 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations.  
Turning to occupational resources of adult learners, Figure 6–3 illustrates that individuals 
having authoritative positions are not significantly different from those without one in their 
upgrading behavior in the first four years since having left initial education. Yet, after these 
period individuals in not authoritative positions tend to enroll in upgrading slightly faster 
compared to those in authoritative position. Among sidesteppers, the of impact of 
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occupational position emerges after about 10 years since having completed initial education: 
individuals in authoritative position become more likely to move into sidestepping than those 
in not authoritative positions. 
Figure 6–3: Plot of survivor functions (product-limit estimation) for upgrading and 
sidestepping, by occupational resources 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations.  
Although the findings for occupational position contradict my expectations (Hypotheses H4 
and H5), it should be noted that access to authoritative position is strongly determined by 
initial educational level (e.g., see Chapter 5). Therefore, the descriptive results presented here 
might just reflect the patterns for those initially already higher-educated, and thus further 
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multivariate analyses are necessary. Furthermore, since authoritative position is a time-
dependent variable, non-parametric descriptive methods such as Kaplan-Meier method are 
not suitable for examining their impact due to the failure to capture their time-dependency in 
an analytical way.  
In regard to gender (Figure 6–4), men enroll faster in upgrading than women, while there are 
no such differences in regard to sidestepping. Since men are generally less educated than 
women, these patterns might result from a compositional effect. While the first observation 
underlines my expectations, the second one is contrast to them (Hypothesis H8). 
6.5.2 Multivariate results  
The results of the competing risk piece-wise constant exponential transition rate models that 
predict enrollment in upgrading and in sidestepping are presented in Table 6–3 and Table 6–
4, respectively. I examine social inequality in access to adult education in Russia in the 
following steps. I begin with a model that includes the main explanatory variables, i.e., initial 
education, occupational position, and period effect (Model 1.1 for upgrading and Model 2.1 
for sidestepping), as well as further model covariates and controls, in order to test Hypotheses 
H1-H5. Second, to study whether there is a variation in the initial educational effect over the 
regime change (Hypothesis H6), I add an interaction term between initial education and 
period (Model 1.2 for upgrading and Model 2.2 for sidestepping). Third, I examine whether 
the effect of the occupational positions changed over regime change (Hypothesis H7) by 
adding and interaction term between occupational position and period (Model 1.3 for 
upgrading and Model 2.3 for sidestepping). All results are presented for women and men 
both together and separately by gender. 
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Figure 6–4: Plot of survivor functions (product-limit estimation) for upgrading and 
sidestepping, by gender 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations.  
6.5.2.1 Upgrading 
Model 1.1 in Table 6–3 predicts that – ceteris paribus – those with secondary completed 
education are the mostly likely to upgrade, followed by those with incomplete secondary 
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educational levels.78 Hence, I find support for hypotheses H1, stating that medium-educated 
adults should be more likely to upgrade. In line with hypothesis H3, the results for 
occupational position suggest that individuals with job authority are more likely to upgrade, 
net of other covariates. Furthermore, in line with hypothesis H5b and in contrast to 
hypothesis H5a, I find that on average, fewer individuals enroll in upgrading after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and particular among men. Regarding gender difference, the 
results show no gender differences in upgrading behavior among equally equipped men and 
women, which contradicts Hypothesis H8. 
The interaction between initial education and the post-Soviet period (Model 2.1) increases the 
goodness of fit, and the likelihood-ratio test79 is statistically significant (Models 1.1 versus 
1.2: p<0.001). Interaction effects turn out to be significant, though there is only limited 
variation in the effect of initial education over regime change. For those with secondary 
professional education, the regime change had positive impact on their propensity to enroll in 
adult education (coefficient: –0.63+0.87=0.24). In contrast, all other groups began to enroll 
less, particularly the lower-educated (although there is no significant variation of the period 
effect among these groups).80 An additional examination of the group differences allows me 
to conclude that the regime change had a statistically significant negative impact only for 
initially medium- and lower-educated individuals (i.e., those below secondary-professional 
level), while no effect for the initially higher-educated (those above the secondary-
professional level) can be observed. 81  Although these results do not precisely support 
hypothesis H6, the patterns seem to be in line with expectations of a “weaker negative effect” 
for the initially higher-educated (which, in my case, yields no negative effect). Moreover, the 
distance between those with complete secondary education and those with secondary 
professional education appears to reduce after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These 
                                                
78 According to the Wald Test, differences between those with lower vocational education and those with 
secondary professional education are not statistically significant (p=0.756). 
79 The null hypothesis (that the additional interaction parameters are simultaneously zero) is tested. 
80 I checked this by changing the reference category of educational level.  
81 Wald Test of the post-Soviet period effect for those with incomplete secondary education p<0.001, lower 
vocational education p<0.05, secondary completed education p<0.001, secondary professional education 
p=0.064, and higher education p=0.192. 
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findings factually mean that the initially medium-educated “lost their advantage” with regard 
to an access to upgrading. Models stratified by gender follow generally the same patterns as 
model with both genders. 
An interaction between occupational position and the post-Soviet period (Model 1.3) seems 
not to increase the goodness of model fit at the conventional levels of statistical significance 
(likelihood-ratio test Model 1.1 versus Model 1.3: p=0.087). Still, there is some variation in 
the post-Soviet period effect. Although enrollment rates in upgrading decreased after the 
regime change, among those in authoritative positions, the negative effect of the post-Soviet 
period is weaker (coefficient: –0.41+0.24=−0.17, Wald Test: p=0.192) than among those in 
non-authoritative positions (coefficient: −0.41; Wald Test: p<0.001). However, the post-
Soviet period effect is not statistically significant for individuals in authoritative positions, 
meaning that they were able to retain their advantages after the regime change, whereas 
individuals in non-authoritative positions lost even more. Although not precisely, these 
results are in line with Hypothesis H7. Models stratified by gender predict the same patterns 
for women. For men, Hypothesis H7 is supported, because I find that also those in 
authoritative positions faced negative consequences of the Soviet Union collapse (Wald Test: 
p<0.05), though these negative effect was less pronounced then for those in non-authoritative 
positions (Wald Test: p<0.001). 
The interaction between gender and the post-Soviet period (Model 1.4) increases the 
goodness of fit, and the likelihood-ratio test is statistically significant (Models 1.1 versus 1.4: 
p<0.001). The results imply that the collapse of the Soviet Union appears to disadvantage 
only men in chances of upgrading (coefficient: –0.67), whereas for women there was no 
statistically significant change (coefficient: –0.67+0.56=−0.11, Wald Test: p=0.194). Both 
findings contradict Hypothesis H9. Moreover, the gender gap in propensity to upgrade that 
was to the female disadvantage under the Soviet regime (coefficient: –0.29, Wald Test: 
p<0.001), turned around in favor of women during the post-Soviet period coefficient: –
0.29+0.56=0.27, Wald Test: p<0.001). 
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6.5.2.2 Sidestepping  
Before discussing the results for sidestepping (Table 6–4), it is important to mention that 
sidestepping is much rarer than upgrading (563 events of sidestepping versus 1,369 events of 
upgrading), especially for men (200 events). Therefore, in some cases, the lower statistical 
power of the predictor variables might be due to a small sample size (Allison, 2012). 
In contrast to upgraders, individuals with a higher educational level tend to sidestep more 
often (Model 2.1).82 However, these patterns are only pronounced for women, whereas for 
men, there is no statistical difference between different educational groups.83 Consequently, 
the Hypothesis H2, predicting higher participation in sidestepping for initially higher-
educated individuals, is supported for women but not for men. The results for occupational 
position predict no average effect of having an authoritative job on the likelihood of enrolling 
in sidestepping. However, in the stratified models by gender, men in authoritative (versus 
non-authoritative) positions seem to sidestep more often, while for women, the effect is the 
opposite and is not statistically significant. Consequently, Hypothesis H4, stating that 
individuals from more favorable occupational groups should be less likely to enroll in 
sidestepping, found no support. The post-Soviet period has a negative impact on the chances 
of sidestepping. This result is only statistically significant for men, which supports 
Hypothesis H5b. For women, the post-Soviet period effect is positive (which would be in line 
with Hypothesis H5a), albeit albeit not statistically significant. According to the model, men 
and women do not differ from each other in terms of their propensity for sidestepping, other 
thins being equal. Hence, Hypothesis H8 is not supported.   
                                                
82 Wald Test of differences between those with secondary professional education and higher p<0.05. 
83 For men, Wald Test of differences between those with lower vocational education and secondary professional 
education p=0.347, between those with lower vocational education and higher education p=0.646, and between 
those with secondary professional education and higher education p=0.819. 
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Interaction between the initial educational level and the post-Soviet period (Model 2.2) 
improves the model significantly (likelihood-ratio test Model 2.1 versus Model 2.2: p<0.001) 
and implies that the post-Soviet period had negative consequences in terms of access to 
sidestepping for those with an initial educational level of incomplete secondary education 
(coefficient: −1.87), lower vocational education (coefficient: −1.87+1.19=−0.68). In turn, the 
regime change slightly increased the chances for those with secondary completed education 
(coefficient: −1.87+2.25=0.38), secondary professional education (coefficient: 
−1.87+1.90=0.03), and higher education (coefficient: –1.87+2.13=0.26). Nonetheless, 
additional tests demonstrate that the regime change only had a statistically significant impact 
for those with lower vocational education.84 Importantly, there were only seven individuals 
with incomplete secondary education who enrolled in sidestepping. Therefore, since the 
negative effect of the regime change was the strongest for this group, lack of statistical 
significance might be due to the lower sample size (in failure). Gender-specific models imply 
that these findings are valid for women. For men, the results follow the same patterns, though 
group comparison imply no statistically significant differences with regard to a period effect. 
Again, this is likely to be a result of lower sample sizes. My findings are generally in line 
with Hypothesis H6 (particularly for women) as I do not find a negative effect of the regime 
change for the initially higher-educated, but I do find it for the initially lower-educated. 
The interaction between the occupational position and the period (likelihood-ratio test Model 
2.1 versus Model 2.3: p<0.001) suggests a positive post-Soviet period effect for individuals 
in authoritative positions (Model 2.3). Closer examination of the interaction effect yields the 
following picture: Before the collapse the Soviet regime, individuals in authoritative 
positions were less likely to enroll in sidestepping compared with individuals in non-
authoritative positions (coefficient: −0.35, Wald test: p<0.05). After the collapse, I find 
turnabout patterns (coefficient: −0.35+0.73=0.38, Wald test: p<0.01). As a result, the chances 
of sidestepping reduced for individuals in non-authoritative positions after the regime change 
(coefficient: −0.37, Wald test: p<0.01). Conversely, for those in authoritative positions, the 
regime change had a positive effect (coefficient: −0.37+0.73=0.36, Wald test: p<0.05). This 
                                                
84 Wald Test of the post-Soviet period effect for those with incomplete secondary education p=0.083, lower 
vocational education p<0.001, secondary completed education p=0.259, secondary professional education 
p=0.866, and with higher education p=0.189. 
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means that the gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged has been reversing since the 
regime change and benefiting those already advantaged (this turnabout in effects also explain 
an absence of the total effect of the regime change in Model 2.1). These results only partly 
support Hypothesis H7 as I find not a weaker negative effect but a positive effect of the post-
Soviet period for those in more favorable positions. Despite a somewhat different 
interpretation, the results for men and women similarly predict rather an exacerbation effect 
of the regime change on inequality of adult-educational opportunity due to occupational 
positions. 85 
Finally, interacting gender and period (Model 2.4) improves model fit (likelihood-ratio test 
Model 2.1 versus Model 2.4: p<0.001) and indicates similar patterns as I found for upgraders 
(Model 1.4): post-Soviet Union collapse reduced chances for men to sidestep (coefficient: –
0.70) but not for women (coefficient: –0.70+0.85=0.15, Wald Test: p=0.236), thereby 
reversing the initial gender inequalities to the female disadvantage.86 Hence, Hypotheses H9 
lacks empirical support. 
6.6 Discussion 
Life-course research argues that initial advantages in educational careers are likely to be 
reproduced and amplified in later educational and labor market opportunities (“cumulative 
advantage effect”, DiPrete & Eirich, 2006; “Matthew Effect”, Merton, 1968), resulting in a 
steadily growing gap between initially advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In this regard, 
                                                
85 For men, I find no statistically significant gap in regard to authoritative position during the Soviet period 
(Wald Test: p=0.697), whereas men in authoritative (versus non-authoritative) positions are more likely to 
enroll in sidestepping during the post-Soviet period (Wald Test: p<0.001). Additionally, the post-Soviet effect 
has only statistically significant negative effect for men in non-authoritative positions (Wald Test: p<0.001; for 
men in authoritative positions, p=0.641). This means that the regime change worsened chances of the 
occupationally disadvantaged men. For women, although the gaps due occupational positions seem not to reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance (Wald Test: during the Soviet period p=0.060, during the post-
Soviet period p=0.376), the post-Soviet effect has statistically significant positive effect for women in 
authoritative positions (Wald Test: p<0.05; for women in non-authoritative positions, p=0.705). This means that 
the gap to the advantage of occupationally advantaged women emerged with the regime change. 
86 During the Soviet period, women were less likely to sidestep then men (coefficient: –0.51, Wald Test: 
p<0.001), whereas they became more likely to sidestep after the collapse of the Soviet Union (–0.51+0.85=0.34, 
Wald Test: p<0.05). 
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this study explicitly addresses inequality of adult-educational opportunity for those initially 
advantaged and disadvantaged in socialist and post-socialist Russia. I thereby argue that 
initial educational achievement and the attained occupational position might be strong 
motivating factors in addition to also being constraining factors (in terms of resources and 
opportunity costs) for enrollment in two distinct strategies of adult education, namely 
upgrading (defined as achieving a higher formal level of education) and sidestepping (defined 
as achieving an identical or lower formal level of education). Using techniques of event-
history analysis on linked data from the GGS and EES, I investigated (1) how previously 
accumulated initial educational levels and occupational resources may incentivize or hinder 
adults from enrolling in upgrading or sidestepping, (2) how the regime change in Russia has 
shaped these patterns, and (3) how selective participation in adult education shapes inequality 
of adult-educational opportunity. Special attention was drawn to gendered patterns in adult 
education enrollment. In the following section, I briefly highlight the main findings for adult 
learners as well as these findings’ implication for social-inequality patterns in Russia. 
I anticipated that adult upgraders would consist of individuals who are initially educationally 
disadvantaged and who are advantaged in the labor market, while adult sidesteppers would be 
those who are initially educationally advantaged and who are disadvantaged in the labor 
market. I additionally assumed gender inequalities disfavoring women in both types of adult 
education. In line with these anticipations, the empirical results have demonstrated that the 
initially medium-educated as well as those in more favorable occupational positions are more 
likely to upgrade. Moreover, I found initially higher-educated individuals more likely to 
sidestep, even if this conclusion holds true only for women and not for men.87 However, 
since the sample size for men was smaller than for women, one should be cautious when 
interpreting the non-significant effect of male initial education as being zero. Regarding the 
labor market (dis-)advantage, I found men in more (versus less) favorable occupational 
                                                
87 Analyses of the first significant job in Russia in the Chapter 5 might support this claim, as I find that 
particularly among higher-educated there is a gender gap in the access to authoritative positions. Probably, 
fewer chances for higher-educated women to match their skills to the better labor market positions, motivates 
them to seek retraining over educational sidestep in order to improve their labor market outcomes. The literature 
further hints that the most-educated and the lowest-educated female (versus male) graduates face higher risks of 
labor market exclusion in Russia (see Bühler & Konietzka, 2011; Denisova, 2002). 
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positions to be more likely to sidestep, whereas for women, there are no such differences.88 
Sidestepping – as a “risky” investment strategy – may well be less dependent on occupational 
resources, instead depending on individuals’ own motivation. Accordingly, the results for 
sidestepping partly contrast with my expectations. The expectations on gender have found no 
support in my study: men and women with similar characteristics have equal opportunities 
for both upgrading and sidestepping. Altogether, this means that it is rather individual 
preferences and needs, and structural factors that push individuals to return to education in 
the later life course.89 
What do these findings mean for social inequality in Russia? My analyses have revealed that 
stratified patterns of participation in adult education might exert both equalization and 
exacerbation effects on inequality adult-educational of opportunity. Higher enrollment rates 
in upgrading for previously educationally disadvantaged individuals suggest an equalizing 
pattern, while the results for occupational position suggest an exacerbation effect of 
upgrading. The greater access of initially educationally advantaged women to sidestepping 
suggests an exacerbation effect, yet the results for men advocate more equalized patterns. The 
lack of a gap between those previously occupationally advantaged and disadvantaged women 
in sidestepping implies that this type of adult education does not pronounce existing 
inequality. In turn, a greater access to sidestepping of previously advantaged men speaks in 
support of an exacerbation effects. 
Although I had contrasting expectations for the regime change on the incidences of adult 
education, the regime change was argued to result in fewer opportunities for adult education 
particularly for those previously disadvantaged either educationally or in the labor market. 
First, I found that a negative regime change effect on overall level of opportunity and 
particularly among men. Second, initially educationally disadvantaged individuals (i.e., the 
lower- and medium-educated) lose their advantage in access to upgrading and face greater 
disadvantages in access to sidestepping in post-Soviet Russia (statistically significant only for 
women). Third, I found that those initially disadvantaged in the labor market (i.e., those in 
                                                
88 Notably, men are generally more risk-seeking than women (Borghans et al., 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 
2007), which may support my speculation. 
89 Step-wise inclusion of variables implied that family constrains (being married and having children) fully 
explain the gender inequalities to the female disadvantage in probability to enroll in upgrading.  
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less favorable occupational positions) have lost their “equal” positions in access to upgrading 
and their advantageous positions in regard to sidestepping since the regime change in Russia. 
Both patterns are in line with my expectations. On the basis of this evidence, it seems fair to 
suggest that the regime change has clearly contributed to inequality of adult-educational 
opportunity and hence has strengthened the exacerbation effect of adult education on social 
inequality. 
Notably, I find that women (compared to men) having faced disadvantages in opportunities 
for upgrading and sidestepping under the Soviet Union, whereas this has been reversed in the 
post-Soviet period in Russia (this explains the absence of the overall gender effects). The 
post-Soviet demise therefore has changed opportunity structures between men and women in 
a way that women became more likely to enroll in upgrading than men. This change was a 
result of worsening opportunities for men and not of increasing opportunities for women, 
which might not amuse policy-makers. Moreover, considering the abrupt social and 
economic change, masculinization of economy, growth of corruption and importance of 
social networks particularly in the first transition decade (see Sections 2.6, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.8 
for discussion), the gender-specific adult education enrollment patterns might be a result of 
different labor market instruments used by men and women to succeed in a liberalizing and 
faster changing labor market. Lack of state control, high competition and an explosive growth 
of entrepreneurship pushed men relying on informal and often dangerous channels (to which 
men have better access, see e.g. Volkov, 2002), while women had to take more formalized 
channels via educational adjustments.90 
Returning to the “Matthew Effect” (Merton, 1968) or “cumulative advantaged effect” 
(DiPrete & Eirich, 2006), the Russian case can be summarized as follows: Higher social 
origin was and remains a crucial factor for higher educational attainment by adulthood in 
both Soviet and post-Soviet Russia (e.g., Gerber & Hout, 1995; Gerber, 2000a). Higher 
educational attainment, in turn, can give a competitive advantage upon labor market entry 
(e.g., Gerber, 2003; see also Chapter 5) and over the life course (Akhmedjonov, 2011; see 
also Chapter 7) but may also confer a propitious position in access to adult education, 
particularly in the Russian liberalized market economy, as my analyses have shown. 
                                                
90 Tentative support for this argument comes from the study by Gerber & Mayorova (2010) who demonstrated 
that Russia women are less likely to find a job via social networks. 
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Although I found evidence that selective participation adult education may promote intra-
generational equality of adult-educational opportunity in the case of upgrading, it seems that 
these adult learners come from higher social origins (see Table D–1, Appendix D), which 
may contribute to intergenerational inequality of adult-educational opportunity. 
Nevertheless, my study has several limitations that should guide further research. First, the 
data and sample size do not allow for a more fine-grained measurement of adult education. 
For instance, in terms of upgrading, it might be important to differentiate between strong and 
low upgrading. In terms of sidestepping, a further separation of downgrading from 
sidestepping – participation in adult education that is of a lower level – could be another 
relevant distinction for social inequality. Second, characteristics like field of study in initial 
and adult education could improve the measurement of the quality of adult education. Third, 
my results might underestimate inequality of adult-educational opportunity since I only 
considered formal adult education.91 Fourth, although my data is from 2005 and therefore not 
too outdated, it can be expected that the social and economic relevance of adult education has 
increased in Russia since 2005 due to the recent reforms in social and educational policies 
(see Khokhlova et al., 2013). Some recent studies have attempted to tackle related questions 
for the most recent decade in Russia (Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012; Kosyakova et al., 2016; 
Kosyakova, 2014). Finally, the scope of this chapter was limited to participation in adult 
education and did not encompass returns to adult education, an issue that will be dealt in the 
next chapter. 
  
                                                
91 Non-formal and informal education comprise important forms of adult education, as well. However, a large 
amount of empirical literature on non-formal adult education has shown that this type of adult education leads to 
an exacerbation of social inequalities (e.g., Albert, García-Serrano, & Hernanz, 2010; Bassanini et al., 2005; 
Bills, 2005; Brunello, 2001; Cai, 2011; Desjardins & Rubenson, 2011; Dieckhoff et al., 2007; Dieckhoff & 
Steiber, 2012; Hout & DiPrete, 2006; Kosyakova, 2014; Pallas, 2004; Schils & Fouarge, 2008). 
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Chapter 7  
Inequality in returns to adult education and the regime 
change92 
7.1 Introduction 
Economic theories posit that investments in education enhance productivity and consequently 
employment outcomes (G. S. Becker, 1964). Following this premise, policies emphasize the 
importance of human capital accumulation throughout individuals’ entire life course, often 
called “lifelong learning” (European Commission, 1995). In this regard, by improving 
employment outcomes and social inclusion, education and training are believed to benefit 
individuals not only in earlier but also in later stages. Moreover, formal adult education could 
enable initially educationally disadvantaged groups to catch up or to correct initially poor 
decisions (Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012). From a stratification point of view, one can argue that 
adult education may contribute to mitigating social distances and inequalities that emerged 
during schooling in the earlier life course. Furthermore, in a globalizing world calling for 
rapid skills adjustment and knowledge acquisition, adult education is becoming “the 
Solution” to supporting “a rapid transition to a knowledge-based economy” (Kristensson 
Uggla, 2008, p. 213). Correspondingly, adult education as an engine for economic 
development and welfare also benefits society in a broader sense (see also Jenkins et al., 
2003). 
Nonetheless, empirical evidence regarding returns to adult education is ambiguous. While 
several studies have shown that adult learners enjoy improved employment outcomes 
(Jenkins et al., 2003; Tuijnman, Chinapah, & Fägerlind, 1988), others have found no impact 
of adult education (Blanden, Buscha, Sturgis, & Urwin, 2012; Hällsten, 2012; Stenberg, 
2011) or even a labor market disadvantage for mature compared with “on time” graduates 
                                                
92  This chapter is a modified and extended version of Kosyakova, Y. (forthcoming). Cumulation or 
compensation? Adult education, labour market returns, and social inequalities in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia. 
Under peer-review in Advances in Life Course Research. 
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(Egerton, 2001; Elman & O’Rand, 2004; Holmlund, Liu, & Nordström Skans, 2007). Jenkins 
et al. (2003) established that the least qualified may indeed benefit from formal adult 
education, which suggests its equalizing effect on inequalities in employment outcomes. 
Contrarily, Kilpi-Jakonen et al. (2012 for Russia and the UK) demonstrated that those who 
are already advantaged are also the ones who benefit most from adult education, which 
instead alludes to an exacerbation effect on social inequalities.  
Remarkably, most empirical research on formal adult education has been conducted in 
western countries. With several exceptions (see Blossfeld, Kilpi-Jakonen, Vilhena, & 
Buchholz, 2014; Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012), existing sociological literature is silent on adult 
education in transitional societies such as Russia.93 Even less is known about returns to adult 
education during the socialist period and how these returns evolved after the regime change.94 
This gap is surprising because the core idea of education changed with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Under the Soviet regime, the (adult) educational system was very specific: 
Centralized and serving the planning economists, it lacked efficient market structures. As an 
aftermath of the collapse, previously accumulated human capital was almost instantly 
devaluated, economy and labor market structures were vastly reorganized (Sabirianova, 
2002), and the inequality between social groups increased (e.g., Gerber & Hout, 2004). As a 
result, adult education should have gained in significance to cope with the dramatic changes 
after the collapse. However, the educational sector received less attention from the 
government, and the once tight link to the labor market dissolved (Gerber, 2003), resulting in 
higher labor market risks for the graduates (Bühler & Konietzka, 2011). 
                                                
93 Available studies for Russia have focused primarily on non-formal adult education in the post-Soviet period 
and have done so principally from an economic perspective (e.g., Berger et al., 2001; Clarke & Metalina, 2000; 
Didenko, Dorofeeva, & Kljucharev, 2011; Popova, 2008). 
94 However, while Ivančič (2000) provides some empirical evidence on adult-education returns during and after 
the socialist period in Slovenia, she does not directly examine their variation over regime changes. Also the 
study looks only at educational improvement, while acquiring additional qualification at the same or lower level 
was neglected. 
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The aim of this study is (1) to analyze whether participation in formal adult education has a 
substantial effect on employment outcomes in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia.95 Extending 
previous research, (2) I examine returns to two types of adult education: upgrading and 
sidestepping. Upgraders obtain qualification higher than initial qualification, whereas 
sidesteppers obtain qualification lower than or at the same level as initial qualification. This 
differentiation is crucial because upgrading and sidestepping both common forms of adult 
education are likely to differ in their signaling function on the labor market. The signal of 
upgrading should be easily recognized by employers, resulting in a substantial impact on 
career progress. In contrast, the signal of sidestepping is less apparent and possibly results in 
worsened employment outcomes because sidesteppers presumably aim at career change. 
Previous literature (with the exception of Li, König, Buchmann, & Sacchi, 2000; Vono de 
Vilhena, Kosyakova, Kilpi-Jakonen, & McMullin, 2015) neglected these important aspects 
by examining all types of formal adult education together. A differentiation might explain the 
contradicting findings of previous research. 
With regard to employment outcomes, I particularly focus on whether adult education is a 
“solution” to enhance (re-)employment chances, to contribute to occupational upward 
mobility, and to prevent occupational downward mobility.96 A positive answer to at least 
some of these questions would mean that adult education could indeed compensate for 
existing social inequalities. However, adult education may also be detrimental to social 
inequality if initially advantaged individuals enjoy higher returns than initially disadvantaged 
                                                
95 I do not examine non-formal adult education (such as training) because it is mainly employer-supported and is 
associated with poaching, thereby reducing potential returns to this training type (see Blanden et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, in spite of transition in Russia, qualification obtainment is more typical in the formal educational 
system and through formal education types. Finally, the data used do not allow for appropriate measurement of 
non-formal education (which used to be of shorter duration) as only events with a duration of over 3 months 
were surveyed. 
96 I do not examine wages returns due to lacking information on this indicator in my data. Due to wage 
compression under the Soviet regime, wages may also be a less-relevant outcome. For instance, upward 
occupational mobility returned rather small wage rewards but increased access to privileges, higher status, and 
social security (see Clarke, 1999, pp. 62–63). Consequently, up- and downward mobility seem to be more 
promising outcomes as higher occupational positions are linked with monetary (earnings) and non-monetary 
rewards (living standards, social benefits, cultural assets) (see Yanowitch, 1977, Chapter 2). 
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individuals. To explore this question, I further examine (3) whether returns to adult education 
vary by initial educational level. Finally, to understand whether adult education was an 
effective tool after regime change in Russia, I investigate (4) whether and how returns to 
formal adult education changed over the regime change.  
To address these questions empirically, I use linked retrospective data from the Russian 
Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) and the Education and Employment Survey for 
Russia (EES). My sample includes men and women who attained initial education and 
entered the labor market entry. Life histories for the Soviet (1965-1990) and post-Soviet 
periods (1991-2005) are covered. This unique dataset for Russia allows for studying the 
effects of returns to both adult and initial education on career outcomes as well as the role 
played by the regime change. 
7.2 Contextual background 
In Soviet Russia, both education and employment system followed needs and goals of the 
planned economy. Correspondingly, the whole system was designed to function in a 
streamline way. The educational system was highly centralized and standardized in order to 
ensure a sufficient supply of graduates whose qualifications would properly match the skills 
required by the planned economy. The system of adult education was state-controlled and 
well-developed, included compulsory education, improvement of qualifications, and 
advanced training, and had a remarkable network of participating educational institutions 
(Khokhlova et al., 2013; Zajda, 2003). The transition from school to work was coordinated 
by state institutions, which assigned graduates to particular jobs (Gerber, 2003), ensuring 
high occupational specificity. These characteristics together linked educational certificates 
with occupations in a perfect way (Gerber, 2002, 2003). Employment was guaranteed and 
was a main channel for social provision (Standing, 1996). Unemployment though existed, 
was illegal and kept at lower levels (Gregory & Collier, 1988). Strong occupational 
boundaries, state control (and sanctioning) over planning, hiring and firing of personnel, 
encouragement of long-term loyalty to the same employer via access to (non-)monetary 
privileges restricted job and occupational mobility (Clarke, 1999; Uunk et al., 2005). 
Collective wage agreements created less incentives for additional effort. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the consequent liberalization of the labor 
system led to the radical changes in the professional labor market structure. An almost instant 
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devaluation of the human capital accumulated under the communist regime resulted in a 
massive shifts of workers across firms, occupations, and sectors (Kapeliushnikov & 
Lukiyanova, 2010; Sabirianova, 2002). Unemployment emerged from almost zero point, 
though to much lower extent compared to the other post-socialist economies (van der Lippe 
& Fodor, 1998).97 Formally, the employment protection legislation is very strict from the 
comparative perspective (OECD, 2011a), but standards are not heavily enforced (Gimpelson 
et al., 2010). Weak bargaining power of workers and trade unions, labor market volatility, 
and high hiring and separation rates became peculiar to the Russian labor market 
(Kapeliushnikov et al., 2011), suggesting lower turnover costs. 
The state monopoly on education was eliminated in the early 1990s, which induced the 
growth of paid educational programs and private universities and consequently expanded 
enrolment rates in tertiary education (Frumin et al., 2013). At the same time, mandatory job 
assignment was abandoned, and employers’ involvement in the development of professional 
standards diminished. Overall, employers were less interested in cooperating and taking part 
in the educational process, e.g., in terms of offering adult education and apprenticeships. 
Nevertheless, due to the lower priority of the education sector for the reformers and financial 
constraints, the social changes of the early 1990s left the educational system (inclusive adult 
education system) relatively intact compared with other institutions (e.g., the labor market), 
and no significant reforms in the area of professional education were introduced (Frumin et 
al., 2013). As a result, the organizational aspects of educational institutions and educational 
standards lagged behind the demands of the new economy. The educational system became 
much less vocationally oriented, and the linkage between the educational system and the 
labor market faded. Hence, educational certificates became much weaker “signaling devices” 
of the applicants’ productivity level (e.g., Gerber 2003). 
7.3 Theoretical framework on returns to formal (adult) education 
It is well known that initial educational attainment affects occupational allocation and 
contributes to wages and career prospects. Human capital (G. S. Becker, 1964), signaling 
(Spence, 1973), credentialism (Collins, 1979), and job competition (Thurow, 1972) theories 
                                                
97 Unemployment grew gradually: it increased from 5.2% in 1992 to a peak of 13.3% in 1998 and then declined 
to 7.2% in 2005 (Gimpelson & Kapeliushnikov, 2013, fig. 29.3). 
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aim to explain this relationship. Likewise, these theories may elucidate the nexus between 
qualifications obtained at a mature age and subsequent employment outcomes, while 
institutional explanations may shed some light on the role of the regime change. The 
following discussion approaches these theories in respect to adult educational returns, 
distinguishing between potentials of upgrading and sidestepping strategies. 
7.3.1 Individual-level explanations 
Human capital theory (G. S. Becker, 1964) assumes perfect information and understands 
educational certificates as a reliable measure for employee’s performance. Since schooling 
enhances skills, competences, and abilities required for job performance (Bills, 2003), more 
schooling implies better skills and abilities and thus higher productivity levels. More-
educated employees have higher labor market value and respectively higher wages as well as 
more secure positions (G. S. Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1989). Applying this logic to adult 
education, employers are expected to value formal adult education because it is coupled with 
higher worker productivity. However, this fact concerns only upgrading as it reflects 
increased employees’ skills and competences. Sidestepping, in turn, may be connected with a 
depreciation of initial investments in human capital (Li et al. 2000) and is less likely to have a 
positive impact on upward moves in the occupational hierarchy. Nevertheless, sidestepping 
may be associated with corrections of wrong decisions made in the early life course and 
should hence reduce risks of downward mobility and increase (re-)employment chances.  
Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) relaxes the prefect information assumption and focuses on 
the signaling function of education. In order to reach a conclusion about job applicants’ 
potential productivity level, employers use observable indices (unalterable characteristics 
such as sex, race, and so forth.) and signals (alterable characteristics such as educational 
credentials, labor market experience, and so forth) (Spence, 1973). Better-educated applicants 
usually possess “desirable” and “productive” attributes such as higher motivation, are more 
committed to their jobs, and have healthier lifestyles (Li et al., 2000, p. 46). Consequently, 
they are more attractive to employers. In line with these arguments, formal adult education 
serves as a crucial signal because it implicates comparably high time- and monetary 
investments and thus points out the high motivation of job applicants. Consequently, both 
upgrading and sidestepping should be profitable for employment outcomes. Upgrading might 
additionally signal enhanced productivity levels, thereby implying a stronger positive impact 
on career prospects than sidestepping. 
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Credentialism theory (Collins, 1979) argues that education functions as a means of social 
exclusion. The theory emphasizes that more-educated individuals experience socio-economic 
success over the life course not because they necessarily possess higher skills and knowledge, 
but because they are able to control and restrict access to the most favorable and privileged 
occupations and positions (Bills, 2003). This situation is considered societally appropriate 
and desirable. Accordingly, upgrading should lead to higher-rank positions and occupations; 
sidestepping would help only those already in higher positions (i.e., the better-educated) to 
retain these positions because these learners already “have access”. 
The theory of job competition (Thurow, 1972) posits that it is not the actual skill level itself 
that is important for job assignment, but rather a relative position of the worker in the labor 
queue; the most preferred applicant gets the best jobs. The main premise here is that all skills 
that are important for doing a job are acquired after entering the job. The primary objective of 
the labor market is “matching trainable individuals with training ladders’ and not with skills 
suppliers or those demanding these skills (Thurow, 1972, p. 72). Profit-oriented employers 
screen and rank job applicants based on their trainability, relying on signals derived from 
background characteristics. Education is premised to be one of the most important screens for 
trainability, and the more-educated are thus preferred. However, since the core idea of this 
theory is the relative position of the individual in the job queue, a growing supply of the 
more-educated workforce devaluates its signaling power. As result, acquiring even more 
education (later in life) becomes a defensive instrument in order to remain in a job. So what 
does this theory infer about adult education? On the one hand, the least-educated, in 
particular, should benefit from upgrading as their relative position will be enhanced, thus 
moving them forward in the job queue. On the other hand, for higher-educated individuals, 
upgrading should work as a defense mechanism to help them keep their position, thus 
preventing downward mobility. With regard to sidestepping, the situation is not as clear-cut 
and rather suggests pushing downward, at least in the short run. However, recent sidestepping 
may also signal the “trainability” of the job applicant and thus be positively related to upward 
mobility chances. 
7.3.2 Gender differences 
According to the economic theories presented above, the adult education should pay off 
solely based on human capital and labor force experience independently of gender. Hence, 
economic accounts argue in a gender-neutral way (H.-P. Blossfeld, Buchholz, et al., 2015). 
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There are, however, other explanations that underline the role of gender in returns to (adult) 
education (see section 5.3, for detailed discussion). In particular, it has been argued that 
women might be hindered to reap (adult) educational returns to the same extend as men due 
to family role-taking, discrimination, and occupational concentration in lower-paying jobs 
(Felmlee, 1988; Li et al., 2000).  
In spite of this, the literature constantly reports higher returns to adult education for women 
than for men once family responsibilities, age and previous occupation are controlled for. For 
instance, adult education returns higher earnings for women than for men (Blanden et al., 
2012; De Coulon & Vignoles, 2008; Hällsten, 2012; Jacobson, LaLonde, & Sullivan, 2005; 
Stenberg, Luna, & Olle Westerlund, 2011); 98 similarly, women gain more than men in terms 
of occupational upward mobility and employment chances (Jenkins et al., 2003; Kilpi-
Jakonen et al., 2012 for Sweden and the UK). Empirical studies contended that these higher 
(formal) adult education returns result from (a) industrial segregation benefiting women, (b) a 
stronger signaling component of female credentials (Blanden et al., 2012), (c) a positive 
selection of women into adult education (Li et al., 2000), and (d) a more specific demand for 
adult education due to higher labor market absenteeism of women (Stenberg et al., 2011). 
Compared to females male adult learners seem to possess more marginalized labor market 
positions, which convey negative signals to potential employers, thereby counteracting 
positive signals of added credentials.  
7.3.3 The influence of country-specific settings 
The cross-comparative literature on returns to education emphasizes the role of institutional 
settings for labor market success. Characteristics of the educational environment and 
educational opportunities are of great consequence, because they define the importance of the 
certificates and the level of occupational boundaries in the labor market (Allmendinger, 1989; 
Müller & Shavit, 1998).  
In highly standardized and stratified educational systems, credentials provide clear and 
reliable information (signal) about applicants’ proficiency, knowledge, and skill level 
(Allmendinger, 1989). Educational systems with higher vocational orientation ensure more 
                                                
98 Though, see Kilbourne, England, Farkas, Beron, & Weir (1994) for contra-evidence. 
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secure school-to-work transitions and better “matches” between educational qualification and 
occupation (Müller & Shavit, 1998). However, these characteristics can also constrain job 
mobility and career prospects (Scherer, 2005). Conversely, in countries with lower 
standardization, stratification, and vocational specificity, the qualification-occupation link is 
looser, and the main emphasis is on the production of general competences and skills 
(Soskice, 1999). As result, skills and knowledge transmitted by educational system are less 
clear for employers, resulting in a higher rate of job mismatches and job mobility (Scherer, 
2005). In such systems, graduates often first need on-the-job training to be useful to their 
employer. Thus, educational qualifications are not valued as credentials, but rather as signals 
for job applicants’ trainability, potential productivity, and work habits, resulting in higher 
value of academic education (Müller & Shavit, 1998). 
While the arrangement of the educational system determines job-seekers’ attractiveness and 
suitability for perspective employers, the employment system and the level of employment 
regulations affect the employer’s freedom to dismiss workers (Gangl, 2003). In this context, 
the literature often distinguishes between two extremes: “coordinated” market economies 
(CMEs), with reciprocal relationships between market actors, and “uncoordinated” or 
“liberal” market economies (LMEs), based on the market relationships (Soskice, 1999).  
CMEs are characterized by trust relationships, long-term commitments, a high level of 
employment protection, and powerful unions. CMEs are usually supported by standardized, 
stratified, and vocationally oriented educational systems with strong involvement of 
employers in the skill-acquisition process (Müller & Shavit, 1998). All these characteristics 
reduce labor market dynamics in CMEs (Gangl, 2003). As result, the established workforce 
(insiders) enjoys privileged positions, support, and security. The outsiders (e.g., re-entrants or 
those in unfavorable job situations) face difficulties in finding stable and appropriate 
employment and are at risk of getting into (or being stuck in) precarious jobs or being 
unemployed. Conversely, open employment relationships, with lower levels of state 
intervention, short-term competitive relationships between employers and employees, and 
high labor market turnover and employment mobility, are typical features of LMEs. Labor 
market success is determined more by individual resources such as performance as well as 
recent education and employment history, while initial educational investments recede into 
the background (DiPrete, De Graaf, Luijkx, Tahlin, & Blossfeld, 1997). LMEs rely on 
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general skills, and educational systems are commonly characterized by low or even absent 
vocational specificity (Soskice, 1999).  
Applying this deliberation to the Russian context presented earlier, it can be argued that the 
functioning of the Soviet educational and employment systems is more comparable with 
CMEs. In turn, post-Soviet frameworks suggest a mix of both because of labor legislation 
strictness, as in CMEs, and high labor market volatility and flexibility, as in LMEs 
(Kapeliushnikov et al., 2011). Nevertheless, among post-socialist countries, Russia appears 
among “the most liberal” (Knell & Srholec, 2007, p. 55). 
With regard to adult-education returns, we may expect that they are lower in CMEs (versus 
LMEs) as chances to improve one’s labor market position are more limited (Vono de Vilhena 
et al., 2016). Additionally, adult learners are likely to belong to labor market outsiders (e.g., 
unemployed, inactive, or part-time workers) who might face higher labor market risks under 
the Soviet regime. Accordingly, the attainment of education in mature age may not 
necessarily improve the employment outcomes of Soviet adult learners. On the other hand, 
the impact of formal adult education should still be favorable due to the strong linkage and 
coordination between education and employment systems. This means that upgrading 
provides employers with more productive workers, while sidestepping should at least 
facilitate a better match to other job. 
In post-Soviet Russia, education and the labor market became loosely linked, resulting in 
poorer information of the certificates with regard to obtained skills and knowledge. In spite of 
this, recent participation in adult education might still work as a signal for employers of 
higher motivation and productivity levels (H.-P. Blossfeld et al., 2014). Additionally, in 
LMEs, labor market characteristics do not create obstacles for the positive impact of adult 
education on employment outcomes (Vono de Vilhena et al., 2016). Thus, compared with the 
Soviet patterns, returns to adult education after the fall should be more pronounced.99 Finally, 
following the Nee’s Market transition theory, the liberalization of the markets alters incentive 
structure and raises effort (Nee, 1989). As result, human capital investments become better 
proxies for individual skills and productivity (Noelke & Müller, 2011, pp. 5–6). Therefore, 
                                                
99 This expectation can be further supported by the fact that the rates of returns to (initial) schooling are 
generally higher in LMEs-type countries compared with CMEs-type countries (Cohn & Addison, 1998). 
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adult education should return better labor market outcomes in post-Soviet Russia, and 
particularly upgrading due to its signal of higher skills and productivity.  
7.4 Research design 
My empirical investigation is based on linked data from the Russian Generations and Gender 
Survey (GGS) and the Education and Employment Survey for Russia (EES). Details on both 
surveys can be found in Chapter 4. 
7.4.1 Risk sample 
For the research on adult-education returns, the sample is restricted to “adults”, i.e., those at 
risk of being an adult learner. This definition excludes individual episodes before completing 
initial education, which is defined either by a) closing gaps of less than 12 months between 
two educational spells or b) enrolment in education in the “normal age range”. For more 
details on the definition of completion of initial education, see Section 4.2.1, and on the 
definition of “adults”, see section 6.4.1. 
To capture the beginning of the career, the sample is further confined to episodes and events 
after labor market entry occurred.100 Accordingly, episodes are censored on the left at the 
time of the first observable employment episode. On the right, the observational window at 
the interview date, or when the respondent is in the pre-retirement age (49 for women and 54 
for men). After these restrictions, the data includes about 91% of EES respondents (2,245 
men and 3,614 women). 
7.4.2 Dependent variables 
Three sets of employment outcomes are examined: (1) re-employment chances, (2) upward 
occupational mobility, and (3) downward occupational mobility. I employ event-history 
analysis, which is particularly useful for examining labor market career processes since it 
allows for appropriately modeling the time-dependency and casual relationships between the 
                                                
100 Labor market entry is defined as entry into any first job after having completed initial education. This 
definition slightly differs from that in Chapter 5, where only jobs lasted 6 months or more were considered. This 
approach accounts for all job moves of individuals who made the school-to-work transition (after initial 
education has been attained). Moreover, particularly entry into short-term jobs may incline individuals to re-
enter education in order to improve employment opportunities. 
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variables of interest (H.-P. Blossfeld et al., 2007). Event-history analyses can best consider 
interdependent processes at the micro (e.g., educational careers) and macro (e.g., regime 
change) levels because future changes in the processes are linked and are dependent on 
current changes in processes (cf. H.-P. Blossfeld et al., 2007). Finally, event-history models 
are well suited to capturing right-censoring (when the end of the episode is not observed). 
Table 7–1 contains an overview of the main modeling details in the logic of event-history 
analyses.  
Table 7–1: Modelling details: Events, risk sample, and time 
Outcome Re-employment chances Occupational mobility 
Event Transition from non-employment to 
employment 
Transition towards higher 
occupational class 
Transition towards lower 
occupational class 
Risk sample Unemployed or inactive Unskilled and skilled 
manual workers, services, 
semi-professionals, 
professionals 
Skilled manual workers, 
services, semi-professionals, 
professionals, managers 
Time clock 
starts 
Non-employment entry (conditional 
on the occurrence of labor market 
entry) 
Labor market entry 
Time clock 
ends 
Entry into employment, or 
interview date in the case of right 
censoring or age 50 or 55 for 
women or men, respectively 
Interview date in the case of right-censoring or age 50 or 
55 for women or men, respectively 
Process time Time since individuals entered non-
employment, i.e., non-employment 
experience 
Time since labor market entry, i.e., general labor force 
experience 
Model Continuous time piece-wise 
constant exponential transition rate 
model with single episodes 
Continuous time competing risk piece-wise constant 
exponential transition rate model with repeated events 
Note: Own illustration. 
In the (re-)employment chances analyses, the event is defined as a transition from non-
employment to employment. This outcome is crucial because improved (re-)employment 
chances are “the first stepping stone for a broader range of improvements in the labor 
market” (Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2012, p. 49). The risk sample includes non-working episodes 
(unemployment and inactivity). The numbers in my sample were not sufficient to study 
unemployment separately from other types of non-employment101  because the EES only 
surveyed episodes, which lasted 3 months and more. Less than 1% and 5% of the episodes 
can be identified as unemployment during the Soviet and post-Soviet period, respectively.  
                                                
101 I control for the type of non-employment episode in the statistical model. 
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To study occupational up- and downward mobility, I refer to the occupational class based on 
the European Socioeconomic Classification (ESeC, see Gerber & Hout, 2004 for details), 
which is similar to the Erikson-Goldthrope-Portocarero (EGP) schema. ESeC is based on 
employment relationships, work autonomy and skills in a job, and these characteristics were 
less likely to change over the fall, which would be the case for measures like prestige or 
socio-economic index (Billingsley & Matysiak, 2012). Upward (downward) mobility is 
defined as any movement towards a higher (lower) occupational class. I model occupational 
mobility, employing a competing-risk approach with two transition states: upward and 
downward occupational mobility. All other exits are treated as censored (e.g., lateral 
occupational moves, exits to unemployment, or inactivity). 
7.4.3 Transition-rate models 
In general, the transition rate in continuous-time models is defined as: 
! " = 	 lim()→( + (	,	-.() -/()()1(  . 
Using this formulation, the rate can be interpreted as the instantaneous probability of 
experiencing an event. More specifically, the rate equals the probability that the event time 
lies within the infinitesimal interval (t, t”) given that individual “survived” up to t, 
standardized by the time interval (t, t”). In my multiple-episode models (occupational 
mobility), individuals might experience a certain event repeatedly on a common time axis 
(time since labor market entry). This implies that the individual might enter, exit, and re-enter 
the risk set for the process under study along the time axis. In other words, a multi-episode is 
used to build the representative risk set for the life career. In contrast, in the single episode 
models ((re-)employment chances), the clock is reset to zero for every single episode. Figure 
7–1 provides a conceptual overview to both approaches. 102 
                                                
102 This is given by the data organization. 
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Figure 7–1: Modeling of an individual career in a single- and multi-episode modeling 
approach 
 
Note: Own illustration. 
Time dependency is modeled using a piece-wise constant approach. This approach is useful 
to control the dependency of duration, while it does not require complex assumptions about 
the time-dependence of the processes (H.-P. Blossfeld et al., 2007). Durations are assumed to 
follow an exponential distribution that implies a time-constant hazard rate. By introducing 
period-specific dummy variables, the rate is allowed to vary over these periods. As a result, 
the models are parameterized as follows: ln !3(") = 56 + 89 + :;, 
where A is a vector of period dummies, X a vector of time-constant covariates, and Z is a 
vector of time-varying covariates. 6, 9, and ; are vectors of parameters to be estimated from 
the data.  
Nonetheless, casual inference is limited by potential endogeneity of (adult) education 
decisions being inbred in the nature of the observational data. For instance, it cannot be 
excluded that in some cases employers may give a commitment to a job promotion, 
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conditional on employee’s acquisition additional formal qualification. Moreover, there might 
be an omitted variable bias. For instance, it could be that productive characteristics such as 
ability or motivation impact upon both education decisions and positive career outcomes (see 
Dieckhoff, 2007; Jenkins, 2006). As these characteristics cannot be accounted for in my data, 
some caution is warranted with regard to interpreting the estimated impact of (adult) 
education on career outcomes in too strict causal terms. Hence, in order to minimize bias due 
to confounding influences, I account for a whole array of covariates.  
7.4.4 Independent variables 
The main variables of interest are the time-varying dummy covariates measuring the 
completion of different types of adult education, i.e., upgrading and sidestepping. Upgrading 
is classified as having completed education that is higher than previously attained, while 
sidestepping is any other type of adult education that cannot be classified as upgrading. I 
consider obtaining adult education, regardless of whether it was completed with or without a 
diploma. The human-capital approach suggests that such investments in education also 
contribute to skills improvement or additional skills formation, though they might be lower 
when compared with “certified” skills (PIAAC, 2011, p. 29). Following the signaling 
approach, obtaining a diploma might be less important than participation in adult education. 
Additionally, by using this definition, I increase the sample of adult learners: 24% of 
upgraders and 7% of sidesteppers completed adult education without a diploma. 
Returns to formal adult education often do not materialize right away but are first visible 
several years after a learning event and may grow over time (Blanden et al., 2012). Therefore, 
I opt for studying adult-education returns in terms of a long-term effect (“total effect”, 
Blanden et al., 2012, p. 505), in which adult-education variables change their values from 
zero to one as soon as a person completes adult education (see Figure E–1 in Appendix E).103 
                                                
103 In additional analyses, I examined (1) a short-term effect, in which adult-education variables are assigned to 
one at the end of each episode a person completes adult education; and (2) a lagged effect, in which time periods 
since completing adult education are considered. In many cases, I found the strongest effect of adult education 
right after graduation. This association became weaker over time, though adult education still paid off, e.g., after 
10 years after graduation. Results are available upon request.  
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To reduce the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, I include the following time-constant 
and time-varying controls that may influence participation in adult education and 
employment status:  Initial educational level is an important determinant for the subsequent 
career outcomes as well as for adult educational enrolment (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2003). 
Original variable for initial education is collapsed into three attainment levels: low 
(incomplete secondary), medium (lower vocational and secondary completed), high 
(secondary and higher professional). I account for gender (female), because women tend to to 
have career trajectories being different from men due to competing family roles (e.g., 
Härkönen & Manzoni, 2016). As mentioned, there might be gender differences in returns to 
adult education (see Section 7.3.2). Age of labor market entry may be associated with success 
in the job search as well as with the attained educational level. In this sense, earlier (usually 
lower-qualified) labor market entrants enjoy a “starting advantage” before the higher-
qualified entrants take over (Hillmert, 2011, p. 418). Both factors may influence the 
subsequent career-attainment process. I control for socio-economic origin because own labor 
market success is often boosted by advantaged socio-economic origin throughout 
individuals” life courses (Hillmert, 2011), which was even the case under the socialist regime 
(Gerber & Hout, 1995). Additionally, socio-economic origin might partly approximate the 
ability and resources associated with parental background.104 
The career-attainment process is embedded in the social structure and is strongly determined 
by actual historical time as well as by the historical time of the labor market entry (H.-P. 
Blossfeld, 1986). Accordingly, I control for post-Soviet labor market entry if the entry 
occurred after 1990 and for the post-Soviet period if the actual spell is related to the time after 
1990. I further account for competing family roles (being married and presence of children) 
as these obviously influence educational and labor market opportunities. Since Russian 
women had to take over gainful employment as well as household work, this double burden 
might particularly dampen females’ occupational mobility and promotion possibilities (see 
Chapter 5). At the same time, family roles might also have a stabilization effect on males’ 
careers, because children increase mobility costs for men (Maltseva, 2005). A control for 
                                                
104  Warren, Sheridan and Hauser (2002) found that the socio-economic-origin effect operates throughout 
educational attainment and ability. 
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rural residence area enters the models to capture the current place of residence since both 
employment and adult education opportunities are usually restricted in rural areas. 
In the models for the employed, I additionally consider “available career resources” and 
control for having an authoritative position and being part of the higher-level occupational 
class ((semi-)professionals and managers). This also captures the “ceiling” effect (Li et al., 
2000). Due to restricted opportunities for occupational mobility, I further control for being 
self-employed, a family-worker, or a farmer (Mach et al., 1994). Since turnover rates vary 
strongly among economic sectors in Russia (see, e.g., GOSKOMSTAT USSR, 1988, p. 258; 
GOSKOMSTAT, 2001, p. 106), I account for sectors of economy. Previous number of jobs 
enters as a continuous measure of labor force experience. In the analyses of (re-)employment 
chances, variables for occupational class, authoritative position, sector of the economy, and 
self-employment are captured for the previous job. Since I model a single episode here, I 
need to account for the history of the process itself (see Heckman & Borjas, 1980). Hence, I 
control for number of previous non-working spells and previous labor force experiences. 
Finally, I control for approximate education (see Section 4.2.1), for residence in Moscow or 
St. Petersburg at the time of the GGS survey (see Section 4.1), for whether the respondent has 
had the experience of employment interruptions (only for the employed), and for missing 
values in the multivariate models. For more information on variable construction, see Table 
4–1 in Section 4.2.2. 
7.5 Results 
Before examining labor market returns to adult education, the following section illustrates 
descriptive statistics for key variables. First, the frequency of adult education completion is 
presented. In contrast to the Chapter 6, here I concentrate on the obtainment of and not the 
enrollment in adult education. Afterwards, the labor market transition processes of interest 
before and after the collapse of the Soviet period are depicted and discussed.  
7.5.1 Descriptive results 
Table 7–2 shows the proportion of individuals who upgraded or sidestepped during the 
observation period. Approximately 19% of the individuals in the sample upgraded their 
educational level, while only 8% completed sidestepping. These patterns vary substantially 
when we consider period differences. While about 15% of adults upgraded at least one time 
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during the Soviet period, this related to only 8.6% of adults during the post-Soviet period. 
About 8% sidestepped during the Soviet period, and a similar proportion sidestepped during 
the post-Soviet period. 
Table 7–2: Proportion of adult learners in Russia 
 Analytical sample Upgrading Sidestepping 
Overall    
In % 100% 18.52% 7.95% 
Individuals  5,859 1,085 466 
Soviet period    
In % 100% 15.04% 5.21% 
Individuals  4,069 612 212 
Post-soviet period    
In % 100% 8.60% 4.64% 
Individuals  5,859 504 272 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Adult-education completion is considered 
as at least one-time completion per observation period. Thus, sample sizes and proportions across rows 
and columns do not add up in total. 
Re-employment patterns are depicted in Figure 7–2. For visual simplicity, non-employment 
duration is cut by a maximum of 96 months. In general, the survival function decreases 
monotonically with increasing duration spent in non-employment for all groups. In the first 
three months of non-employment duration, the survival function decreases almost linearly 
and suggests that about 40% (36% for the post-Soviet period) of individuals enter 
employment. However, the patterns of re-employment differ slightly for distinct groups when 
longer-term non-employment is considered. Among Soviet entrants, the risk of not being re-
employed during the Soviet period seems to be negligible (Group 1), suggesting successful 
labor market reintegration in line with the Communist principle of full employment. 
Examining the post-Soviet period, we find that the Soviet entrants (Group 2) face higher risks 
of not finding a job compared to  the post-Soviet entrants (Group 3). Soviet experience 
probably serves as a penalty effect in the new dynamic labor market. 
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Figure 7–2: Plot of survivor functions (product-limit estimation) for (re-)employment 
chances for Soviet and post-Soviet labor market entrants, by period 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. 
Figure 7–3 displays the transition patterns for upward and downward occupational mobility. 
First, among Soviet entrants, there are more upward than downward moves during the Soviet 
period (Group 1). Yet, during the post-Soviet period, Soviet entrants (Group 2) seem to be 
more mobile downward than upward. Additionally, Soviet entrants are generally less mobile 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, suggesting a more established career process with 
growing labor market experience. Otherwise, this might be a further implication for the 
penalty effect of the labor market experience gained under the Communist regime (discussed 
above). Investigating at the post-Soviet entrants (Group 3), we find that they are better off 
compared with Soviet entrants (Group 1) when we consider upward mobility, whereas they 
are worse off with regard to downward mobility. 
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Figure 7–3: Plot of survivor functions (product-limit estimation) for up- and downward 
mobility for Soviet and post-Soviet labor market entrants, by period 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. 
7.5.2 Multivariate results  
Multivariate models are built up in the following steps: Model 1 presents average returns to 
adult education accounting for all covariates. Model 2 explores variation of adult education 
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returns by gender. By including an interaction term between initial and adult education, 
Model 3 addresses the question of whether adult education impacts on social inequality. In 
Model 4, interaction effects between post-Soviet-period and adult education are introduced. 
This model examines change in returns to adult education over the regime change. All 
models (excluding Model 2) are presented for the whole sample and separately for men and 
women. For the sake of presentation, controls are omitted in the main tables but are available 
in Appendix E. 
7.5.2.1 Average returns to adult education 
The results on average returns to adult education in terms of (re-)employment chances, up- 
and downward mobility are reported in Table 7–3. 
Both upgrading and sidestepping increase the hazards of exiting non-employment with 
returns to sidestepping being higher than for upgrading (Model 1.1). Nevertheless, a Wald 
test yielded that returns do not differ statistically for types of adult education. Upgrading 
fosters upward mobility, whereas sidestepping does not (Model 2.1). However, this 
conclusion holds only for women. For men, both adult education strategies are sufficient 
instruments for way up and coefficients do not differ statistically. Upgrading may prevent 
downward mobility, though this seems to be true only for women (Model 3.1). The effect of 
sidestepping is not significant in either substantial or statistical terms. Altogether, for non-
workers both upgrading and sidestepping are profitable. Among workers, only upgrading 
benefits women; men benefit from both adult education strategies, though only in terms of 
upward occupational mobility.   
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Looking at the other covariates, we find that in all cases higher initial education level is an 
important instrument to improve labor market position and avoid labor market risks, ceteris 
paribus (Models 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1). Women are in general less likely to enter employment 
after non-employment (Model 1.1). On the other hand, among workers, women are more 
mobile upwardly then men (Model 2.1) and there are no gender differences in terms of 
downward mobility risks (Model 3.1). After the collapse of the Soviet Union risks of labor 
market failure have been enlarged: non-workers face difficulties to (re-)enter employment 
(Model 1.1), while workers become more downwardly mobile (Model 3.1), and these 
negative developments are not compensated by more chances for upward mobility (Model 
2.1). These results are in line with empirical evidence for Russia’s post-Soviet period (see 
Chapter 3). 
The model results suggest that the Soviet Union collapse harmed women more than men. To 
explore this in more detail, I included an interaction effect between gender and period in 
additional analyses (results are not shown). Indeed, there are notable developments worth of 
discussion. Under the Soviet regime there were no gender differences in finding a new job 
(p=0.069), women (compared to men) were more likely to be upwardly mobile (p<0.001) but 
also faced greater risks of downwardly moves (p<0.001). The Soviet Union collapse impaired 
females’ chances for (re-)employment (p<0.001), and had no statistically significant effect 
for men (p=0.350). At the same time, men became more upwardly mobile (p<0.01), while 
women did not (p=0.706). Although both men and women faced higher risks of downward 
mobility (women: p<0.001, men: p<0.001), these risks were greater for men. As a result of 
these developments, gender inequalities to the female disadvantage in (re-)employment 
chances rose (p<0.001), women lost their advantage in to upward mobility chances 
(p=0.706), but won in regard to lower risks of downward mobility (p<0.05). 
7.5.2.2 Returns to adult education and gender 
The analyses above as well as theoretical elaborations lead to the expectation that returns to 
adult education do vary by gender. Accordingly, the following models include interaction 
terms between gender and adult education variables (Table 7–4). 
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Table 7–4: Piece-wise constant exponential models, interactions between adult 
education and gender (logit coefficients) 
 Model 1.2,  
(Re-)Employment, 
(non-workers) 
Model 2.2, 
Upward mobility, 
(workers) 
Model 3.2,  
Downward mobility, 
(workers) 
Post-Soviet period (ref. Soviet period) -0.38*** 0.08 0.34*** 
Initial educational level (ref. High)    
Medium  -0.17*** -0.49*** 0.88*** 
Low -0.10*** -0.47*** 0.60*** 
Female (ref. Male) -0.24*** 0.11* 0.08 
Long-term effect of AE (ref. no AE)    
UP 0.38*** 0.47*** -0.17 
UP x Female -0.09 0.07 -0.30* 
SST 0.57*** 0.13 0.01 
SST x Female -0.27** -0.07 0.05 
(Further variables are omitted) (see Table E–3, 
Appendix E) 
(see Table E–4, 
Appendix E) 
(see Table E–5, 
Appendix E) 
Number of observations 44,085 102,414 8,7859 
Number of sub-episodes 11,644 5,823 5,510 
Number of failures 9,475 2,946 2,731 
Number of individuals 4,550 5,823 5,998 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** 
p<.001. AE=adult education, UP=upgrading, SST=Sidestepping. For model fit, see Table E-2, 
Appendix E. 
The results for (re-)employment analyses (Model 1.2, Table 7–4) indicate slightly higher 
returns to upgrading for men than for women, however, these differences are not statistically 
significant. Yet, men enjoy almost twice of returns to sidestepping than women. Regarding 
upward mobility, there are no statistically significant gender differences in returns to 
upgrading, and sidestepping returns no positive rewards for both genders (Model 2.2). For 
downward mobility risks, we find that only women benefit from upgrading, while 
sidestepping does not pay of neither for women nor for men (Model 3.2). Bringing together, 
among non-workers, men and women benefit from upgrading to the similar extent, while 
sidestepping is more profitable for men. Among workers, upgrading can reduce labor market 
failures for women in a more effective way than for men. 
7.5.2.3 Returns to adult education and social inequality 
Table 7–5 presents the results on interaction effects between adult-education variables and 
initial educational. This set of models explores the question on whether adult education is an 
effective tool to alleviate existing social inequalities in labor market outcomes due to initial 
educational level. I calculated the average partial effect (APE) of adult education for each 
educational level for each employment outcome. These results are presented in Table 7–6. 
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The APE of adult education illustrates the average difference to non-participants in predicted 
hazards of exiting from origin status to destination, conditional on the covariates in the model 
and their distribution in the sample. This effect can be interpreted as an adult-education 
premium on the hazard scale. The right part of Table 7–6 additionally contrasts the effect of 
adult education for different educational levels (corresponding to a change of the reference 
category). 
Upgrading  
Looking at the (re-)employment chances of non-workers (Model 1.3, Table 7–5), the 
interaction effect between upgrading and initial education implies that the distance between 
higher- (and medium-)educated non-participants and upgraders is larger than the distance 
between lower-educated non-participants and upgraders (see Table 7–6 for APEs of adult 
education). This means that the relative benefit from adult education is higher for those 
already more-educated (particularly for men), and this is complementary to the overall 
premium of more schooling on the higher chances of finding a job. Thus, since those who are 
initially more educated are by far the primary beneficiaries of upgrading, upgrading is 
exacerbating social inequalities in labor market outcomes. On the other hand, the data does 
not allow a firm conclusion on whether differences between the least- and highest-educated 
upgraders are statistically significant. 
For occupational upward mobility (Model 2.3, Table 7–5), the higher the initial educational 
level is, the higher the premium of upgrading is (see Table 7–6 for APEs of adult education). 
Yet, looking at the stratified models by gender, we find that these patterns are specifically 
true for women. For men, we find similar trends, though the statistical test of the interaction 
effect indicates that the differences in the upgrading effect do not differ statistically by initial 
educational level. In sum, these results underline that upgrading tends to have an 
exacerbation effect on social inequality especially for women. 
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Table 7–6: Tests of interaction effects between adult education and initial educational 
level  
 All  Men Women 
 APE a Contrast 
versus b 
APE  a Contrast 
versus b 
APE a Contrast 
versus b 
Model 1.3, (Re-)Employment, (non-workers) 
UPGRADING 
(a) Low 0.23 *** (c)  0.22 * (c)  0.26 ** (c)  
(b) Medium 0.38 *** (a) * 0.40 *** (a) + 0.32 *** (a)  
(c) High 0.33 *** (b)  0.46 ** (b)  0.28 * (b)  
SIDESTEPPING 
(a) Low -0.24  (c)  -0.44  (c) + 1.89 ** (c) ** 
(b) Medium 0.54 *** (a) * 0.54 *** (a) * 0.41 *** (a) * 
(c) High 0.29 *** (b) ** 0.32 * (b)  0.34 *** (b)  
Model 2.3, Upward mobility, (workers) 
UPGRADING 
(a) Low 0.33 ** (c) ** 0.50 ** (c)  0.29  (c) *** 
(b) Medium 0.50 *** (a)  0.53 *** (a)  0.48 *** (a)  
(c) High 0.84 *** (b) * 0.61 * (b)  1.06 *** (b) ** 
SIDESTEPPING 
(a) Low 1.06  (c)  1.60  (c)  0.35  (c)  
(b) Medium 0.09  (a)  0.30 + (a)  -0.05  (a)  
(c) High 0.07  (b)  0.22  (b)  0.03  (b)  
Model 3.3, Downward Mobility, (workers) 
UPGRADING 
(a) Low -0.11  (c)  -0.13  (c) + -0.06  (c)  
(b) Medium -0.45 *** (a) * -0.34 ** (a)  -0.54 *** (a) * 
(c) High -0.11  (b) + 0.37  (b) ** -0.50 * (b)  
SIDESTEPPING 
(a) Low -1.30  (c)  -0.88  (c)  -14.41  (c)  
(b) Medium 0.07  (a)  0.06  (a)  0.21  (a)  
(c) High 0.02  (b)  0.13  (b)  -0.05  (b)  
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.00. a APE=average partial effect, scale in log-hazards. b Statistical test whether the 
difference between respective coefficient is significant. 
Upgrading reduces the risk of downward mobility (Model 3.3, Table 7–5) only for initially 
medium-educated, whereas having has no statistically significant effect for low- and high-
educated workers (see Table 7–6 for APEs of adult education). Gender-specific models imply 
that higher-educated men may even face downward mobility if they upgrade (though not 
statistically significant). For lower- and medium-educated men, upgrading can reduce the risk 
of moving downward (statistically significant only for the medium-educated). For women, 
the results in Table 7–5 suggest the opposite: higher premium for higher- and medium-
educated, no premium for low educated workers – but no statistically significant differences 
in the effects across educational groups. In sum, upgrading seems to prevent downward 
mobility only for workers in the medium educational group, which have the highest rates of 
downward mobility in the first place (see Table 7–3). With regard to social inequality, no 
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straightforward conclusion is possible. Among male upgraders: (1) the contrast between the 
high- and medium-educated is shrinking; (2) the contrast between the medium- and low-
educated is increasing; (3) the contrast between the high- and low-educated remains 
unchanged. Among female upgraders, for all except for the low-educated risk of downward 
mobility decreases.  
Sidestepping  
The interaction effect between sidestepping and initial education indicates that the relative 
advantage of adult education for (re-)employment chances is more pronounced among the 
medium-educated than among the higher-educated (Model 1.3, Table 7–5; see Table 7–6 for 
APEs of adult education). For lower-educated individuals, sidestepping is not beneficial. 
These results are, however, only true for men. For women, the additional benefit of 
sidestepping is by far the highest among the lower-educated. With regard to social 
inequalities, these results suggest an exacerbation effect of sidestepping for men and an 
equalizing effect for women. 
The relative advantage of sidestepping on up- and downward mobility is the highest for the 
lower-educated (Models 2.3 and 3.3, Table 7–5; see Table 7–6 for APEs of adult education), 
which would speak to an equalization effect on social inequalities. However, the APEs are 
not statistically different from zero for either group, and the same is true for the differences in 
the sidestepping effect between different groups. 
7.5.2.4 Returns to adult education and institutional change 
Next, I turn to the question of whether adult-education returns vary by historical period in 
Russia. I find that both upgrading and sidestepping return higher chances for non-working 
individuals to (re-)enter employment (Model 1.4, Table 7–7). Yet, the Wald test suggests that 
period-specific effects of adult education do not differ in statistical terms (for upgrading: 
p=0.171, for sidestepping: p=0.125). These patterns, however, are different for genders. For 
non-working men, upgrading pays off in both periods. In turn, sidestepping was effective 
only during the Soviet period, and the difference between period-specific coefficients is 
statistically significant (p<0.01). Non-working women may exit non-employment through 
completing upgrading but only during the Soviet period (difference between period-specific 
effects: p<0.05), whereas sidestepping pays off in both periods (difference between period-
specific effects: p=0.506).  
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Upgrading seems to have increased the chances of upward mobility mainly only during the 
Soviet period (Model 2.4, Table 7–7). However, there is also a non-significant positive trend 
for the post-Soviet period, and the period differences in the upgrading effect are not 
statistically significant (for all: p=0.293, for men: p=0.191, for women: p=0.540). For 
downward mobility (Model 3.4, Table 7–7), upgrading is related to a risk reduction of 
downward mobility only during the Soviet period (difference between period-specific effects: 
p<0.05) and only for women (difference between period-specific effects for men: p=0.843, 
for women: p<0.05). Sidestepping effect does not vary across periods neither for upward 
mobility (Model 2.4, Table 7–7) nor for downward mobility (Model 3.4, Table 7–7). 
7.5.2.5 Overall explanatory power of the models 
In the final step, I examined whether adult education contributes to the overall explanatory 
power of my models by conducting a likelihood ratio test (for a similar approach, see Li et 
al., 2000). Results are available in Table E–1 in Appendix E. In re-employment, upward-
mobility, and in most cases for downward mobility analyses, all specifications of adult 
education improve the goodness of models significantly. This reveals that adult education has 
an important impact on career prospects and is an essential instrument for reducing labor 
market risks. 
7.5.3 Robustness checks 
7.5.3.1 Modelling finishing adult education with credentials 
Several checks for robustness were carried out. For instance, finishing adult education with 
credentials may convey a stronger signal compared to adult education without a credential. 
Replicating the models with considering only certified adult education (diploma or related 
certificate) did not change largely any substantial conclusion. Minor differences were spotted 
with regard to downward mobility analyses: under the Soviet Union, men may also benefit 
from upgrading in terms of reduced risks of downward moves if they complete it with a 
diploma. For women, the differences in a long-term upgrading effect by initial education on 
downward moves lack overall statistical significance (though the direction of the effect and 
according interpretation remained the same).  
  
181 
7.5.3.2 Modeling possible selection into adult education 
Even though, my analyses accounted for potential selection into adult education based on 
observables, there might still be confounding factors that are unobserved but might drive 
selection into adult education and labor market outcomes. Thus, I corroborated my analyses 
by applying an alternative fixed-effects design which nullifies all influences of time-constant 
heterogeneity on estimates. More precisely, models have been re-run using stratified Cox 
regression with robust standard errors (Allison, 1996, 2009; for modeling details, see Brüderl, 
2015). Consequently, the effective sample was reduced to more mobile individuals having 
repeated job episodes.  
Regarding re-employment outcomes, fixed-effects results were fairly consistent and effect 
sizes were even stronger (particularly for women) owing to more heterogeneity controlled 
for.105 Regarding the upward mobility outcome, the coefficient for upgrading tend to be 
positive but lack statistical significance, whereas sidestepping implies a negative statistically 
significant effect. Since fixed-effect models bias the sample to highly mobile individuals (and 
particularly under the Communist regime, when overall mobility was highly restricted), it 
might be that for this individuals upgrading shows no effect since they are generally more 
prone for a job change. Otherwise, an upward move might purport an educational upgrade 
due to the structural upgrading in aftermath of the labor market liberalization in Russia.106 
The negative effect of sidestepping on upward mobility might be explained by the fact that 
the sidesteppers were very mobile before and due to this mobility they opted for sidestepping. 
This in turn increased their chances for more stable employment. Regarding downward 
mobility, I found a negative statistically significant effect of upgrading on downward 
mobility for men; for women, the effect is positive and not statistically significant. Probably, 
women who are more prone to downward mobility send highly negative signals to employers 
and thus an upgrading as a signal of potential labor market absenteeism during studies even 
increases their labor market risks. 
                                                
105 Results for interaction effects are not discussed due to low number of cases, and hence highly unreliable 
estimates and their possible interpretations. 
106  As the period-specific coefficient for upgrading seems to be greater (though both are not statistically 
significant) for the post-Soviet period, this might provide an indirect evidence for such a speculation. 
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Note, estimates obtained from fixed-effects models should be interpreted with a caution and 
several limits of these models in the context of this analysis should be clarified. First, there is 
no possibility to estimate effects of time-constant independent variables such as initial 
education or gender, which in our case is crucial. Second, fixed-effect design discards 
information across individuals and considers only within variation, resulting in higher 
standard errors. In this regard, analysis of returns to adult education is somewhat challenging 
and coefficients might be highly unreliable, because of a much greater variation of adult 
education across individuals and little variation within individuals (few individuals 
participate in formal adult education repeatedly over the life course). Third, due to modelling 
specification there might be a high loss of power: (a) individuals with only one event are 
excluded because of no comparison possibility of this event with another one, and (b) 
intervals where the first interval is shorter than the previous one will not be considered in the 
analyses. Consequently, the analytical sample becomes highly selective. Fourth, examining 
returns to adult education by fixed-effect specification can be only generalized to potential 
adult learners (average treatment effect only among treated), while for those who would 
never return to education in the later life course the effect might be completely different. In 
contrast, my analyses estimated associations between adult education and labor market 
outcomes, which can be generalized to the whole population. To estimate the true effect of 
adult education, one would need an experimental design (for more details, see Allison, 1996, 
2009). 
7.6 Discussion 
Economic theories predict positive labor market returns to educational investments in the 
later life course. On the basis of these theoretical implications, educational policy-makers in 
the OECD countries and the European Union have proposed “active aging” or the “Lisbon 
Strategy” (the concept of “lifelong learning”) in order to encourage all potential workers to 
actively invest in their human capital. Nevertheless, there has been an inconclusive debate in 
the sociological literature about the effectiveness of adult education for employment 
outcomes and its significance in terms of social inequality. In this chapter, I have added some 
insight to the benefits of adult education by examining returns to formal adult education, with 
Russia’s transitional economy serving as an example. My results generally support economic 
theories, although returns to adult education strongly vary dependent on the type of edult 
education and analyzed labor market outcome. 
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My research considerably contributes to the methodological scope of research on adult-
education returns. By accounting for time-constant and time-varying heterogeneity in 
applying an event-history framework, long-term effects of adult education were examined. 
By analyzing various outcomes, this study further extends the ongoing debate on the benefits 
of adult education. I also tested whether adult education has different consequences by 
gender, previous educational attainment, and institutional context.  
The empirical results can be summarized as follows: Upgrading facilitates exiting from non-
employment to employment and is an efficient strategy for fostering upward career mobility 
and preventing mobility downwards. Conversely, sidestepping appears to not always be 
beneficial. While sidestepping strategy is an efficient to find an employment, it does not pay 
off in terms of upward mobility and does not work as a safeguard against downward 
mobility. The results, however, revealed that in some cases upgrading and sidestepping 
rewards men and women in different ways. For instance, upgrading seems to be an efficient 
tool against downward mobility risk for women, whereas it does not pay off for men. 
Sidestepping returns much greater chances for (re-)employment for men than for women. 
Probably, among upgraders, women are more positively selected than men, while these 
patterns are turnabout among sidesteppers. Thus, my analyses highlight the significance of 
gender as a crucial intervening factor when studying adult education.  
Can adult education compensate pre-existing inequalities in labor market outcomes? My 
findings suggest that adult learners enjoy improved career prospects compared with non-
participants; therefore, adult education can lessen social inequalities by narrowing the gap 
between different educational groups. Nevertheless, the necessary condition for such a 
conclusion would be either equal or higher returns to adult education for initially 
(educationally) disadvantaged individuals compared with the initially advantaged. The results 
in my empirical analyses, however, provide no equivocal evidence. For female adult learners, 
upgrading turns out to be more beneficial for those already advantaged. Sidestepping may 
have an equalizing effect for women, but only with regard to (re-)employment chances, while 
it does not vary by initial educational level for occupational mobility. Among men, the 
findings suggest an equalization effect of upgrading when considering downward mobility, 
whereas they indicate an exacerbation effect when considering (re-)employment chances and 
upward mobility (although this is only a trend). Sidestepping may amplify the gap in labor 
market outcomes between the initially lower- and medium-/higher-educated men. These 
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results are only evident when we look at (re-)employment chances. Since adult education in 
many cases either pays off equally for all groups or benefits predominantly those who are 
initially already advantaged, we may conclude that existent social inequalities endure with or 
can even be boosted by adult education in Russia. 
Another crucial aspect is that the efficiency of adult education seems to have changed since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. While results indicate a positive persistent effect of 
upgrading in Soviet Russia, acquiring this type of adult education seems to be less (if at all) 
valued in the post-Soviet labor market. This is surprising because obtaining a tertiary degree 
as an adult has been found to advance individuals’ labor market position in modern Russia 
(Kosyakova et al., 2016; Kosyakova, 2014). On the other hand, lower sample sizes do not 
allow a firm conclusion on the period-specific differences in the adult education effects. 
Positive returns of sidestepping on (re-)employment chances are mainly pronounced before 
the collapse (for all, and men in particular). The best explanation as to why such a small 
number of adults participate in formal adult education in today’s Russia compared with other 
modern countries is probably the absence of returns to adult education.107 
Coming back to the theoretical inquiries, human capital, signaling, credentialism, and job 
competition theories (although based on different mechanisms) predicted that adult education 
should be positively related to employment prospects. It is not straightforward and even 
challenging to try determining which of those theories works the best; however, 
differentiating between upgrading and sidestepping might provide some leverage to help 
conceive which theory is more applicable because these theories offer diverse implications 
for different adult education strategies.  
Human capital theory implied positive returns to upgrading in all cases. For sidestepping, it 
only implied positive returns in terms of lower risks of downward mobility and better 
employment chances. My findings generally support these predictions. Signaling theory 
claimed that both upgrading and sidestepping are profitable, yet with lower effects for the 
latter. In general, the results confirm that upgrading is more valued than sidestepping, 
                                                
107  In 2008, only 2.7% of individuals participated in formal adult education in Russia, whereas 13.3% of 
individuals in Sweden, about 9% of individuals in Finland and the Great Britain, 6.7% of individuals in 
Switzerland, and 4.5% of individuals in EC-25 did so (GU VShE, 2010, p. 458). 
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although sidestepping did not prove to be a good instrument for career prospects, particularly 
for women. Thus, signaling theory appears to supply a less suitable explanation. The 
credentialism approach envisaged improved outcomes for upgraders, whereas only already-
educationally advantaged sidesteppers were expected to face lower labor market risks. 
Overall, the first claim found full support, yet there is no support for the second. Either all 
groups of individuals or the previously least-educated women and medium-educated men are 
the prominent beneficiaries of sidestepping. Finally, the job competition model forecasted 
positive effects of upgrading for the previously lower-educated on upward mobility chances, 
and negative effects of upgrading for the previously higher-educated on downward mobility 
risks. Differing entirely from our predictions, the opposite relationship was observed. 
Contentions for sidesteppers, however, found full support: The theory suggested positive 
effects on upward (“trainability” effect) as well as downward mobility, both presumably in 
the short run. 
Finally, turning to institutional predictions, I found no empirical support for the expectation 
that adult education returns were more pronounced after the fall of the Soviet Union 
compared with the previous system. It seems that the strong linkage and coordination 
between educational and employment systems are associated with high levels of trust. In such 
social structures, employers can clearly identify the “signals” of educational certificates and 
rely on them (Rosenbaum et al., 1990). Accordingly, adult education may be considered an 
efficient means for adult learners. In contrast, in the social structures characterized by lower 
levels of trust (as in post-Soviet Russia), employers have to rely on “signals”, while adult 
education might not necessarily provide a positive signal. Moreover, since formal adult 
education is usually connected with labor market interruptions, employers might even 
consider adult learners to be labor market losers and would thus be more reluctant to hire 
and/or promote them. The negative reputation of evening schools, which usually offer adult-
education programs, might have further affected the signals transmitted through adult-
education certificates in contemporary Russia (Zajda, 2003). 
Nevertheless, from the life course perspective, it would be desirable to cover a longer horizon 
for the post-Soviet period. If adult education helps in the long run, we might not observe its 
effects for labor market participants who entered the market shortly before or after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the post Soviet effects of adult education might 
be underestimated. This theory might be further supported by the fact that the most important 
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reforms in the educational system and particularly with regard to lifelong learning have only 
been taking place recently in Russia (Khokhlova et al., 2013).  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions and discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
Life-course theory views individual life courses as path-dependent trajectories in which 
previous decisions and experiences shape subsequent decisions and experiences in a 
cumulative way. In this sense, initial (dis-)advantages may accrue following the logic of the 
Matthew effect, resulting in an exacerbation of social inequalities over the life course. The 
extent to which these inequalities accrue is argued to be strongly associated with the 
institutional arrangements in a given country: Individual life courses are presumed to be 
influenced by the institutional frameworks in which they are embedded. The empirical 
evidence provided by cross-national comparisons tends to support this claim. However, these 
studies are limited to the extent of potential interpretations since empirical analyses generally 
involve “steady state” societies with highly stable institutional structures. Therefore, in this 
type of research, only correlations can be predicted.  
An alternative avenue in the literature takes a dynamic perspective and investigates social 
stratification patterns when institutional structures change. In this regard, the context of 
transition societies should be of particular interest for sociologists. The reason is that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the following shifts in economic, political and social 
institutional arrangements – which I label as “regime change” – offer an exceptional 
opportunity to study how patterns of social inequality vary across broader institutional 
contexts and over time. Given the fact that “institutional context changed suddenly while the 
persons involved remained the same” (Mayer, 2006, p. 14), this important “natural 
experiment” allows us to disentangle and to trace the major consequences of the post-socialist 
transition from individual traits. This notion was also implemented in the present study.  
Accordingly, the goal of this thesis was to investigate different aspects of social inequality 
with a special focus on the changing structures in which these social inequalities are 
entrenched. The regime change in the aftermath of the post-socialist transformation and the 
following liberalization of the market enable us to tackle this issue empirically. My 
theoretical and empirical analyses were structured around three basic research questions: (1) 
  
188 
To what extent did social inequality prevail under the Communist regime? (2) How has post-
socialist transition to market economy structured the patterns and the degree of social 
inequality? and (3) What processes have been driving these changes?  
Taking on a life-course perspective, I have studied the case of Russia and addressed these 
research questions in three stages approaching social inequalities in terms of gender 
inequalities (and differences) upon labor market entry (Chapter 5), inequalities due to (initial) 
educational and occupational attainment in access to adult education (Chapter 6), and 
inequalities due to educational endowments (initial and adult education) in career outcomes 
(Chapter 7). As these issues have rarely been tackled by previous research, one of my thesis 
contributions is extending the scope of the literature on transitional societies. 
The regime change and its consequences for social inequalities have been addressed in prior 
research. However, previous studies were often limited in the time span they cover. The 
research has focused mainly on the short pre-fall period and the first years after transitions, 
particularly in the Russian case.108 In contrast, my thesis relied on life-history data that 
facilitated analyses of the educational and occupational attainment processes over the life 
course both during and after the socialist regime in Russia. The data go back to January 1965, 
thereby covering 25 years of state socialism. The post-Soviet period covers the years between 
1991 and 2005, with a transition crisis and a rapid recovery period afterwards. A central 
contribution of my thesis is exploring changes and continuities in the patterns of social 
inequalities in Russia spanning a much larger observation window of the last four decades. 
Beyond the availability of rich and appropriate data, the Russian case is particularly 
stimulating from a sociological perspective for reasons: First, Russia – as the leading 
Communist state – represents an ideal model of state socialism. The Communist ideology 
                                                
108 For instance, empirical research on social inequalities over time in Slovenia covered the years between 1974 
and 1994 (Ivančič, 2000). For Hungary, Estonia, and Russia, the data allowed for considering a longer time-
horizon (for Hungary, see Bukodi, 2009, years 1980-1999; for Russia, see, e.g., Gerber & Mayorova, 2010, 
years 1985-2001; and Gerber, 2003, years 1970-2000; for Estonia, see Täht et al., 2009, years 1980-2001). 
Another approach used in the transition literature is to compare social outcomes between time points, e.g., one 
during and one after the socialist regime (see Brainerd, 2000; Mach, 2004; Rona-Tas, 1994; van der Lippe & 
Fodor, 1998). However, many empirical studies have considered only the first years of transition (for Russia, 
e.g., Brainerd, 1998 years 1991-1994; Gerber & Hout, 1998 years 1991-1995). 
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was welcomed and fostered by the Russian population, which, by the introduction of the 
Bolshevik power, mainly consisted of the working class and peasantry. Communism was 
organically embraced and embedded into all aspects of economic and social life, particularly 
due to Russia’s cultural and historical heritage (Hedlund, 2013). This was probably also the 
reason that the socialist order survived for almost 70 years, having a longer life compared 
with the other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Gerber & Hout, 1995, 1998).  
Moreover, Russia’s transformation process – as in other CEE countries – involved an 
immediate dismantling of the socialist institutions and an implementation of capitalist ones 
with an overarching goal of liberalization reforms and economic efficiency. Nevertheless and 
in contrast to the forecasts of reformers, the transformation process resulted in an overall 
economic and social disruption in all countries, particularly in Russia (The World Bank, 
2002). Finally, the Russian transformation process compounded reforms of the major formal 
political and economic institutions while the social sphere and informal structures remained 
mostly the same (e.g., Frumin et al., 2013; Kapeliushnikov et al., 2011). Correspondingly, an 
exceptional Russian feature involves a historically pronounced co-existence of formal rules 
with informal norms and practices (Burawoy & Krotov, 1992; Hedlund, 2013). This 
ambivalence makes Russia an insightful case for testing the predictions of (market) theories 
that were developed in Western societies. 
This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the three empirical chapters, 
considers their implications for social inequality and changing institutional structures, and 
discusses their connotation for stratification theory in a broader sense. In the final section, I 
acknowledge limitations and suggestions for further research. 
8.2 Summary of central findings 
(Post-)Socialist countries constitute a special case within modern societies in regard to gender 
relations, particularly because of the proclaimed full gender-equality principles under the 
socialist regime. In Chapter 5, I examined how shifts from a socialist to a post-socialist 
regime were associated with horizontal gender differences in terms of sectorial distribution 
and vertical gender inequalities in terms of job authority upon labor market entry in Russia.  
My results showed that the school-to-work transition process was not gender-neutral in 
Russia. In particular, dissimilarity indices as well as sectorial distribution analyses implied 
that the first job allocation was quite segregated by gender during the Soviet period, and this 
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increased after the regime change even more. Gender segregation, in turn, is found to drive 
gender differences in vertical outcomes in terms of wages and job prestige (Katz, 1997; 
Ogloblin, 2005b). My analyses supported this claim and implied greater net disadvantages for 
women in entry into authoritative positions in the economic sectors that women were more 
likely to enter. I further found an overall advantage for female entrants in terms of job 
authority in their first job, obviously a result of their higher investments in human capital. 
However, when considering female and male entrants with comparable characteristics, I 
found a substantial gender gap to the female disadvantage, suggesting lower educational 
returns for Russian women compared with those of men. In respect to the regime change, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union increased net gender inequalities to the disadvantage of female 
entrants in Russia. This expanding net gender gap could be traced back to a growing 
disadvantage of female entrants rather than to a growing advantage of male entrants.  
Chapter 6 focused on adult education as the potential phenomenon of “re-tooling” one’s 
credentials in response to such dramatic regime changes as those that Russia experienced as 
well as on systematic social differences in the opportunity to engage in such re-tooling. Adult 
education may provide an opportunity for educational improvements or re-training in a new 
field for those with lower educational levels and/or in marginalized labor market positions, 
thereby reducing initial inequalities in the attainment process. However, the societal function 
of adult education becomes ambiguous if the predominantly advantaged obtain greater access 
to adult education. Following this debate, I explored inequality of educational opportunity in 
the later life course. In other words, I questioned whether there was a social gap in access to 
adult education for those initially (educationally and occupationally) advantaged and 
disadvantaged in Russia and the role of the regime change associated with this gap. In 
addition, I delved deeper into gender aspects with respect to inequality of adult-educational 
opportunity. Differentiating between upgrading and sidestepping, I anticipated that the 
driving mechanisms behind these two types of adult education differ depending on specific 
incentives (“needs”) and impediments (resources and opportunity costs).  
My results demonstrated greater access to upgrading for initially educationally disadvantaged 
individuals, which suggests an equalization effects on social inequalities in Russia. However, 
greater access to sidestepping for initially educationally advantaged women implies an 
exacerbation effects, while no effect of initial education for men indicates preservation 
effects. In regard to the occupational attainment of adult learners, I found occupationally-
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advantaged individuals to have more chances to upgrade, while there is no stratification in 
occupational position for access to sidestepping. In terms of social inequalities, this means an 
exacerbation effects in the case of upgrading and preservation effects in the case of 
sidestepping. Nevertheless, the regime change impaired adult educational opportunities for 
all groups, particularly for those initially (educationally and/or occupationally) 
disadvantaged. Regarding gender, I found women being less likely to enroll in both types of 
education during the Soviet period. The post-Soviet collapse condensed males’ opportunities 
for adult education, thereby changing the structure of inequality of adult-educational 
opportunity between sexes towards a female advantage.  
Conforming the predictions of economic theories, lifelong learning should benefit individuals 
by allowing educationally disadvantaged groups to catch up or to correct initially wrong 
decisions, thereby improving their career opportunities. Consequently, from a stratification 
vantage point, participation in adult education may mitigate social distances and inequalities 
that emerged during schooling and training in the earlier life course. Such societal function 
should be particularly relevant in transition societies, in which market-based relationships 
accompanied by individuals’ own initiative and effort replaced highly regulated and secure 
school-to-work transition processes after the collapse of the socialist regime. Scrutinizing this 
idea, Chapter 7 questioned whether participation in adult education has a measurable effect 
on employment patterns and occupational mobility in transition economies. If so, adult 
education indeed could compensate for existing social inequalities. However, adult education 
may also exacerbate social inequality if it primarily benefits initially advantaged groups. 
Another question I posed in this chapter was whether and how returns to adult education 
changed throughout the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
My results support the expectations of the economic model for the Russian case, although 
returns to adult education vary remarkably by the outcome under study. Correspondingly, 
both upgrading and sidestepping manifested a potential to lower social inequalities by 
narrowing the gap between different social groups. However, an in-depth examination of 
beneficiaries of adult adult education has shown that, in most cases, upgrading enlarged the 
gap in labor market outcomes between initial (educationally) advantaged and disadvantaged, 
and particularly among women (for men the same trends, though lower statistical power of 
the results). Sidestepping either did not vary much by initial educational level or was more 
profitable for already more-educated individuals, men in particular. Only for women and only 
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in the case of the (re-)employment chances, sidestepping suggested a reduction of initial 
(educational) inequalities. Based on this evidence, I conclude that adult education has only 
limited potential to offset existent social inequalities. In some cases, social inequalities were 
rather amplified by adult education in Russia. When looking at gender inequalities, upgrading 
rewards both men and women in improving their career prospects. Yet, in terms of 
preventing labor market failure, upgrading seems to be more effective for women, while 
sidestepping tends to benefit mostly men. Turning to the role of the regime change, my 
analyses stress that before the Soviet regime collapse, adult education was effective in 
improving labor market position. After the regime change, the economic function of adult 
education became questionable as returns to adult education attenuated or even vanished. 
8.3 Implications of the research 
In this section, I highlight the most important findings of my thesis with regard to theoretical 
progress. Many of these findings may additionally have important policy implications.  
8.3.1 Regime change and social inequality 
In the market transition debate, the liberalization of markets is argued to reduce social 
inequalities because competitive market structures remunerate human capital in a more 
effective way than redistributive structures of state socialism, whereas returns to political 
power vanish (Cao & Nee, 2005; Nee, 1989, 1991). Therefore, labor market success should 
be based on merit (and not on ascription, such as gender). On the other hand, the life-course 
theory implies that abrupt changes in institutional structures are likely to exacerbate 
inequalities in initial endowments and resources. This growing “social divergence” should be 
amplified by the transition from an egalitarian and rather homogeneous society to a 
heterogeneous and individualized one (cf. Mayer, 2006, p. 15). Correspondingly, the 
overwhelming empirical evidence for transition societies corroborates the conclusion that 
inequalities across social groups became more pronounced after the socialist period (see 
Section 2.6 for a review). Following these findings, the global hypothesis of this thesis 
anticipated that the (net) social gap between various groups of individuals has been opening 
up or enlarging since regime change in Russia. 
Correspondingly, when approaching social inequalities in terms of gender, the results in 
Chapter 5 imply growing horizontal gender differences and (net) vertical gender inequalities 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in Russia. Considering inequality of adult-educational 
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opportunity (social gap due to educational and occupational attainment in access to adult 
education), Chapter 6 also pointed out flourishing distances between advantaged and 
disadvantaged individuals in aftermath of the regime change in Russia. Hence, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 yielded convincing evidence that the regime change in Russia was associated with 
negative consequences for social inequalities and thus supports the global hypothesis. 
Although I did not directly test the regime-change impact on adult education returns for 
different social groups in Chapter 7,109 it is unlikely that adult education became an effective 
tool for reducing social inequalities after the regime change. On the one hand, adult education 
was found to be mostly beneficial either for all or for predominantly (educationally) 
advantaged groups. On the other hand, I found diminished (if any) returns to adult education 
after the Soviet regime collapse. From stratification point of view, these results imply that 
adult education in Russia became a less efficient instrument for coping with existing 
inequalities after the regime change (if it was efficient at all), which is also in line with the 
global hypotheses of this thesis. 
8.3.2 Market Transition Debates 
My empirical findings also have important implications for the debates on the market 
transition. Since liberalization reforms should have invoked higher value of merit from the 
labor market, the Market Transition Theory (MTT) forecasted a lower reliance upon 
ascription in the hiring processes (among other things) (Nee & Matthews, 1996). These 
expectations found no support in Chapter 5 as gender (and not solely merit) influenced the 
school-to-work transition in Soviet Russia and became an even more important factor in the 
job allocation process after liberalization reforms. Furthermore, following the MTT, the 
growing value of merit should have amplified the demand for education and thus also the 
demand for adult education. Although evidence in the literature for credential inflation 
supported this statement (e.g., Kapeliushnikov, 2008; OECD, 2012), I found no support of 
this prediction in my analyses in regard to adult education; the results in Chapter 6 instead 
indicated lower incidences of enrollment in formal schooling in the later life course after the 
Soviet regime collapse. Finally, the MTT stressed growing returns to education because the 
                                                
109 Mainly due to low incidences of adult education, the inclusion of the three-way interaction effects between 
adult education, initial educational levels, and the post-Soviet period would result in high standard errors, 
which, in turn, would impede drawing and justifying any firmer conclusions. 
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market forces reward merit more strongly than the redistributive system (Nee, 1989). At least 
in terms of adult education, the MTT was wrong – the results in Chapter 7 emphasize that 
adult education in Russia became less effective for career prospects, and in some cases, this 
implied no returns to human capital investments if the education was completed in the adult 
life course.  
8.3.3 Importance of the structural and cultural context 
Turning to the general research questions, my results conform to the empirical findings that 
despite the ideological principles of the Communism in respect to the equalization of life-
course chances, Soviet Russia could be characterized as a reasonably stratified society. The 
transition to a liberalized economy, however, not only worsened the overall standards of 
living (Gorodnichenko et al., 2010) but also increased existing social inequalities. In this 
regard, my thesis evinces the relevance of the contextual embeddedness of the stratification 
process and contributes to our understanding of the role of institutional and cultural factors in 
the life-course trajectory. In the following, I emphasize institutional and cultural factors that 
were presumably crucial in these processes.  
Four peculiar developments in the aftermath of the regime change in Russia likely 
contributed to growing social inequalities in gender relations. First, the weakened link 
between the educational system and the labor market might have led to a stronger selection 
based on ascriptive characteristics (such as gender) on the employers’ side. Such a selection 
process evidently influenced female entrants more strongly than male entrants. Second, the 
regime change induced the reinforcement of cultural gender stereotypes on professions and 
domestic roles caused by growing uncertainty and emerging new forms of business ethics and 
typical frames of professional interactions (“Wild West”-like effects). Third, family policies 
introduced after the collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced traditional-like family formation 
patterns and encouraged mothers to stay at home. In this sense, the lack of state support 
(reduced childcare services) together with longer maternity leave might influence women’s 
chances of attaining high-status jobs and contribute to their status as a “risk factor” for 
employers and/or encourage a self-selection of women into jobs that require less 
commitment, effort, and upgrading. Fourth, growing informal relationships in the post-Soviet 
Russia (that has been widely documented by the empirical literature, see Guariglia & Kim, 
2006; Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2000; Johnson, Kaufmann, & Shleifer, 
1997; B.-Y. Kim, 2002) rose the importance of social capital and ties for occupational 
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success (Yakubovich & Kozina, 2000; Yakubovich, 2005). These developments obviously 
impaired females labor market opportunities, since women have fewer access to (high-
quality) ties and social networks in Russia (Ashwin & Yakubovich, 2005; Gerber & 
Mayorova, 2010). 
The worsened societal function of adult education after the collapse of the Soviet Union – 
which was revealed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 – was likely a result of the changes in the 
educational sphere. First, the state disappeared as a main coordinator between educational 
and employment systems, and the education-occupation link vanished. Consequently, returns 
to adult education investments became insecure and vague, which may explain my findings 
for low returns to adult education (or their absence) after the regime change in Russia. In 
turn, this issue obviously increased the reluctance of both employers and employees to invest 
in adult education despite the growing need for new skills and knowledge due to 
globalization and the intensification of competition. Moreover, the state disappeared as a 
major sponsor of educational investments, particularly for learners outside of the regular age, 
thereby leading to the “privatization” of risks. This privatization obviously increased the 
stratification of adult education in economic terms. Growing (labor market) uncertainty in the 
aftermath of the regime change played no less important role. On the one hand, it might have 
deterred individuals from returning to time- and money-consuming formal schooling. On the 
other hand, these uncertain environment might have blurred signals of (adult) education, 
giving room to other factors in determining hiring processes: “Supply and barter networks, 
access to locally scarce goods, connections with customs officials and local politicians, skill 
in the military and pleasure-providing arts – these, not education, are the most important 
forms of capital in the new Russian market” (Gerber & Hout, 1998, p. 37). 
8.3.4 Gender 
Throughout my thesis, I acknowledged the importance of gender in the process of 
educational attainment and careers in a tremendously changing society. Women and men 
indeed face distinct chances and opportunities during their life courses, and, as my thesis has 
revealed, institutional and cultural arrangements shape these chances and opportunities. 
In the early labor market careers (Chapter 5), Russian women make a series of “right” 
choices. They invest in education, they choose branches in the economy with many 
authoritative positions and as a consequence, they are often found in such positions in their 
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first jobs. But nevertheless, something goes “wrong”: compared to men they have lower 
returns to initial education. As potential explanations for females’ structural inability to 
translate higher educational attainment into better occupational opportunities, I proposed 
females’ educational and occupational choices oriented more towards a sound work-family 
balance, employers’ discrimination, and/or lower access to social networks and ties. 
These patterns were likely to even worsen during the post-Soviet period, since I found that 
the gender gap for job authority has enlarged, owing to reduced chances of female entrants 
for job authority (Chapter 5). Also in the later career phases, women were hit by Russia’s 
transition to a liberalized economy more than men (Chapter 7). For instance, previous rather 
equal opportunities to find a (new) job during the Soviet period turned to unequal 
opportunities disadvantaging women in the post-Soviet Russia. Similarly, the formerly higher 
upward career-mobility of women diminished, thereby eliminating advantages women 
enjoyed in the Soviet era. Yet, women also benefited from the transition in Russia. Under the 
Soviet regime, women had much higher risks of downward career-mobility than men. This 
changed totally because men were hit severely by liberalization reforms; as a consequence, 
the gender gap in downward mobility even reversed. Also gender differences in adult 
education opportunities – women participated less than men in the Soviet Russia – turned 
around (Chapter 6). However, this change was brought out by a reduced male participation in 
adult education rather than a growing female participation.  
Probably, the growing labor market disadvantages (in the early and late career stages) due to 
the Soviet Union collapse inclined women to keep seeking for educational upgrading or 
sidestepping in the post-Soviet period (Chapter 6). One could expect that the post-Soviet 
female edge in adult education enrolment points to women’s better opportunities for 
improving labor market positions. Looking at returns to adult education, in most cases men 
and women did not differ (Chapter 7). Benefits of upgrading were similar by gender for (re-
)employment and upward mobility chances. Only in regard to downward mobility risks, 
upgrading paid off for women and not for men. Women benefitted from sidestepping, 
however, only little (if at all) in the labor market.  
With regard to gender, one could conclude that women experienced a loss in labor market 
outcomes relative to men over the Soviet Union collapse. They lost at the labor market entry 
and also in later stages of the career. It seems that women structurally responded to this via a 
participation in adult education. Nevertheless, it should be noted that formal adult education 
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is quite selective in participation and involves monetary and time investments. Hence, it is 
questionable whether women have really succeeded in compensating their relative losses 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.   
Chapter 5 has further insights for gender relations in a broader sense. Following the 
“homosocial reproduction” argument (Kanter, 1977), individuals give preference to 
ascriptively similar others and gender inequalities in job authority might hence foster the 
persistence of further labor market related inequalities between the sexes (see Elliott & 
Smith, 2001 for empirical support). Thus, studying the school-to-work stage may enhance our 
knowledge of when and why gender inequalities arise. Gender inequality in access to 
authority positions might also shape gender inequality within the family. Since authoritative 
positions are more demanding in terms of overtime and flexibility (Abendroth, Maas, and van 
der Lippe 2013), higher male employment levels in these jobs might cause lower male 
involvement in household chores. Correspondingly, my study improves our knowledge on the 
arrangements of labor divisions in society as a whole (Yaish and Stier 2009). Both issues 
become of particular relevance given (a) the enormous achievements of Communism in terms 
of female employment and female advances in education (Gerber, 2003; McAuley, 1981) as 
well as (b) societal changes linked to a “release” of Russian women from their labor market 
duties and that send them back to their traditional duties and positions in the family. Hence, 
the existence of gender inequalities between similarly equipped men and women stresses the 
fact that it is not enough to focus only on the quantitative dimension of the gender issue. 
8.3.5 Matthew effects 
What is more, this thesis illustrates a remarkable case for Merton’s idea of a Matthew effect. 
First, individuals with higher initial educational levels have better prospects for good labor 
market entry, ceteris paribus (Chapter 5). Second, these higher credentials fetch more returns 
in the labor market (Chapter 7). Third, although individuals with lesser credentials to begin 
with are more likely to upgrade their initial level in the later life course (Chapter 6), the 
relative advantage of adult education appears to be lower for them compared with upgraders 
with more credentials to begin with (Chapter 7). Fourth, upgrades tend to be individuals who 
already occupy better positions in the labor market (Chapter 6), and upgrading can improve 
career prospects further and reduce various labor market risks (Chapter 7). Fifth, it seems that 
an advantaged family background provides an additional direct advantage in the later life 
course in adult education access (Chapter 7). Sixth, while there is some evidence that initially 
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lower-educated individuals might benefit more strongly from adult education in form of 
sidestepping (Chapter 7), they seem to have fewer chances for enrollment in sidestepping 
(Chapter 6). Altogether, alongside status attainment process, we observe the remarkable 
accumulation of educational and occupational (dis-)advantages across the individual life 
course in which the already advantaged gain further ground. 
8.3.6 Education as a life-long process 
My thesis contributes to sociology of education by separating between educational upgrading 
and sidestepping – two adult education strategies with very different potentials for labor 
market outcomes (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). The distinction between upgrading and 
sidestepping is an original contribution having been barely addressed by previous research 
(with exception of Li et al., 2000; Vono de Vilhena et al., 2016), particularly with regard to 
the social stratification of those strategies. This distinction opens up new avenues for re-
considering what we (do not) know about educational re-entries in later career stages.  
Educational upgrading provides a handle to built up on previously attained human capital and 
to improve initial skills and knowledge. The potentials of upgrading are obvious: A higher 
educational level signals productivity and motivation rendering an applicant more attractive 
for employers, which may result in higher wages and salaries, higher-ranked positions, and 
better promotion opportunities. In turn, sidestepping implies a sort of depreciation of initial 
skills, since by acquiring new qualification, older skills become less relevant and less useful. 
In this sense, sidestepping is a more risky strategy also because learning in older ages is less 
efficient than earlier in life (Heckman, 2006). Nevertheless, sidestepping could be promising 
to find a new job or to reduce labor market risks by switching to another occupation or 
branch. Having said that, particularly those who experienced labor market failure will be 
mostly likely to adopt a sidestepping strategy. Elaborating on characteristics of adult learners, 
I provided a theoretically-driven discussion based on the perpetuation of initial credentials 
and occupational attainment which (jointly) were expected to be the main driving forces but 
also constraints for opting for upgrading or sidestepping. 
Beyond this, my study of adult education stresses that adult education indeed needs to be 
examined and understood as part of individuals’ educational career and life-long learning 
process. In this context, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 highlight the complexity of adult education 
related to individual education and work experience during times of societal changes. Beyond 
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the case of Russia, this study is also an example of and provides some direction for referring 
to educational career patterns developed during post-secondary education. Furthermore, 
relating upgrading and sidestepping to changes in political regime is appealing as it can have 
broad implications for understanding the dynamics in adult education due to macro changes 
in society. Finally, my study contributes to a better understanding of the link between the 
educational system and the labor market in Russia, where formal arrangements often deviate 
from practical experience, thereby obscuring theoretical predictions of the institutional 
literature (Kapeliushnikov et al., 2011). 
8.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
In this final section, I address the limitations of my thesis that should also guide further 
research. First of all, I acknowledge potential recall bias, which is a common problem of the 
retrospective data. However, the period I cover is connected with important societal events 
that are likely to enhance the accuracy of recall. Furthermore, recall inaccuracy should be 
offset by rather stable career patterns during the Soviet period. Although the post-Soviet 
period implies more volatile career patterns, reported events are more recent and should 
hence contain less errors. The underreporting of sensitive information, such as 
unemployment, might be a further issue of the retrospective data, though this information is 
less relevant to my analyses. Given the higher risks of mortality, my results might be slightly 
biased in favor of higher-educated individuals (Bessudnov, McKee, & Stuckler, 2011; 
Bessudnov, 2011). A potential solution to overcome issues linked to the retrospective data 
would be to collect prospective data. Unfortunately, there is no such data available for Russia 
that would also cover both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. 
The second issue refers to the limited information available in the used data. Inter alia, the 
data lack information on income or major job characteristics that would allow for an 
approximation of the life-course income trajectory as well as a detailed occupational status. 
For the gender inequality study, further information on individuals’ view of gender norms 
and roles would be essential to address the issue of inequality versus preferences. In terms of 
education, the field of study would be crucial for a better definition of upgrading and 
sidestepping in adult education strategies. Finally, qualitative data on the personal experience 
of the regime change would give direct insights into the link between macro-level changes 
and micro-level outcomes. 
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Third, the empirical analyses in my thesis – as in most analyses of such type – are limited in 
terms of strict causality of the “regime change” variable, which would be nonsensical to 
postulate on substantial grounds. Instead, I studied change along a sharp transition process 
that took place in a unique historical context. Observed associations mirror a large number of 
changes and continuities in institutional and cultural spheres as well as individual adaptations 
to and maneuvering in the given context. Notably, Russia – as many other post-Socialist 
countries – went through several periods of transformation with a deep economic and 
political crisis in the 1990s and rapid recovery in the following decades. Therefore, it might 
be that it is not the collapse of the Soviet Union per se that shaped social inequalities, but 
possibly the dramatic economic decline. To disentangle the potential “causal” impact of the 
Soviet Union collapse, it would be desirable to cover a longer horizon, including the financial 
crisis at the end of 2000s, and to account for different periods during the Soviet and post-
Soviet eras. More practically, available longitudinal panel studies (e.g., Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey) could make additional investments in a specific module that collects life-
history data in addition to that gathered annually (a prospective one). 
Although my thesis provides important implications for transition societies, it is difficult to 
claim that the results found here can be generalized for all post-socialist countries. 
Correspondingly, replication studies for other post-socialist countries experiencing a regime 
change might shed more light on the issues of the institutional and cultural impact on social 
inequalities. In this context, future research should also take on a comparative perspective 
and delve into the question of whether there is a convergence on a specific regime type in the 
logic of the “variety of capitalism” approach (Esping-Andersen, 1990) or a path-dependency 
due to the socialism and whether post-socialist societies are on their way to their own regime 
types (see, e.g., Fenger, 2007). Currently, there is no available data that would enable 
addressing the regime change impact on social inequalities – as examined here – through a 
comparative lens. However, using appropriate and comparable measurements and analytical 
methods, researchers could scrutinize the available life-history data for countries with 
socialist past, e.g., German National Education Panel Survey Study and the Estonia Social 
Survey. Other aspects of social stratification (such as race, age, and health) and other life-
course stages (such as early educational careers, later labor market careers, retirement 
decisions, and fertility behavior) could also be studied if the data allow. 
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Appendix A Chapter 3 
Table  A–1: Russian educational system – ISCED (1997) correspondence table 
ISCED97 level Russian equivalent 
ISCED 0: Pre-primary education 
Programmes at level 0, (pre-primary) defined as the 
initial stage of organized instruction are designed 
primarily to introduce very young children to a 
school-type environment, i.e., to provide a bridge 
between the home and a school-based atmosphere. 
Upon completion of these programmes, children 
continue their education at level1 (primary 
education). 
Pre-primary (pre-school) education 
This stage in Russia is not included into the 
education system: this stage is not mandatory for 
continuing education at the following level. 
However, it is organized usually on the basis of an 
educational institution and is intended to prepare 
very young children for school. 
ISCED 1: Primary education 
First-stage education. Programmes at level 1are 
normally designed on a unit or project basic to give 
students a sound basic education in reading, writing 
and mathematics along with an elementary 
understanding of other subjects such as history, 
geography, natural science, social science, art and 
music. In some cased religious instruction is 
featured. 
Primary education 
In Russia this educational stage (grades 1–4) is the 
first level of mandatory education in educational 
institutions. This stage also covers students in 
preparatory classes, which are considered to be 
“pre-primary” in the ISCED system, as level 0. 
Successful completion of this stage is sufficient for 
the primary education qualification. The data 
presented in this thesis and for this stage does not 
include special (correctional) educational 
institutions and classes for students with special 
needs (e.g. disabled student, children with deviant 
behavior) or evening schools. 
ISCED 2: Lower secondary education 
Second-stage education, first level of secondary 
education. The contents of education at this stage 
are typically designed to complete the provision of 
basic education which began at ISCED level 1. in 
many, if not most countries, the educational aim is 
to lay the foundation for lifelong learning and 
human development on which countries may 
expand, systematically, further educational 
opportunities. The programmes at this level are 
usually on a more subject-oriented pattern using 
more specialized teachers and more often several 
teachers conducting classes in their field of 
specialization. The full implementation of basic 
skills occurs at this level. The end of this level 
often coincides with the end of compulsory 
education where it exists. 
Basic secondary education 
This is the second stage of the compulsory 
education system (5–9 grades of regular schools); 
completion if this stage means completion of 
compulsory school education and is sufficient for 
basic secondary education qualifications. 
Qualification awarded: Attestat 1. 
The data presented in this thesis and for this stage 
does not include special (correctional) educational 
institutions and classes for students with special 
needs (e.g. disabled student, children with deviant 
behavior) or evening schools. 
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Table  A–1: Continued 
ISCED97 level Russian equivalent 
ISCED 3: Upper secondary education 
Third-stage education. This level of education 
typically begins at the end of full-time compulsory 
education for those countries that have a system of 
compulsory education. More specialization may be 
observed at this level than at ISCED level 2 and often 
teachers need to be more qualified or specialized than 
for ISCED level 2. The entrance age to this level is 
typically 15 or 16 years. The educational 
programmes included at this level typically require 
the completion of some 9 year of full-time education 
(since the beginning of level 1) for admission or a 
combination of education and vocational or technical 
experience and with as minimum entrance 
requirements the completion of level 2 or 
demonstrable ability to handle programmes at this 
level. 
Full secondary education (grades 10–11/12) and 
primary vocational education 
Full secondary education (corresponds to ISCED 3A) 
is feasible in gymnasium, lyceum and secondary 
school; awarded by Attestat 2 of Maturity (zrelost). 
Primary vocational education (corresponds to ISCED 
3C) is included in this stage, regardless of whether 
student has a certificate of secondary (full) education; 
feasible in specialized school (uchilische), awarded 
by: (a) one-year duration: certificate with worker's 
qualification; (b) two-year duration: Attestat 2 of 
Maturity (zrelost), confirms upper secondary 
education and certificate with worker's qualification. 
ISCED 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
Fourth-stage education, post-secondary non-tertiary. 
ISCED 4 captures programmes that straddle the 
boundary between upper secondary and post-
secondary education from an international point of 
view, even though they might clearly be considered 
as upper-secondary or post-secondary programmes in 
a national context. ISCED 4 programmes can, 
considering their content, not be regarded as tertiary 
programmes. They are often not significantly more 
advanced than programmes as ISCED 3 but they 
serve to broaden the knowledge of participants who 
have already completed a programme at level 3. The 
programme content can be expected to be more 
specialized or detailed and the applications to more 
complex in some cases than those offered at the 
upper-secondary level.  
This stage can include professional training course 
(computers, accounting, secretarial, etc.) which 
usually represent non-formal education. This stage 
may also include preparatory courses, organized for 
the purposes of entering HEIs. The available statistics 
do not fully indicate the relevant data on this stage of 
education. 
This type of education has duration of one year and 
awarded by certificate with worker's qualification. 
ISCED 5b: Tertiary-type B education 
Fifth-stage education, first level of tertiary education, 
5 B programmes. This level consists of tertiary 
programmes having an educational content more 
advanced than those offered at level 3 and 4. The 
content of ISCED level 5B programmes is practically 
oriented/occupationally specific and is mainly 
designed for participants to acquire the practical 
skills. Programmes in this level do not lead directly 
to an advanced scientific qualification, and cover 
practical (technical) professional fields. 
Secondary professional education / tertiary education 
of non-university level 
Secondary professional education based on upper 
secondary level (11 years); ensures receipt of 
secondary professional schools and professional 
technical colleges and secondary professional 
branches of HEIs; awarded by Specialist’s diploma 1. 
ISCED 5a: Tertiary-type A education 
Fifth-stage education, first level of tertiary education, 
5 A programmes. ISCED level 5 A programmes that 
are largely theoretically based and are intended to 
provide sufficient qualification for gaining entry into 
advanced research programmes and profession with 
high skills requirements. 
Higher professional education / tertiary education of 
university level  
Education in different types of HEIs (institutes, 
academies, universities). So definition of tertiary 
(higher) education in the Russian educational 
framework is narrower than in OECD countries and 
in fact covers only IDCED 5a; and does not include 
ISCED 5b (which corresponds to the secondary 
professional education) and ISCED 6 (which 
corresponds to the postgraduate education). 
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Table  A–1: Continued 
ISCED97 level Russian equivalent 
ISCED 6: Advanced research programmes 
Sixth-stage education, second level of tertiary 
education. This level is reserved for tertiary 
programmes which lead to the award of an advanced 
research qualification. The programmes are therefore 
devoted to the advanced study and original research 
and are not based on course-work only.  
Post-graduate education 
Post-graduate studies, including aspirantura 
(candidate of sciences) (Equivalent of Ph.D. studies) 
and Doctorate’s programmes 
Note: Adapted from GU VShE (2010), ISCED 1997 MAPPINGS (2012), OECD (2007) 
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Appendix B Chapter 4 
Education attainment level refers to the highest educational attainment level in each month. 
We constructed this variable with information on (1) kind of studies the respondent received, 
(2) beginning and end of education episode, and (3) presence of diploma or certificate of 
education by the end of the episode. Full-time professional training courses at the workplace 
or apart from job, as well as short-term professional training courses were not considered 
because such courses do not lead to higher educational attainment level. 
 
1st. coding step: construction of categorical variable with kind of studies the respondent 
received (based on the original EES questionnaire) 
43 Secondary school - 10–11 years 
44 Professional education: vocational college, factory-and-work college – without secondary education 
47 Vocational college with secondary education, technical college or lyceum, 2–3 years of studies 
48 Secondary special: technical, medical, musical, teacher training, arts college or school, 3–4 years after 
unfinished secondary school 
49 Secondary special: technical, medical, musical, teacher training, arts college or school, at least 2 years 
after finishing secondary school 
50 Higher: university, institute, or academy: specialist, B.A., M.A. 
51 Postgraduate education: Ph.D. (Cand. Sc., Dr. Sc.), postgraduate military academy 
 
2nd. coding step: 8 time-dependent dummy variables for different received degrees 
Incomplete_secondary = 1 for each respondent in each month 
Complete_secondary = 1 if (diploma = 1 & studies = 43) | if (diploma = 1 & studies = 47) | if 
(diploma= 1 & studies = 48) 
= 1 if studies >= 49 & studies <= 51 
Vocational_long = 1 if (diploma = 1 & studies = 47) 
Vocational_short = 1 if (diploma = 1 & studies = 44) 
Professional_long = 1 if (diploma = 1 & studies = 48) 
Professional_short = 1 if (diploma = 1 & studies = 49) 
Higher = 1 if (diploma = 1 & studies = 50) | (studies = 51) 
Post-graduate = 1 if (diploma = 1 & studies = 51) 
 
3rd. coding step: as soon as a dummy equaled 1, we used Stata carryforward command to 
code all following spells to 1. 
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4th. coding step: step-by-step reconstruction of the highest level attained from the 
longitudinal perspective; one categorical variable, 8 categories 
1 Incomplete secondary = 1 if incomplete_secondary = 1 & complete_secondary = 0 & 
vocational_long = 0 & vocational_short = 0 & professional_long = 0 & 
professional_short = 0 & higher = 0 & post-graduate = 0 
2 Incomplete secondary with 
vocational  
= 2 if incomplete_secondary = 1 & complete_secondary = 0 & 
(vocational_long = 1 | vocational_short = 1) & professional_long = 0 & 
professional_short = 0 & higher = 0 & post-graduate = 0 
3 Complete secondary  = 3 if complete_secondary = 1 & vocational_long = 0 & vocational_short = 
0 & professional_long = 0 & professional_short = 0 & higher = 0 & post-
graduate = 0 
4 Complete secondary with 
vocational 
= 4 if complete_secondary = 1 & (vocational_long = 1 | vocational_short = 
1) & professional_long = 0 & professional_short = 0 & higher = 0 & post-
graduate = 0 
5 Secondary professional, 
based on incomplete 
secondary  
= 5 if professional_long = 1 & professional_short = 0 & higher = 0 & post-
graduate = 0 
6 Secondary professional, 
based on complete secondary 
= 6 if professional_short = 1 & higher = 0 & post-graduate = 0 
7 Higher = 7 if higher = 1 & post-graduate = 0 
8 Post-graduate = 8 if post-graduate = 1 
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Appendix C Chapter 5 
Table  C–1: Comparison of model specifications (N = 5,825) 
 2 periods    4 periods    
Model specification         
 LL DF AIC BIC LL DF AIC BIC 
(2) G, P -2476.11 3 4958.21 4978.22 -2463.81 5 4937.62 4970.97 
(3) G, P, G × P -2475.13 4 4958.26 4984.94 -2461.27 8 4938.53 4991.89 
(4) G, P, E -1776.09 7 3566.18 3612.87 -1771.03 9 3560.06 3620.09 
(5) G, P, G × P, E -1774.15 8 3564.29 3617.65 -1766.44 12 3556.88 3636.91 
(6) G, P, E, G x E -1770.36 11 3562.72 3636.09 -1765.38 13 3556.76 3643.47 
(7) G, P, E, S -1587.84 19 3213.68 3340.41 -1585.10 21 3212.19 3352.26 
(8) G, P, G × P, E, S -1585.12 20 3210.24 3343.64 -1579.98 24 3207.96 3368.04 
(9) G, P, E, G x E, S -1582.45 23 3210.90 3364.31 -1579.86 25 3209.71 3376.46 
(10) G, P, E, S, G × S -1579.42 31 3220.83 3427.60 -1576.73 33 3219.47 3439.57 
(11) G, P, E, S, C -1577.65 27 3209.29 3389.38 -1575.42 29 3208.83 3402.26 
(12) G, P, G × P, E, S, C -1574.75 28 3205.51 3392.27 -1569.96 32 3203.92 3417.35 
(13) G, P, E, G × E, S, C -1572.58 31 3207.16 3413.93 -1570.44 33 3206.88 3426.99 
(14) G, P, E, S, G × S, C -1568.90 39 3215.79 3475.92 -1566.69 41 3215.38 3488.84 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Model specification: G=Gender (female), 
P=Period of entry, E=educational level, S=Sector of economy; C=controls (presence of children, 
private sector, rural area, self-employed, a family worker, or farmer, approximated education, missing 
for private sector, for rural area, lived in Moscow or St. Petersburg at the time of the GGS survey); 
interaction indicated by ×. 
Table  C–2: Comparison of LR improvement test (N = 5,825) 
  2 periods  4 periods  
 Δ LR χ2 p LR χ2 p 
(1) G (base) 12.83 0.003 12.83 0.003 
(2) G, P (1) 8.69 0.003 33.28 0.000 
(3) G, P, G × P (2) 1.95 0.163 5.09 0.165 
(4) G, P, E (2) 1,400.03 0.000 1,385.56 0.000 
(5) G, P, G × P, E (4) 3.89 0.049 9.19 0.027 
(6) G, P, E, G x E (4) 11.46 0.022 11.30 0.023 
(7) G, P, E, S (4) 376.50 0.000 371.87 0.000 
(8) G, P, G × P, E, S (7) 5.44 0.020 10.23 0.017 
(9) G, P, E, G × E, S (7) 10.78 0.029 10.48 0.033 
(10) G, P, E, S, G × S (7) 16.85 0.155 16.72 0.160 
(11) G, P, E, S, C (7) 20.39 0.009 19.36 0.013 
(12) G, P, G × P, E, S, C (11) 5.78 0.016 11.91 0.012 
(13) G, P, E, G × E, S, C (11) 10.13 0.038 9.95 0.041 
(14) G, P, E, S, G × S, C (11) 17.50 0.131 17.45 0.133 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Model specification: G=Gender (female), 
P=Period of entry, E=educational level, S=Sector of economy; C=controls (presence of children, 
private sector, rural area, self-employed, a family worker, or farmer, approximated education, missing 
for private sector, for rural area, lived in Moscow or St. Petersburg at the time of the GGS survey); 
interaction indicated by ×; Δ = comparison model. 
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Table  C–3: Further effects from regression models 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Table 5–5  and 
Table 5–6 (logistic regression model on entry into authoritative position) 
 continued Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Presence of children (ref. no children) 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 
Private sector (ref. public sector or mixed) -0.20 -0.23 -0.19 -0.20 
Rural area (ref. urban area) 0.29** 0.29** 0.28** 0.29** 
Self-employed, family worker, or farmer (ref. not self-
employed, family worker, or farmer) 1.19** 1.16** 1.22** 1.25** 
Controls     
Approximated education  0.30 0.32 0.26 0.28 
Missing for private sector -1.44 -1.43 -1.38 -1.46 
Missing for rural area -0.17 -0.20 -0.16 -0.13 
GGS residence area in Moscow or St. Petersburg 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001.  
Table  C–4: Gender gap in entry into authoritative versus non-authoritative position by 
period of labor market entry, educational level, and branch of economy 
  Female APE a z p 
Model 6: female × post-Soviet labor market entry    
Soviet labor market entry -3.50 -3.01 0.003 
Post-Soviet labor market entry -6.77 -5.09 0.000 
Model 7: female × educational level    
Incomplete secondary  -1.19 -1.01 0.313 
Lower vocational -0.71 -0.52 0.604 
Secondary completed -2.40 -1.81 0.071 
Secondary professional -5.08 -1.98 0.048 
Higher -22.15 -5.88 0.000 
Model 8: female × branch of industry    
Agriculture -1.62 -0.74 0.460 
Mining -8.46 -1.51 0.130 
Manufacturing -3.01 -1.81 0.071 
Power industry -7.13 -1.11 0.267 
Construction -2.50 -0.74 0.458 
Trade and consumer services -7.12 -2.24 0.025 
Transport and communication -4.19 -1.36 0.173 
Finance services -17.44 -1.19 0.235 
State services -12.62 -4.07 0.000 
Health -6.20 -1.41 0.158 
Education -15.90 -2.57 0.010 
Other communal, social, and personal services 6.21 1.31 0.190 
Other or miss -4.90 -0.86 0.392 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. a APE = average partial effect, scale in 
percentage points. 
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Appendix D Chapter 6 
Figure  D–1: Entry into upgrade: plots of pseudo-residuals based on the Cox and Snell 
(1968) approach 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. EXP=Standard exponential; PCE=Piece-
wise constant exponential; GOMP=Gompertz; WEIB=Weibul; LNOR=Log-normal; LLOG=Log-
logistic.  
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Figure  D–2: Entry into sidestep: plots of pseudo-residuals based on the Cox and Snell 
(1968) approach 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. EXP=Standard exponential; PCE=Piece-
wise constant exponential; GOMP=Gompertz; WEIB=Weibul; LNOR=Log-normal; LLOG=Log-
logistic.  
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Table  D–1: Likelihood ratio improvement test, compared to standard exponential 
model 
 Upgrading (N=101,544) Sidestepping (N=101,921) 
   LR = 2*((PCE) - (EXP)) 528.17 148.18 
LR = 2*((GOMP) - (EXP)) 277.12 74.27 
LR = 2*((WEIB) - (EXP)) 1.45 1.28 
LR = 2*((LNOR) - (EXP)) 47.26 27.74 
LR = 2*((LLOG) - (EXP)) 77.81 76.05 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. EXP=Standard exponential; PCE=Piece-
wise constant exponential; GOMP=Gompertz; WEIB=Weibul; LNOR=Log-normal; LLOG=Log-
logistic.  
Table  D–2: Akaike’s information criterion and Bayesian information criterion 
Upgrading (N = 101,544) 
 LL DF AIC BIC 
     EXP -4602.03 27 9258.06 9515.32 
PCE -4337.95 35 8745.89 9079.38 
GOMP -4463.47 28 8982.94 9249.73 
WEIB -4601.30 28 9258.60 9525.39 
LNOR -4578.40 28 9212.80 9479.59 
LLOG -4563.12 28 9182.24 9449.04 
     Sidestepping (N = 101,921) 
  LL DF AIC BIC 
     EXP -2220.92 27 4495.84 4753.21 
PCE -2146.83 35 4363.66 4697.28 
GOMP -2183.79 28 4423.57 4690.47 
WEIB -2220.28 28 4496.56 4763.46 
LNOR -2207.05 28 4470.10 4736.99 
LLOG -2182.90 28 4421.79 4688.69 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. EXP=Standard exponential; PCE=Piece-
wise constant exponential; GOMP=Gompertz; WEIB=Weibul; LNOR=Log-normal; LLOG=Log-
logistic. 
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Appendix E Chapter 7 
Figure  E–1: Definition of adult education variables, a snapshot from the simulated data 
 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Variable specifications: 
idind=individual’s identification number, t_start=spell start time, t_end=spell end time, 
psv_period=spell refers to the post-Soviet period, ae_short=a short-term effect of adult education, 
ae_long= a long-term effect of adult education, ae_lagged=a lagged effect of adult education, 
ae_long_psv=a post-Soviet period long-term effect of adult education (used for interaction effect 
between post-Soviet period and a long-term effect of adult education).  
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Table  E–1: Comparison of LR improvement test 
  All Men Women 
 Δ LR χ2 p LR χ2 p LR χ2 p 
Re-employment, (non-
workers) 
       
(1) LNG (NOAE) 175.54 *** 85.44 *** 79.93 *** 
(2) LNG, LNG×EDU (NOAE) 194.76 *** 100.34 *** 84.90 *** 
(3) LNG, LNG×EDU (LNG) 19.23 *** 14.91 ** 4.97  
(4) LNG, LNG×PRD (NOAE) 184.17 *** 91.25 *** 89.63 *** 
(5) LNG, LNG×PRD (LNG) 8.64 * 5.81 + 9.70 ** 
(6) LNG, LNG×F (NOAE) 187.10 ***     
(7) LNG, LNG×F (LNG) 11.57 **     
Upward mobility, 
(workers) 
       
(1) LNG (NOAE) 67.40 *** 35.75 *** 38.89 *** 
(2) LNG, LNG×EDU (NOAE) 75.61 *** 37.07 *** 48.61 *** 
(3) LNG, LNG×EDU (LNG) 8.21 + 1.32  9.72 * 
(4) LNG, LNG×PRD (NOAE) 73.54 *** 39.98 *** 42.27 *** 
(5) LNG, LNG×PRD (LNG) 6.13 * 4.23  3.38  
(6) LNG, LNG×F (NOAE) 67.90 ***     
(7) LNG, LNG×F (LNG) 0.49      
Downward mobility, 
(workers) 
       
(1) LNG (NOAE) 26.29 *** 4.05  25.43 *** 
(2) LNG, LNG×EDU (NOAE) 35.41 *** 11.94 + 33.40 *** 
(3) LNG, LNG×EDU (LNG) 9.12 + 7.89 + 7.97 + 
(4) LNG, LNG×PRD (NOAE) 27.16 *** 6.69  26.37 *** 
(5) LNG, LNG×PRD (LNG) 0.86  2.64  0.95  
(6) LNG, LNG×F (NOAE) 32.18 ***     
(7) LNG, LNG×F (LNG) 5.88 +     
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.00. Model specification: LNG=Long-term effect of adult education, EDU=Initial 
education level, PRD=Period; F=Female; NOAE=No effects of adult education; interaction indicated 
by ×.  
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Table  E–2: Akaike’s information criterion and Bayesian information criterion 
 All Men Women 
 LL DF AIC BIC LL DF AIC BIC LL DF AIC BIC 
(Re-)Employment, (non-workers) 
Model 1.1 -19,670  35    39,410     39,714    -7,176     34    14,421     14,681    -11,905     34    23,879     24,160    
Model 1.2 -19,664  37    39,402     39,724            
Model 1.3 -19,660  39    39,399     39,738    -7,169     38    14,414     14,704    -11,903     38    23,882     24,196    
Model 1.4 -19,666  37    39,405     39,727    -7,173     36    14,419     14,694    -11,901     36    23,873     24,171    
Upward mobility, (workers) 
Model 2.1 -6,873   39    13,824     14,196    -2,494     38    5,063     5,389    -4,203     38    8,481     8,825    
Model 2.2 -6,873  41    13,828     14,219            
Model 2.3 -6,869  43    13,824     14,234    -2,493     42    5,070     5,430    -4,198     42    8,479     8,860    
Model 2.4 -6,870  41    13,822     14,213    -2,492     40    5,063     5,406    -4,201     40    8,482     8,844    
Downward mobility, (workers) 
Model 3.1 -6,460  39    12,997     13,363    -2,003     38    4,082     4,403    -4,354     38    8,783     9,121    
Model 3.2 -6,457  41    12,995     13,380            
Model 3.3 -6,455  43    12,996     13,400    -1,999     42    4,082     4,437    -4,350     42    8,783     9,156    
Model 3.4 -6,459  41    13,000     13,385    -2,001     40    4,083     4,421    -4,353     40    8,786     9,142    
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. 
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Table  E–3: Further effects from models on (re-)employment chances 
continued Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 
 All Men Women All All Men Women All Men Women 
Duration of non-employment 
0 months -2.35*** -2.76*** -2.07*** -2.37*** -2.33*** -2.74*** -2.06*** -2.35*** -2.75*** -2.08*** 
6 months -3.74*** -4.56*** -3.17*** -3.76*** -3.72*** -4.55*** -3.16*** -3.74*** -4.55*** -3.18*** 
12 months -3.59*** -4.75*** -2.82*** -3.60*** -3.57*** -4.73*** -2.81*** -3.59*** -4.74*** -2.82*** 
24 months -3.51*** -3.75*** -3.27*** -3.53*** -3.49*** -3.73*** -3.26*** -3.51*** -3.74*** -3.27*** 
60+ months -4.64*** -5.69*** -4.00*** -4.65*** -4.61*** -5.66*** -3.99*** -4.63*** -5.67*** -4.00*** 
Age of LM entry (ref. 20-25) 
Below 20 -0.12*** -0.12** -0.03 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12** -0.03 -0.12*** -0.11** -0.04 
Above 25 -0.12 0.10 -0.16 -0.12 -0.11 0.12 -0.16 -0.11 0.12 -0.15 
Socio-economic origin (ref. low) 
Medium 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
High -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 
Post-soviet LM entry 0.29*** 0.40*** 0.09 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.40*** 0.09 0.29*** 0.40*** 0.09 
Married -0.03 0.41*** -0.31*** -0.03 -0.03 0.40*** -0.31*** -0.03 0.40*** -0.31*** 
Presence of children 0.08** 0.21*** -0.16*** 0.08** 0.09** 0.21*** -0.16*** 0.08** 0.21*** -0.17*** 
Rural residence area -0.05* -0.10* -0.03 -0.05* -0.05* -0.10* -0.03 -0.05* -0.10* -0.03 
Higher level occupational 
class 
0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.05 
Authoritative position 0.11** -0.05 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** -0.07 0.11* 0.11** -0.05 0.11** 
Self-employed -0.22** 0.05 -0.31** -0.20** -0.20** 0.04 -0.30** -0.22** 0.05 -0.30** 
Sector of economy (ref. tertiary) 
Primary  -0.13*** -0.13** -0.01 -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14** -0.01 -0.13*** -0.13** 0.00 
Secondary  0.07** 0.08* 0.04 0.07** 0.06* 0.07 0.04 0.07** 0.08* 0.04 
Previous N of non-working 
spells 
0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 
Previous labor force 
experience 
0.07*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 
Type of non-employment (ref. inactive) 
Unemployed -0.60*** -0.91*** -0.41*** -0.60*** -0.60*** -0.92*** -0.41*** -0.60*** -0.91*** -0.41*** 
Controls           
Missing on socio-economic 
origin 
0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Missing on residence area -0.15 -0.20 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.17 -0.14 -0.16 -0.25 -0.14 
Missing on occupational 
class 
-0.49** -0.61* -0.29 -0.54** -0.53** -0.67** -0.29 -0.46* -0.62* -0.29 
Missing on authoritative 
position 
0.16 0.22 2.50* 0.18 0.18 0.24 2.49* 0.16 0.22 2.52* 
Missing on self-employed -0.28 0.30 -3.26** -0.24 -0.25 0.34 -3.26** -0.30 0.31 -3.28** 
Missing on sector of 
economy 
0.01 -0.10 0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.10 0.08 
Approximate education 0.01 -0.11 0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.11 0.01 -0.10 0.12 
GGS residence area in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg 
-0.09* 0.03 -0.14** -0.09* -0.09* 0.03 -0.14** -0.09* 0.03 -0.13** 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. LM=labor market.  
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Table  E–4: Further effects from models on upward occupational mobility 
continued Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
 All Men Women All All Men Women All Men Women 
Time since labor market entry 
0 years -3.73*** -3.47*** -3.78*** -3.73*** -3.75*** -3.47*** -3.80*** -3.72*** -3.46*** -3.78*** 
1 year -3.72*** -3.47*** -3.70*** -3.71*** -3.73*** -3.47*** -3.72*** -3.71*** -3.46*** -3.69*** 
2 years -4.12*** -4.16*** -3.89*** -4.12*** -4.14*** -4.16*** -3.91*** -4.11*** -4.15*** -3.88*** 
5 years -4.68*** -4.69*** -4.44*** -4.67*** -4.69*** -4.69*** -4.47*** -4.67*** -4.68*** -4.44*** 
10 years -5.05*** -5.25*** -4.73*** -5.05*** -5.07*** -5.25*** -4.76*** -5.04*** -5.23*** -4.72*** 
15 years -5.29*** -5.44*** -4.98*** -5.28*** -5.31*** -5.44*** -5.02*** -5.26*** -5.41*** -4.97*** 
20 years -5.45*** -5.48*** -5.20*** -5.45*** -5.47*** -5.48*** -5.23*** -5.42*** -5.44*** -5.18*** 
25 years and more -5.90*** -5.97*** -5.68*** -5.89*** -5.92*** -5.97*** -5.70*** -5.86*** -5.91*** -5.65*** 
Age of LM entry (ref. 20-25) 
Below 20 0.03 0.19** -0.09 0.03 0.02 0.19* -0.09 0.03 0.19** -0.09 
Above 25 0.24 0.46 -0.02 0.24 0.25 0.46 -0.01 0.25 0.45 -0.02 
Socio-economic origin (ref. low) 
Medium 0.20*** 0.26** 0.15* 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.26** 0.15* 0.20*** 0.25** 0.15* 
High 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.42*** 0.30*** 
Post-soviet LM entry 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.00 
Married 0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.11* 0.03 -0.05 0.11 
Presence of children -0.21*** -0.04 -0.27*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.04 -0.27*** -0.21*** -0.04 -0.27*** 
Rural residence area -0.14** -0.07 -0.15* -0.14** -0.13** -0.06 -0.15* -0.14** -0.06 -0.15* 
Occupational class (ref. unskilled) 
Skilled -1.37*** -2.07*** -0.71*** -1.37*** -1.36*** -2.07*** -0.70*** -1.36*** -2.06*** -0.71*** 
Services -1.74*** -2.39*** -1.53*** -1.74*** -1.74*** -2.39*** -1.52*** -1.74*** -2.41*** -1.53*** 
Semi-professionals -2.67*** -2.48*** -2.69*** -2.67*** -2.68*** -2.49*** -2.70*** -2.67*** -2.47*** -2.69*** 
Professionals -3.82*** -3.35*** -4.05*** -3.82*** -3.83*** -3.35*** -4.07*** -3.82*** -3.35*** -4.05*** 
Authoritative position 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.03 
Self-employed 0.24* 0.23 0.13 0.24* 0.24* 0.23 0.13 0.24* 0.23 0.13 
Sector of economy (ref. tertiary) 
Primary  -0.16* -0.25** -0.16 -0.16* -0.16** -0.25** -0.16* -0.15* -0.25** -0.15 
Secondary  0.10* 0.13 -0.08 0.10* 0.10* 0.14 -0.08 0.10* 0.14 -0.08 
Previous N of jobs 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 
Controls           
Experience of interruption -13.80 -12.88 -14.35 -13.80 -13.81 -13.51 -13.86 -13.81 -12.89 -14.35 
Missing on socio-economic 
origin 
0.06 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.04 
Missing on residence area -0.40 -0.42 -0.42 -0.40 -0.40 -0.42 -0.43 -0.39 -0.43 -0.42 
Missing on occupational 
class 
0.43 0.34 0.54 0.43 0.44* 0.35 0.54 0.43* 0.33 0.55 
Missing on authoritative 
position 
0.29 0.35 -13.05 0.30 0.36 0.37 -12.54 0.31 0.36 -13.06 
Missing on sector of economy 0.08 -0.18 0.05 0.08 0.08 -0.18 0.05 0.09 -0.17 0.05 
Approximate education -0.13 -0.23 -0.05 -0.13 -0.13 -0.24 -0.05 -0.13 -0.23 -0.05 
GGS residence area in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg 
0.14* 0.06 0.14 0.15* 0.14* 0.06 0.14 0.15* 0.07 0.14 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. LM=labor market. 
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Table  E–5: Further effects from models on downward occupational mobility 
continued Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
 All Men Women All All Men Women All Men Women 
Time since labor market entry 
0 years -6.80*** -6.93*** -6.42*** -6.82*** -6.82*** -7.01*** -6.41*** -6.80*** -6.94*** -6.42*** 
1 year -6.58*** -6.98*** -6.10*** -6.60*** -6.60*** -7.06*** -6.09*** -6.58*** -6.99*** -6.10*** 
2 years -6.79*** -7.13*** -6.31*** -6.81*** -6.81*** -7.21*** -6.30*** -6.79*** -7.14*** -6.31*** 
5 years -7.19*** -7.47*** -6.69*** -7.21*** -7.22*** -7.56*** -6.69*** -7.19*** -7.47*** -6.69*** 
10 years -7.56*** -7.80*** -7.07*** -7.58*** -7.59*** -7.89*** -7.06*** -7.56*** -7.80*** -7.07*** 
15 years -7.89*** -8.09*** -7.40*** -7.91*** -7.91*** -8.18*** -7.39*** -7.89*** -8.11*** -7.39*** 
20 years -8.10*** -8.37*** -7.57*** -8.11*** -8.12*** -8.45*** -7.56*** -8.10*** -8.39*** -7.56*** 
25 years and more -8.39*** -8.55*** -7.99*** -8.41*** -8.41*** -8.63*** -7.97*** -8.39*** -8.58*** -7.97*** 
Age of LM entry (ref. 20-25) 
Below 20 0.15** 0.14 0.16** 0.14** 0.15** 0.14 0.16* 0.15** 0.13 0.16** 
Above 25 -0.30 -0.25 -0.33 -0.30 -0.30 -0.23 -0.33 -0.30 -0.24 -0.33 
Socio-economic origin (ref. low) 
Medium -0.02 0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 -0.07 -0.02 0.11 -0.07 
High -0.12* 0.01 -0.18* -0.12* -0.11 0.02 -0.17* -0.12* 0.01 -0.18* 
Post-soviet LM entry 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.05 
Married -0.08 -0.43*** 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.43*** 0.05 -0.08 -0.42*** 0.05 
Presence of children -0.22*** 0.01 -0.30*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 0.02 -0.30*** -0.22*** 0.01 -0.30*** 
Rural residence area -0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 
Higher level occupational 
class 
0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.05 
Occupational class (ref. 
skilled) 
          
Services 0.94*** 1.57*** 0.46*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 1.57*** 0.46*** 0.94*** 1.58*** 0.46*** 
Semi-professionals 1.18*** 1.64*** 0.76*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.67*** 0.76*** 1.18*** 1.64*** 0.76*** 
Professionals 1.22*** 1.46*** 0.91*** 1.21*** 1.24*** 1.49*** 0.91*** 1.22*** 1.46*** 0.91*** 
Managers 2.42*** 2.28*** 2.44*** 2.41*** 2.43*** 2.31*** 2.44*** 2.42*** 2.30*** 2.44*** 
Authoritative position -0.35*** -0.39*** -0.42*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.38*** -0.41*** -0.35*** -0.39*** -0.42*** 
Self-employed -0.25* -0.26 -0.36 -0.26* -0.24* -0.26 -0.36 -0.25* -0.26 -0.36 
Sector of economy (ref. tertiary) 
Primary  0.01 -0.11 0.15 0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.15 0.01 -0.11 0.15 
Secondary  0.15** 0.11 0.07 0.14** 0.15** 0.11 0.07 0.15** 0.11 0.07 
Previous N of jobs 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 
Controls           
Experience of interruption -13.61 -13.21 -14.25 -13.62 -13.59 -12.95 -14.23 -13.60 -13.20 -14.25 
Missing on socio-economic 
origin 
0.18** 0.32** 0.12 0.18** 0.19** 0.33** 0.12 0.18** 0.33** 0.12 
Missing on residence area -0.08 0.02 -0.16 -0.09 -0.08 0.04 -0.15 -0.09 0.01 -0.16 
Missing on occupational class -0.10 -0.08 -0.95 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.94 -0.10 -0.08 -0.94 
Missing on authoritative 
position 
-13.30 -13.04 -14.35 -13.26 -13.27 -12.78 -14.34 -13.30 -13.03 -14.35 
Missing on self-employed           
Missing on sector of economy 0.36** 0.07 0.41** 0.36** 0.37** 0.08 0.42** 0.36** 0.08 0.41** 
Approximate education 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.07 
GGS residence area in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg 
-0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 
Note: Linked GGS (2004) and EES (2005) data; own calculations. Significance level: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. LM=labor market. 
  
255 
Appendix F Permissions 
 
Document Number: 23610 Version: 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RP 
8/14/15 
 
_X_ ASA allows reproduction of its material for teaching and research purposes without permission 
and without fee. This policy allows instructors and educational institutions to photocopy isolated 
articles for nonprofit classroom or library reserve. Although ASA holds the copyright to the 
material listed, we have determined that this policy covers your request. This policy allows uses 
such as: 
• Reproduction for classroom use without fee to students 
• Short-run research reports distributed without fee or at cost 
• Use in unpublished dissertations, or dissertations placed in a non-reviewed institutional 
repository. Dissertation authors may post working versions of their papers on their 
personal web sites and non-peer-reviewed repositories. (If the dissertation is 
published at a later date, permission will be required from ASA at that time.) 
• Unpublished non-profit research. (If the research is published at a later date, 
permission will be required from ASA at that time.) 
• Electronic requests in this category must abide by the following conditions: online use is 
limited to a secure or password protected server for a maximum of one year; digital 
rights management (DRM) should be utilized to prevent unauthorized reproduction. 
Posting for longer than one year requires an additional request. 
 
 __ ASA Code of Ethics. You have permission from the ASA to use the ASA Code of Ethics in your 
work. 
 
 
 
 
__ Copyright has expired. This material is now in the public domain. ASA journal articles 
published prior to 1964 are now in the public domain and may be used without permission. 
Material published on or after January 1, 1964 has a copyright term of 95 years, during which 
time the ASA must be contacted for permission to reprint. 
 
 
   _ Material to be reused is less than 200 words. ASA considers short passages of 200 words or 
less as fair use and does not require permission for such use, such as abstracts. 
 
 
 __ Author's own work. An author of ASA copyrighted material may use her/his own material 
without permission in any new volume of which s/he is sole author or editor. 
 
 
 __ ASA’s term of copyright has expired. Copyright is now held by the original author’s heirs. For 
material published between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1977, if the original author(s) 
died within 28 years of initial publication, copyright permission may be required from his/her 
heirs. 
 
If you need additional information, contact: 
ASA Reprint and Permissions Services 
American Sociological Association 
1430 K Street NW,  
Suite 600, Washington, DC 20005 
(202) 383-9005 x336; fax (202) 527-7879; permissions@asanet.org 
 
Material Requested:  
“Elite Opportunity in Transitional 
Economies”  
Andrew G. Walder 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, 
No. 6 (Dec., 2003), Figure 1 pg. 905, 
Figure 2 pg. 907 
Material to Appear In: 
PhD Thesis 
European University Institute 
Yuliya Kosyakova 
Via dei Roccettini 9 
50015 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy 
 
 
 
Freitag,	30.	Oktober	2015	um	08:29:54	Mi;eleuropäische	Normalzeit
Page	1	of	2
Betreﬀ: RE:	permission	request
Datum: Donnerstag,	29.	Oktober	2015	um	13:28:09	Mi@eleuropäische	Normalzeit
Von: Gennady	Lukichev
An: Kosyakova,	Yuliya
CC: RussianENIC@sci.pfu.edu.ru
Dear  Yuliya,
We have no objection to the use of this information.
Please note that in the education system since that time there have been changes. They are reflected in the present
description, posted on the website  http://www.russianenic.ru
Best regards,
Gennady LUKICHEV
Director
National Information Center on Academic Recognition and Mobility
Tel. 007 495 9582881, 9550818; Fax: 07 495 4331511
http://www.russianenic.ru/
27.10.2015, 23:51:39 пользователь Kosyakova, Yuliya (Yuliya.Kosyakova@EUI.eu) написал:
Dear	Sir	or	Madame,
	
I	a	PhD	student	in	European	University	InsUtute	and	I	would	like	to	ask	for	permission	to	use	and
reprint	adapted	version	of	the	ﬁgures	on	Russian	educaUon	system	(version	published	in	the	year
2012)	in	my	PhD	thesis.
Kindest	regards,
Yuliya	Kosyakova
	
________________
 
Yuliya Kosyakova (MSc)
 
- Research Scientist -
Department of Political and Social Sciences (SPS) /
Comparative Life Course & Inequality Research Center
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana - Via dei Roccettini 9
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy
 
Office: Villa San Felice, SF 013
Tel:       +39 055 4685 303
E-Mail: yuliya.kosyakova@eui.eu
Web:    www.kosyakova.org
 
 
The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged
material. Any review, retransmission, dissemination, distribution, forwarding, or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this
information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited without the express permission of the sender. If you
received this communication in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.
30.10.15, 09:03RightsLink Printable License
Seite 1 von 2https://s100.copyright.com/App/PrintableLicenseFrame.jsp?publish…6-8db3-48a1-9fd7-1fdf6b243fb4%20%20&targetPage=printablelicense
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LICENSE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Oct 30, 2015
This is a License Agreement between Yuliya Kosyakova ("You") and Oxford University
Press ("Oxford University Press") provided by Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC"). The
license consists of your order details, the terms and conditions provided by Oxford
University Press, and the payment terms and conditions.
All payments must be made in full to CCC. For payment instructions, please see
information listed at the bottom of this form.
License Number 3738661088648
License date Oct 30, 2015
Licensed content publisher Oxford University Press
Licensed content publication European Sociological Review
Licensed content title Horizontal and Vertical Gender Segregation in Russia—Changes
upon Labour Market Entry before and after the Collapse of the
Soviet Regime:
Licensed content author Yuliya Kosyakova, Dmitry Kurakin, Hans-Peter Blossfeld
Licensed content date 10/01/2015
Type of Use Thesis/Dissertation
Institution name None
Title of your work The regime change and social inequality: Educational and job
careers in the Soviet and post-Soviet Era
Publisher of your work n/a
Expected publication date Feb 2016
Permissions cost 0.00 EUR
Value added tax 0.00 EUR
Total 0.00 EUR
Total 0.00 EUR
Terms and Conditions
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR REPRODUCTION OF MATERIAL
FROM AN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS JOURNAL
1. Use of the material is restricted to the type of use specified in your order details.
2. This permission covers the use of the material in the English language in the following
territory: world. If you have requested additional permission to translate this material, the
terms and conditions of this reuse will be set out in clause 12.
3. This permission is limited to the particular use authorized in (1) above and does not allow
you to sanction its use elsewhere in any other format other than specified above, nor does it
apply to quotations, images, artistic works etc that have been reproduced from other sources
which may be part of the material to be used.
4. No alteration, omission or addition is made to the material without our written consent.
30.10.15, 09:03RightsLink Printable License
Seite 2 von 2https://s100.copyright.com/App/PrintableLicenseFrame.jsp?publis…6-8db3-48a1-9fd7-1fdf6b243fb4%20%20&targetPage=printablelicense
Permission must be re-cleared with Oxford University Press if/when you decide to reprint.
5. The following credit line appears wherever the material is used: author, title, journal, year,
volume, issue number, pagination, by permission of Oxford University Press or the
sponsoring society if the journal is a society journal. Where a journal is being published on
behalf of a learned society, the details of that society must be included in the credit line.
6. For the reproduction of a full article from an Oxford University Press journal for whatever
purpose, the corresponding author of the material concerned should be informed of the
proposed use. Contact details for the corresponding authors of all Oxford University Press
journal contact can be found alongside either the abstract or full text of the article concerned,
accessible from www.oxfordjournals.org Should there be a problem clearing these rights,
please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
7. If the credit line or acknowledgement in our publication indicates that any of the figures,
images or photos was reproduced, drawn or modified from an earlier source it will be
necessary for you to clear this permission with the original publisher as well. If this
permission has not been obtained, please note that this material cannot be included in your
publication/photocopies.
8. While you may exercise the rights licensed immediately upon issuance of the license at
the end of the licensing process for the transaction, provided that you have disclosed
complete and accurate details of your proposed use, no license is finally effective unless and
until full payment is received from you (either by Oxford University Press or by Copyright
Clearance Center (CCC)) as provided in CCC's Billing and Payment terms and conditions. If
full payment is not received on a timely basis, then any license preliminarily granted shall be
deemed automatically revoked and shall be void as if never granted. Further, in the event
that you breach any of these terms and conditions or any of CCC's Billing and Payment
terms and conditions, the license is automatically revoked and shall be void as if never
granted. Use of materials as described in a revoked license, as well as any use of the
materials beyond the scope of an unrevoked license, may constitute copyright infringement
and Oxford University Press reserves the right to take any and all action to protect its
copyright in the materials.
9. This license is personal to you and may not be sublicensed, assigned or transferred by you
to any other person without Oxford University Press’s written permission.
10. Oxford University Press reserves all rights not specifically granted in the combination of
(i) the license details provided by you and accepted in the course of this licensing
transaction, (ii) these terms and conditions and (iii) CCC’s Billing and Payment terms and
conditions.
11. You hereby indemnify and agree to hold harmless Oxford University Press and CCC, and
their respective officers, directors, employs and agents, from and against any and all claims
arising out of your use of the licensed material other than as specifically authorized pursuant
to this license.
12. Other Terms and Conditions:
v1.4
Questions? customercare@copyright.com or +1-855-239-3415 (toll free in the US) or
+1-978-646-2777.
30.10.15, 09:00RightsLink Printable License
Seite 1 von 2https://s100.copyright.com/App/PrintableLicenseFrame.jsp?publis…-bd35-412d-9969-03b1e623acf0%20%20&targetPage=printablelicense
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LICENSE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Oct 30, 2015
This is a License Agreement between Yuliya Kosyakova ("You") and Oxford University
Press ("Oxford University Press") provided by Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC"). The
license consists of your order details, the terms and conditions provided by Oxford
University Press, and the payment terms and conditions.
All payments must be made in full to CCC. For payment instructions, please see
information listed at the bottom of this form.
License Number 3738660964255
License date Oct 30, 2015
Licensed content publisher Oxford University Press
Licensed content publication European Sociological Review
Licensed content title Horizontal and Vertical Gender Segregation in Russia—Changes
upon Labour Market Entry before and after the Collapse of the
Soviet Regime:
Licensed content author Yuliya Kosyakova, Dmitry Kurakin, Hans-Peter Blossfeld
Licensed content date 10/01/2015
Type of Use Thesis/Dissertation
Institution name None
Title of your work The regime change and social inequality: Educational and job
careers in the Soviet and post-Soviet Era
Publisher of your work n/a
Expected publication date Feb 2016
Permissions cost 0.00 EUR
Value added tax 0.00 EUR
Total 0.00 EUR
Total 0.00 EUR
Terms and Conditions
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR REPRODUCTION OF MATERIAL
FROM AN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS JOURNAL
1. Use of the material is restricted to the type of use specified in your order details.
2. This permission covers the use of the material in the English language in the following
territory: world. If you have requested additional permission to translate this material, the
terms and conditions of this reuse will be set out in clause 12.
3. This permission is limited to the particular use authorized in (1) above and does not allow
you to sanction its use elsewhere in any other format other than specified above, nor does it
apply to quotations, images, artistic works etc that have been reproduced from other sources
which may be part of the material to be used.
4. No alteration, omission or addition is made to the material without our written consent.
30.10.15, 09:00RightsLink Printable License
Seite 2 von 2https://s100.copyright.com/App/PrintableLicenseFrame.jsp?publis…-bd35-412d-9969-03b1e623acf0%20%20&targetPage=printablelicense
Permission must be re-cleared with Oxford University Press if/when you decide to reprint.
5. The following credit line appears wherever the material is used: author, title, journal, year,
volume, issue number, pagination, by permission of Oxford University Press or the
sponsoring society if the journal is a society journal. Where a journal is being published on
behalf of a learned society, the details of that society must be included in the credit line.
6. For the reproduction of a full article from an Oxford University Press journal for whatever
purpose, the corresponding author of the material concerned should be informed of the
proposed use. Contact details for the corresponding authors of all Oxford University Press
journal contact can be found alongside either the abstract or full text of the article concerned,
accessible from www.oxfordjournals.org Should there be a problem clearing these rights,
please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
7. If the credit line or acknowledgement in our publication indicates that any of the figures,
images or photos was reproduced, drawn or modified from an earlier source it will be
necessary for you to clear this permission with the original publisher as well. If this
permission has not been obtained, please note that this material cannot be included in your
publication/photocopies.
8. While you may exercise the rights licensed immediately upon issuance of the license at
the end of the licensing process for the transaction, provided that you have disclosed
complete and accurate details of your proposed use, no license is finally effective unless and
until full payment is received from you (either by Oxford University Press or by Copyright
Clearance Center (CCC)) as provided in CCC's Billing and Payment terms and conditions. If
full payment is not received on a timely basis, then any license preliminarily granted shall be
deemed automatically revoked and shall be void as if never granted. Further, in the event
that you breach any of these terms and conditions or any of CCC's Billing and Payment
terms and conditions, the license is automatically revoked and shall be void as if never
granted. Use of materials as described in a revoked license, as well as any use of the
materials beyond the scope of an unrevoked license, may constitute copyright infringement
and Oxford University Press reserves the right to take any and all action to protect its
copyright in the materials.
9. This license is personal to you and may not be sublicensed, assigned or transferred by you
to any other person without Oxford University Press’s written permission.
10. Oxford University Press reserves all rights not specifically granted in the combination of
(i) the license details provided by you and accepted in the course of this licensing
transaction, (ii) these terms and conditions and (iii) CCC’s Billing and Payment terms and
conditions.
11. You hereby indemnify and agree to hold harmless Oxford University Press and CCC, and
their respective officers, directors, employs and agents, from and against any and all claims
arising out of your use of the licensed material other than as specifically authorized pursuant
to this license.
12. Other Terms and Conditions:
v1.4
Questions? customercare@copyright.com or +1-855-239-3415 (toll free in the US) or
+1-978-646-2777.
30.10.15, 09:02RightsLink Printable License
Seite 1 von 2https://s100.copyright.com/CustomerAdmin/PLF.jsp?ref=59390089-41ce-4ea1-8ac7-76050d9186a1
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LICENSE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Oct 30, 2015
This is a License Agreement between Yuliya Kosyakova ("You") and Oxford University
Press ("Oxford University Press") provided by Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC"). The
license consists of your order details, the terms and conditions provided by Oxford
University Press, and the payment terms and conditions.
All payments must be made in full to CCC. For payment instructions, please see
information listed at the bottom of this form.
License Number 3738660793167
License date Oct 30, 2015
Licensed content publisher Oxford University Press
Licensed content publication European Sociological Review
Licensed content title Horizontal and Vertical Gender Segregation in Russia—Changes
upon Labour Market Entry before and after the Collapse of the
Soviet Regime:
Licensed content author Yuliya Kosyakova, Dmitry Kurakin, Hans-Peter Blossfeld
Licensed content date 10/01/2015
Type of Use Thesis/Dissertation
Institution name None
Title of your work The regime change and social inequality: Educational and job
careers in the Soviet and post-Soviet Era
Publisher of your work n/a
Expected publication date Feb 2016
Permissions cost 0.00 EUR
Value added tax 0.00 EUR
Total 0.00 EUR
Total 0.00 EUR
Terms and Conditions
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR REPRODUCTION OF MATERIAL
FROM AN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS JOURNAL
1. Use of the material is restricted to the type of use specified in your order details.
2. This permission covers the use of the material in the English language in the following
territory: world. If you have requested additional permission to translate this material, the
terms and conditions of this reuse will be set out in clause 12.
3. This permission is limited to the particular use authorized in (1) above and does not allow
you to sanction its use elsewhere in any other format other than specified above, nor does it
apply to quotations, images, artistic works etc that have been reproduced from other sources
which may be part of the material to be used.
4. No alteration, omission or addition is made to the material without our written consent.
30.10.15, 09:02RightsLink Printable License
Seite 2 von 2https://s100.copyright.com/CustomerAdmin/PLF.jsp?ref=59390089-41ce-4ea1-8ac7-76050d9186a1
Permission must be re-cleared with Oxford University Press if/when you decide to reprint.
5. The following credit line appears wherever the material is used: author, title, journal, year,
volume, issue number, pagination, by permission of Oxford University Press or the
sponsoring society if the journal is a society journal. Where a journal is being published on
behalf of a learned society, the details of that society must be included in the credit line.
6. For the reproduction of a full article from an Oxford University Press journal for whatever
purpose, the corresponding author of the material concerned should be informed of the
proposed use. Contact details for the corresponding authors of all Oxford University Press
journal contact can be found alongside either the abstract or full text of the article concerned,
accessible from www.oxfordjournals.org Should there be a problem clearing these rights,
please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
7. If the credit line or acknowledgement in our publication indicates that any of the figures,
images or photos was reproduced, drawn or modified from an earlier source it will be
necessary for you to clear this permission with the original publisher as well. If this
permission has not been obtained, please note that this material cannot be included in your
publication/photocopies.
8. While you may exercise the rights licensed immediately upon issuance of the license at
the end of the licensing process for the transaction, provided that you have disclosed
complete and accurate details of your proposed use, no license is finally effective unless and
until full payment is received from you (either by Oxford University Press or by Copyright
Clearance Center (CCC)) as provided in CCC's Billing and Payment terms and conditions. If
full payment is not received on a timely basis, then any license preliminarily granted shall be
deemed automatically revoked and shall be void as if never granted. Further, in the event
that you breach any of these terms and conditions or any of CCC's Billing and Payment
terms and conditions, the license is automatically revoked and shall be void as if never
granted. Use of materials as described in a revoked license, as well as any use of the
materials beyond the scope of an unrevoked license, may constitute copyright infringement
and Oxford University Press reserves the right to take any and all action to protect its
copyright in the materials.
9. This license is personal to you and may not be sublicensed, assigned or transferred by you
to any other person without Oxford University Press’s written permission.
10. Oxford University Press reserves all rights not specifically granted in the combination of
(i) the license details provided by you and accepted in the course of this licensing
transaction, (ii) these terms and conditions and (iii) CCC’s Billing and Payment terms and
conditions.
11. You hereby indemnify and agree to hold harmless Oxford University Press and CCC, and
their respective officers, directors, employs and agents, from and against any and all claims
arising out of your use of the licensed material other than as specifically authorized pursuant
to this license.
12. Other Terms and Conditions:
v1.4
Questions? customercare@copyright.com or +1-855-239-3415 (toll free in the US) or
+1-978-646-2777.
27/10/2015 
Herewith I, David Bills, confirm that I collaborated with Yuliya Kosyakova on the following 
articles: 
 
Bills, D., and Kosyakova, Y. (in press). Adult education. In: G. Ritzer (Ed.) Wiley 
Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology (S: in press). Wiley-Blackwell, , 
(accepted Mai 13, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
I agree with using this work as an integral part of her thesis.  
 
 
 
___ ______________________ 
(Signature) 


27/10/2015 
Herewith I, Sandra Buchholz, confirm that I collaborated with Yuliya Kosyakova on the 
following articles: 
 
Triventi, M., Skopek, J., Kosyakova, Y., Buchholz, S., and Blossfeld, H.-P. (2015). 
Gender Inequalities at Labor Market Entry: A Comparative View from 
eduLIFE Project. In: Comparative Social Research, 31 
Blossfeld, H.-P., Buchholz, S., Dämmrich, J., Kilpi-Jakonen, E., Kosyakova, Y., 
Skopek, J., Triventi, M., and Vono de Vilhena, D. (2015). Gender Differences 
at Labor Market Entry: The Effect of Changing Educational Pathways and 
Institutional Structures. In: H.-P. Blossfeld, J. Skopek, M. Triventi, and S. 
Buchholz (Eds.), Gender, Education and Employment: An International 
Comparison of School-To-Work Transitions (S: 3-38). Cheltenham, 
UK/Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Blossfeld, H.-P., Skopek, J., Kosyakova, Y., Triventi, M., and Buchholz, S. (2015). 
Gender, Education, and Employment: Lessons Learned from the Comparative 
Perspective. In: H.-P. Blossfeld, J. Skopek, M. Triventi, and S. Buchholz 
(Eds.), Gender, Education and Employment: An International Comparison of 
School-To-Work Transitions (S: 347-382). Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, 
USA: Edward Elgar. 
 
 
 
 
I agree with using this work as an integral part of her thesis.  
 
 
 
_________________________ 
(Signature) 








